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American public policy debates about the legal regulation of the 
family are often framed as a contest between liberals and 
conservatives, battling out their different political visions in gladiator-
like performances.  The dividing lines are easily drawn on issues 
ranging from welfare to abortion to same sex marriage: liberals with 
their emphasis on equality and an egalitarian family line up in favor, 
while conservatives with their emphasis on morality and the 
traditional family stand opposed.  While this divide does characterize 
much political debate, it is by no means up to the task of explaining 
contemporary public policy debates over the legal regulation of the 
family.  Indeed, a focus on this divide risks obscuring an equally 
important clash of political visions structuring these public policy 
debates, namely, the divisions within conservative political discourse.  
To risk stating the obvious—yet remarkably overlooked in analyses of 
contemporary family law and policy—conservatives do not always 
agree with one another, even on questions of the family.  Rather, the 
clashes, cleavages, and contradictions within social, fiscal, and 
libertarian conservative political discourse, and the ebbs and flows in 
the relative power of each of these visions, have produced much of 
the current constellation of laws and policies regulating the family. 
This Article examines these contesting conservatisms in public 
policy debates over the legal regulation of the family.  It does so by 
focusing on the question of the privatization of dependency within 
the family.  Family law has always involved the public enforcement of 
private responsibilities of individual family members.  But, in an era of 
privatization and the emergence of a neo-liberal state, characterized 
by a reduction in government social spending and a transfer of these 
responsibilities to the private sphere,1 it might be expected to have a 
                                                          
 1. This process of restructuring and retracting the Keynesian welfare state has 
been extensively documented, although variously labeled within the literature. 
Compare PAUL PIERSON, DISMANTLING THE WELFARE STATE?: REAGAN, THATCHER, AND 
THE POLITICS OF RETRENCHMENT 17 (1994) (describing restructuring as the politics of 
retrenchment, which the author defines as “policy changes that either cut social 
expenditure, restructure welfare state programs to conform more closely to the 
residual welfare state model, or alter the political environment in ways that enhance 
the probability of such outcomes in the future”), with NEIL GILBERT, TRANSFORMATION 
OF THE WELFARE STATE: THE SILENT SURRENDER OF PUBLIC RESPONSIBILITY 45 (2002) 
(describing a similar restructuring process as a shift from a largely social democratic 
state to a more market oriented body, which the author calls “the enabling state”).  
He describes the enabling state as involving an increased emphasis on the private 
delivery of public goods and “less emphasis on providing income support to people 
out of work than does the welfare state and more weight on fostering social inclusion, 
mainly through active participation in the labor force.”  Id.  Others have described 
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newfound importance.  Indeed, in many western nations, family law 
has become a more important regulatory instrument for the 
enforcement of private support obligations for economically 
dependent family members.2 More specifically, society has called 
upon family law to address the economic needs of women and 
children at precisely the moment when it is dismantling the welfare 
state and public financial assistance has become increasingly scarce. 
In the United States, however, this privatization has been partial.  
On one hand, a very public debate about welfare reform has been all 
about privatization.  The privatization of child support obligations has 
                                                          
this process of restructuring as privatization.  See, e.g., STEVEN RATHGEB SMITH AND 
MICHAEL LIPSKY, NONPROFITS FOR HIRE: THE WELFARE STATE IN THE AGE OF 
CONTRACTING 188 (1993) (describing privatization as “a broad policy impulse which 
seeks to change the balance between public and private responsibility in public 
policy”); see also PRIVATIZATION, LAW AND THE CHALLENGE TO FEMINISM 4 (Brenda 
Cossman & Judy Fudge eds., 2002) [hereinafter PRIVATIZATION] (describing 
privatization as capturing “the process of transition from welfare state to neo-liberal 
state as the material base upon which the Keynesian compromise rested has been 
undermined and its mode of governance transformed”).  See generally Isabella 
Bakker, Introduction: The Gendered Foundations of Restructuring in Canada, in 
RETHINKING RESTRUCTURING: GENDER AND CHANGE IN CANADA (Isabella Bakker ed., 
1991) (explaining that the neoliberal approach emphasizes the allocation of 
resources through markets, which reflect the motivation of individual self-interest); 
Gøsta Esping-Anderson, After the Golden Age?: Welfare State Dilemmas in a Global 
Economy, in WELFARE STATES IN TRANSITION: NATIONAL ADAPTATIONS IN GLOBAL 
ECONOMIES 23 (Gøsta Esping-Anderson ed., 1996) (noting that, in most countries, 
there have not been radical changes in the welfare state, though privatization is slowly 
gaining strength); JACOB HACKER, THE DIVIDED WELFARE STATE: THE BATTLE OVER 
PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SOCIAL BENEFITS IN THE UNITED STATES (2002) (examining 
alternative social welfare approaches); JOEL HANDLER, DOWN FROM BUREAUCRACY: THE 
AMBIGUITY OF PRIVATIZATION AND EMPOWERMENT (1996) (claiming that 
decentralization and privatization are now worldwide movements); MICHAEL B. KATZ, 
THE PRICE OF CITIZENSHIP: REDEFINING THE AMERICAN WELFARE STATE (2001)  (insisting 
that the American welfare state is both a public and private structure); PAUL 
KRUGMAN, THE GREAT UNRAVELING: LOSING OUR WAY IN THE NEW CENTURY (2003) 
(condemning the Bush administration and its fiscal policies, including the welfare 
state);  PAUL PIERSON, THE NEW POLITICS OF THE WELFARE STATE (2001) (stating that 
social conflict surrounds the welfare states of affluent democracies); JOSEPH E. 
STIGLITZ, THE ROARING NINETIES: A NEW HISTORY OF THE WORLD’S MOST PROSPEROUS 
DECADE (2003) (detailing the inconsistencies of American welfare policy and its shift 
toward privatization); Barbara L. Bezdek, Contractual Welfare: Non-Accountability 
and Diminished Democracy in Local Government Contracts for Welfare-to-Work 
Services, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1559 (2001) (arguing that welfare reform and 
privatization has led to the erosion of administrative law structures and government 
accountability); Martha T. McCluskey, Efficiency and Social Citizenship: Challenging 
the Neoliberal Attack on the Welfare State, 78 IND. L.J. 783 (2003) (condemning 
neoliberalism as promoting a racialized, genderized, and class-biased vision for 
society); Panel Discussion, The Changing Shape of Government, 28 FORDHAM URB. 
L.J. 1319 (2001) (discussing the positive aspects of privatization and government 
accountability as the welfare state shifts toward privatization); Lisa Phillips, Taxing the 
Market Citizen: Fiscal Policy and Inequality in an Age of Privatization, 63 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS., Autumn 2000, at 111 (using the Canadian system to illustrate that 
privatization may perpetuate gender inequalities). 
 2. See PRIVATIZATION, supra note 1, at 4 (recognizing the shift toward 
privatization in Canada and its effects on women and children). 
3
Crossman: Contesting Conservatisms, Family Feuds and the Privatization of D
Published by Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law, 2005
418 JOURNAL OF GENDER, SOCIAL POLICY & THE LAW  [Vol. 13:3 
 
been identified as an explicit policy objective of welfare reform, and 
the literature has debated the appropriateness of this privatization.3  
However, this form of privatization is not evident in other family 
support obligations, where there has been very little expansion of the 
scope or content of family obligations.  In contrast to the 
developments in other jurisdictions where there has been a 
broadening of definitions of spouse, domestic partners and marriage 
for the purposes of support obligations, as well as a significant 
expansion of the support obligations often quite explicitly in pursuit 
of savings to government spending, both the scope and content of 
family support obligations (other than child support) has remained 
relatively unchanged.  The story of the privatization of public 
responsibility in American family law is then a story of partial 
privatization. 
This Article seeks to analyze some of the factors underlying this 
partial privatization.  Why, given the extent to which the United States 
has lead the way in the privatization of a range of once public goods 
ranging from education and environmental regulation to electricity 
and prisons, is the privatization of the family so partial?  Why have 
some areas of family law been amenable to privatization, while others 
have been resistant?  The question has been surprisingly unaddressed.  
The legal literature on privatization in the United States is unhelpful 
in addressing this question, since it pays such scant attention to the 
family.  Privatization overwhelmingly refers to the delegation of once 
governmental services to the private sector—specifically, to the 
market (private enterprise) and the voluntary sector (non-profit 
charitable actors).4  The idea of delegating public goods and services 
to the family is all but invisible.5  But, even the social welfare and 
                                                          
 3. See infra note 11 and accompanying text (detailing the debate over the 
privatization of what has traditionally been considered public responsibility). 
 4. See, e.g., Jack M. Beermann, Privatization and Political Accountability, 28 
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1507, 1508-30 (2001) (admitting that privatization is difficult to 
define and dividing the concept of privatization into various categories, touching 
briefly on the role of the family in privatization); Ronald A. Cass, Privatization: 
Politics, Law, and Theory, 71 MARQ. L. REV. 449, 450 (1988) (explaining that in the 
United States, privatization is not a clear-cut term, though it generally refers to the 
idea that government should have less involvement in particular activities); Matthew 
Diller, Introduction: Redefining the Public Sector: Accountability and Democracy in 
the Era of Privatization, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1307, 1309 (2001) (explaining that 
privatization may take many forms and emanates from skepticism that the 
government is able to solve problems); Martha Minow, Public and Private 
Partnerships: Accounting for the New Religion, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1229, 1230 
(explaining that the new form of privatization calls for market-style competition in 
providing social services). 
 5. See Martha Albertson Fineman, Cracking the Foundational Myths: 
Independence, Autonomy, and Self- Sufficiency, 8 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 
13 (1999) (detailing the exclusion of the family as a site of analysis in mainstream 
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family literature, which has observed the privatization of dependency 
in the family, has offered little by way of explanation for its partial 
nature. 
A notable exception is found in the work of Grace Blumberg, who 
has observed that unlike other Western nations, in which private 
rights and obligations have expanded as public welfare rights 
contract, in the United States, there has been no similar expansion of 
private rights and obligations.6 She has suggested that this is due to 
the fact that unlike other Western nations, the United States never 
had a particularly robust welfare state, nor an ethic of collective 
responsibility for the social welfare of its citizenry.7  As a result, the 
dismantling of the more limited welfare state has not lead to a 
concomitant expansion of private rights in order to ensure the basic 
welfare of its citizens.8  This is no doubt an important part of the 
story—if there is but a limited welfare state and no sense of social 
responsibility, then the dismantling of welfare need not be 
accompanied by a transfer of social responsibility to the private realm 
                                                          
legal literature).  “Feminist legal theorists can legitimately complain that most 
mainstream work fails to take into account institutions of intimacy, such as the 
family.”  Id. at 13 According to Fineman, the family is typically treated separately from 
the market and the state.  Id at 13-14. 
 6. See Grace Ganz Blumberg, The Regularization of Nonmarital Cohabitation: 
Rights and Responsibilities in the American Welfare State, 76 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
1265, 1267-69 (2001) (tracing the laws of cohabitation in the United States and 
noting that as the government attempts to defend marriage, private employers more 
frequently provide benefits to non-marital spouses). 
 7. See id. at 1270-71 (arguing that the United States has never achieved the 
status of a fully developed welfare state because it has never committed itself to doing 
so). 
 8. See id. at 1307 (suggesting that part of the explanation lies in the invisibility 
of the public welfare  function of the family). 
Although the family plays a greater role in the well-being of its members in 
the United States than it does in nations that have a more highly developed 
and transparent public welfare system, the American state's relatively weak 
and cloaked role as a provider of social welfare seems to obscure the welfare 
function of the American family. 
Id.  According to Blumberg, more fully developed welfare states tend to be more self 
conscious about the welfare role of the family, and in moments of welfare 
retrenchment, have shown a greater willingness to expand the realm of private 
obligations.  Id. 
Unlike most other Western countries, the United States has never committed 
itself to the comprehensive goals of a fully developed welfare state.  
Consequently, it is not ordinarily thought to be the role of the government to 
guarantee the social welfare of its citizenry.  This perspective may have 
affected the way the United States has conceptualized and rationalized family 
law obligations, as compared to countries that have experienced the content 
and ethos of a more fully realized welfare state.  Specifically, American family 
law does not recognize or acknowledge the extent to which the law of private 
family obligations serves a public function. 
Id. at 1308. 
5
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of the family. 
In this Article, I seek to supplement Blumberg’s analysis, arguing 
that there are other important factors at play in the partial 
privatization of American family law.  Public policy debates around 
the family are characterized by a number of very different visions of 
the family; different conservative visions of the family with very 
different ideas about privatization.  Privatization as the transfer of 
public goods and services to the private sphere of the family is one of 
at least three distinct visions of privatization of the family.  A second 
understanding of privatization of the legal regulation of the family 
involves the shift from public norms to private choice.  American 
family law has been said to be characterized by an increased 
individualization of the family and a heightened emphasis on private 
decision-making.9  Within this private choice vision of privatization, 
individuals should be able to decide for themselves how to structure 
their intimate relationships, and how to restructure them if and when 
these relationships break down.  A third understanding of 
privatization of the family involves a return to the ‘traditional family’ 
and the sanctity of marriage.  In this social conservative vision, the 
family with its highly gendered roles is envisioned as the natural site 
for a range of care-giving responsibilities.  This family needs to be 
restored to its once privileged position. 
In this article, I argue that these divergent visions of family and 
privatization, their convergences and contradictions, are factors 
animating the public policy debates over the legal regulation of the 
family.  The three visions of privatization can each be associated with 
political positions often labeled ‘conservative’: the fiscal conservatism 
of privatization as transferring once public goods to the private 
sphere; the libertarian conservatism of privatization as private choice, 
and the social conservatism of privatization as the traditional family.10  
In my view, it is important to pay closer attention to these gaps and 
fissures within “conservative” political discourse.  The conflations and 
conflicts between these three visions of privatization hold key insights 
into the family and welfare public policy debates and help explain the 
partial privatization of American family law.  Privatization as the 
                                                          
 9. See, e.g., Carl E. Schneider, Moral Discourse and the Transformation of 
American Family Law, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1803 (1985); Jana B. Singer, The Privatization 
of Family Law, 1992 WIS. L. REV. 1443 (1992). 
 10. See infra notes 11-52 and accompanying text (explaining that two of these 
three visions of privatization, although associated with conservative thought, actually 
derive from classical liberalism).  Further, the vision of privatization as private choice 
is a position that many progressive thinkers adhere to as well.  Id.  My point is that 
these three visions of privatization can be associated with positions often identified 
with conservative politics. 
6
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transfer of once public goods and services to the family is sometimes 
supported by and other times constrained by privatization as private 
choice and privatization as the restoration of the traditional family.  
The privatization of support obligations has occurred only to the 
extent that it can be made consistent with the social conservative 
vision of the family.  Where these visions of privatization converge 
(child support), the scope and content of family law obligations have 
been expanded.  But, where these visions diverge (same-sex 
marriage), the continuing discursive power of the social conservative 
vision of privatization has precluded any such expansion.  The story of 
public policy reform is then as much a story of the conflicts between 
and among conservatives, as it is a conflict between liberals and 
conservatives. 
The paper begins with an exploration of the theoretical differences 
between these different visions of the family and the contradictory 
implications for the regulation of the family.  It illustrates the extent 
to which these divergent approaches to family and privatization 
correspond to fiscal and social conservative political philosophies, and 
their fundamental differences in assumptions about family, gender 
and dependency.  The paper then turns to consider three issues in 
the federal legal regulation of the family as concrete instantiations of 
the contradictions: child support, welfare reform, and marriage. First, 
it examines federal legislative efforts to strengthen child support 
obligations and enforcement.  The paper argues that initial efforts 
were primarily motivated by a fiscal impulse of privatizing the costs of 
supporting families by shifting responsibility from the state to 
individual families—specifically, to fathers.  However, more recent 
public policy initiatives have begun to place greater emphasis on 
promoting “responsible fatherhood,” a vision more consistent with 
the social conservative restoration of the traditional family.  Secondly, 
the paper analyses the restructuring of welfare eligibility and 
entitlements for single mothers.  It traces a similar shift from fiscal 
conservative emphasis on reconstituting dependent single mothers 
into self-reliant workers to a social conservative emphasis on 
promoting marriage and the traditional family as a solution of welfare 
dependency.  Thirdly, it explores federal initiatives to defend the 
traditional definition of marriage from the challenges by same-sex 
couples.  In contrast to both child support and welfare entitlements, 
public policy debates regarding marriage are overwhelmingly 
dominated by social conservatives, and there is virtually no discussion 
of the potential fiscal advantages of broadening the scope and content 
of family obligations in the context of same-sex relationships.  
Although no one model of the family has emerged as dominant, the 
7
Crossman: Contesting Conservatisms, Family Feuds and the Privatization of D
Published by Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law, 2005
422 JOURNAL OF GENDER, SOCIAL POLICY & THE LAW  [Vol. 13:3 
 
analysis of each of the three areas suggests that the social conservative 
model appears to be in ascendance.  The paper argues that it is the 
discursive power of this social conservative vision that has to a large 
extent precluded broader definitions of family and a more robust 
privatization of support obligations in accordance with the goals of 
fiscal conservatism or the promotion of private choice in accordance 
with the goals of libertarianism. 
I.  CONTESTING VISIONS OF PRIVATIZATION 
A.  Privatization as Transfer of Public Goods and Services to the 
Private Sector 
The privatization literature in the United States defines 
privatization, at its most general, as the transfer of public goods and 
services to the private sector.11  It is described as including a broad 
array of policies.  Jody Freeman, for example, suggests “a broad range 
of arrangements that may constitute privatization, including: “the 
complete or partial sell-off (through asset or share sales) of major 
public enterprises; (2) the deregulation of a particular industry; (3) 
the commercialization of a government department; (4) the removal 
of subsidies to producers; and (5) the assumption by private operators 
of what were formerly exclusively public services through, for 
example, contracting out.”12  For the most part, the literature has 
                                                          
 11. See JOHN D. DONAHUE, THE PRIVATIZATION DECISION: PUBLIC ENDS, PRIVATE 
MEANS 5-12 (1989) (explaining that the definition of privatization in the United 
States is quite different than privatization in the rest of the world); E.S. SAVAS, 
PRIVATIZATION: THE KEY TO BETTER GOVERNMENT 3 (1987) (terming privatization “the 
act of reducing the role of government, or increasing the role of the private sector, in 
an activity or in the ownership of assets”); Nancy Ehrenreich, The Progressive 
Potential in Privatization, 73 DENV. U. L. REV. 1235, 1236 (1996) (describing 
privatization as “returning traditional government functions to the private sphere”); 
Minow, supra note 4, at 1230 (defining privatization as “the range of efforts by 
governments to move public functions into private hands and to use market-style 
competition”); Julie A. Nice, The New Private Law: An Introduction, 73 DENV. U. L. 
REV. 993, 995 (1996) (terming privatization “New Private Law” and describing it as 
deregulation, decentralization, privatization, and contractualization); Paul Starr, The 
Meaning of Privatization, 6 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 6, 14 (1988) (suggesting that 
“privatization has come primarily to mean two things: (1) any shift of activities or 
functions from the state to the private sector; and, more specifically, (2) any shift of 
the production of goods and services from public to private”). 
 12. Jody Freeman, Extending Public Law Norms Through Privatization, 116 
HARV. L. REV. 1285, 1287 (2003) (noting that the last arrangement constituting 
privatization is the most commonly used in the United States); see also Cass, supra 
note 4, at 456-62 (describing privatization as consisting of four basic types of policies: 
divestiture, contracting out, deregulation and vouchers and tax reductions/user fees); 
Matthew Diller, Form and Substance in the Privatization of Poverty Programs, 49 
UCLA L. REV. 1739, 1741 (2002) (describing privatization).  This concept is: 
[A] cluster of related developments and proposals.  The term ‘privatization’ 
encompasses such diverse policies as creating school voucher programs, 
8
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focused on the transfer of once public goods and services to the 
private sphere of the market, increasing the role of private 
enterprise.13  It generally involves a marked preference for market 
ordering and private choice over government regulation and public 
norms.  More recently, the literature has also included considerable 
attention to the transfer of public goods and services to the voluntary 
or charitable sector.14  But little attention has been directed to a third 
sector within the private sphere, namely, the family.  While some of 
the privatization literature mentions this sector in passing,15  there has 
been very little analysis of the transfer of once public goods and 
services to the family. 
To the extent that the family has been discussed at all in the 
privatization literature, it has generally been in relation to the 
deregulation of intimate relationships.  A number of writers have 
attempted to reveal the progressive potential of privatization through 
the deregulation of personal relationships.16  But, the idea of 
privatization operating in these works is somewhat different from the 
more general emphasis on the transfer of once public goods and 
services to the private sphere.  Rather, in this context, privatization 
                                                          
contracting out the delivery of services, selling off governmental assets such as 
public housing and hospitals, replacing the Social Security system with 
individual retirement accounts, and creating private entities, such as 
homeowners’ associations or business improvement districts, endowed with 
powers traditionally associated with local government. 
Id. 
 13. But see, e.g., MARTHA MINOW, PARTNERS, NOT RIVALS: PRIVATIZATION AND THE 
PUBLIC GOOD 1-5 (2002) (demonstrating that not all of this literature depicts the 
public/private distinction as unproblematic).  Rather, many writers recognize the 
constructed and shifting nature of the distinction.  Id. 
 14. See Panel Discussion, Living with Privatization: At Work and in the 
Community, 28 FORDHAM. URB. L.J. 1397, 1412-13 (2001) (explaining that the role of 
charitable organizations in privatization has continued to intensify with the 
establishment of the White House Office of Faith-Based and Community Initiatives by 
the Bush Administration in 2001, which is intended to further promote the provision 
of social services by faith-based organizations). 
 15. See Panel Discussion, supra note 1, at 1324.  Privatization is defined as 
meaning: 
[R]elying more on the private institutions of society and less on government 
to satisfy public needs.  Society’s private institutions include: (1) the 
marketplace and organizations operating therein; (2) voluntary associations 
of all kinds; and (3) the family, which is, after all, the Original Department of 
Health, Department of Education, Department of Housing, and Department 
of Social Services. 
Id.  His subsequent, admittedly brief, discussion, however, focuses exclusively on 
markets and private enterprise.  Id. at 1324-25. 
 16. See Ehrenreich, supra note 11, at 1242-43; see also Beermann, supra note 4, 
at 1530-31 (commenting on the deregulation of intimate relationships through the 
shift to no fault divorce and an increased willingness of the courts to enforce private 
contracts); Martha M. Ertman, Contractual Purgatory for Sexual Marginorities: Not 
Heaven, but Not Hell Either, 73 DENV. U. L. REV. 1107 (1996). 
9
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denotes a shift in government regulation to encourage private choice.  
It is an understanding of privatization that draws more heavily on a 
very different understanding of privatization found in the family law 
literature, discussed in the next section below. 
This conflation of privatization and deregulation is also somewhat 
problematic in so far as the transfer of public goods and services to 
the private sector is not always commensurate with deregulation.  
While some of the literature emphasizes the idea of deregulation as 
an important component of privatization,17 others have suggested 
that privatization often involves an increase or shift in modes of 
regulation.  Some commentators have suggested that privatization is 
better characterized as “re-regulation.”18  As Daniel Farber as 
observed, “privatization, after all, is another form of regulation.”19  
This observation is particularly salient in the context of the legal 
regulation of the family where the transfer of once public goods and 
services to the private sphere involves a shift rather than a decrease in 
regulation.  For example, the increase in child support obligations 
and enforcement that has accompanied the retraction of social 
welfare has involved intensification in the regulation of individual 
family members.  Drawing parallels between the deregulation of 
certain sectors of the economy and the transformations in the legal 
regulation of the family fails to capture the ways in which privatization 
as the transfer of public responsibility to the private sphere has been 
operating within the family. 
While the idea of privatization as reconstituting once public goods 
and services as more appropriately provided by the family remains 
under theorized in general discussions of privatization, it does appear 
in some feminist work, as well as in the literature on the expansion of 
                                                          
 17. See, e.g., Cass, supra note 4, at 459-60 (identifying deregulation as one of the 
four categories of privatization).  Deregulation is defined as reducing or eliminating 
the public regulation of private actors.  Id.   It often involves an effort to increase 
competition in once heavily regulated sectors of the economy.  Id.; see also 
Beermann, supra note 4, at 1528-35. 
 18. See PRIVITIZATION, supra note 1, at 20; Sol Picciotto, Liberalization and 
Democratization: The Forum and the Hearth in the Era of Cosmopolitan Post-
Industrial Capitalism, 63 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 157  (2000); see also Freeman, 
supra note 12, at 1285. 
Instead of seeing privatization as a means of shrinking government, I imagine 
it as a mechanism for expanding government’s reach into realms traditionally 
thought private.  In other words, privatization can be a means of 
‘publicization,’ through which private actors increasingly commit themselves 
to traditionally public goals as the price of access to lucrative opportunities to 
deliver goods and services that might otherwise be provided directly by the 
state. 
Id. 
 19. See Daniel A. Farber,  Whither Socialism?, 73 DENV. U. L. REV. 1011 (1996). 
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child support obligations and the dismantling of social welfare.  For 
example, Martha Fineman’s work on the legal regulation of family has 
highlighted the role of family law in privatizing dependency,20 as well 
as the extent to which “privatization is increasingly seen as the 
solution to complicated social problems reflecting persistent 
inequality and poverty.”21  Similarly, the discourse of public policy 
reform has identified the privatization of support obligations as an 
explicit objective of welfare reform, and many commentators have 
observed the extent to which this reform constitutes a privatization of 
public responsibility.22  Anna Marie Smith, for example, has detailed 
the ways in which recent welfare reform has both “expanded 
governmental presence into the private sphere” while sharply 
reducing “the sphere of public responsibility.”23  According to Smith, 
“[t]he collective obligation to support poor mothers and their 
children is being transformed into a private familial debt . . . .”24  
Laura Morgan has similarly argued that the child support provisions 
of welfare reform have sought to privatize the once public 
responsibility of supporting poor families.25 
                                                          
 20. See, e.g., Martha L.A. Fineman, Masking Dependency: The Political Role of 
Family Rhetoric, 81 VA. L. REV. 2181, 2205 (1995) (“In the societal division of labor 
among institutions, the private family bears the burden of dependency, not the public 
state.  Resort to the state is considered a failure.  By according to the private family 
responsibility for inevitable dependency, society directs dependency away from the 
state and privatizes it.”); see also Martha Albertson Fineman, The Inevitability of 
Dependency and the Politics of Subsidy, 9 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 89 (1998). 
 21. Martha Albertson Fineman, Contract and Core, 76 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1403, 
1405 (2001). 
The rhetoric surrounding many current policy debates urges previously 
public concerns to be transferred to the magic realm of the private solution.  
From welfare reform to the construction of ideal educational or prison 
systems, the assertion is that the private market can better address historically 
public issues than can the public government. 
Id.  However, Fineman notes the unique position of the family within those debates 
about privatization, since dependency is already seen as the responsibility of the 
family.  Id.  “Therefore, the public nature of dependency is hidden, privatized within 
the family, rendering decisions about public responsibility unnecessary, except for 
those stigmatized families that ‘fail’ in meeting their responsibilities.”  Id.  at 1405-06. 
 22. See generally Tonya L. Brito, The Welfarization of Family Law, 48 U. KAN. L. 
REV. 229 (2000); David L. Chambers, Fathers, the Welfare System, and the Virtues 
and Perils of Child-Support Enforcement, 81 VA. L. REV. 2575 (1995); Deborah 
Harris, Child Support for Welfare Families: Family Policy Trapped in Its Own 
Rhetoric, 16 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 619 (1987/1988); Roger J.R. Levesque, 
Targeting “Deadbeat” Dads: The Problem with the Direction of Welfare Reform, 15 
HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL’Y 1 (1994); Laura W. Morgan, Family Law at 2000: Private 
and Public Support of the Family: From Welfare State to Poor Law, 33 FAM. L.Q. 705 
(1999); Anna Marie Smith, The Sexual Regulation Dimension of Contemporary 
Welfare Law: A Fifty State Overview, 8 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 121 (2002). 
 23. Smith, supra note 22, at 211. 
 24. Id. at 212. 
 25. See Morgan, supra note 22, at 708-09 (noting that the government more 
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B.  Privatization as Private Choice in Intimate Relationships 
In the context of family law, the dominant conception of 
privatization is one of the increasing emphasis on private decision-
making over public norms.  As Jana Singer argued in her influential 
article aptly entitled The Privatization of Family Law, “[o]ver the past 
twenty five years, family law has become increasingly privatized.  In 
virtually all doctrinal areas, private norm creation and private decision 
making have supplanted state-imposed rules and structures for 
governing family-related behavior.”26  In her view, this “preference for 
private over public ordering” has included both the substantive and 
procedural dimensions of the legal regulation of the family.27  In 
terms of substantive law, the once sharp line between marriage and 
non-marital cohabitation has been blurred; illegitimacy has been 
largely abolished, unmarried cohabitants have been provided with 
some remedies on the breakdown of their relationships through the 
use of express and implied contract doctrine, and there has been an 
increasing recognition of domestic partnership regimes.  The 
consequences of marital breakdown have similarly seen an increase in 
the ability of spouses to define their own relationships with the shift 
from fault to no-fault divorce and the ability to alter the obligations of 
marriage by contract. 
Singer suggests that this increasing preference for private over 
public ordering reflects a number of broader social trends in the legal 
regulation of the family including an increase in notions of individual 
privacy and autonomy.28  She notes that while individual privacy has 
long been important in American legal thought, in the context of the 
legal regulation of the family, the idea of privacy was generally 
ascribed to the family as a unit, rather than to its individual 
members.29  This idea began to change in the 1970s, as the Supreme 
                                                          
stringently enforces child support awards in order to shift the cost of raising children 
from the federal government back to parents). 
 26. Singer, supra note 9, at 1444. 
 27. Id. 
 28. See id. at 1446 (noting that the other factors include an emphasis on gender 
equality, the increasing influence of law and economics, and the dissociation of law 
and morality). 
 29. See id. at 1509. 
While this notion of family privacy insulated from public oversight certain 
sorts of decisions and activities that took place within families, it did not 
support private choices regarding the formation or dissolution of family 
relationships.  Indeed, the traditional notion of family privacy may have 
reinforced public control over the definition and composition of families, 
since only certain sorts of intimate groupings were considered worthy of the 
degree of autonomy that the tradition provided . . . .  In this sense, the 
traditional notion of family privacy represented not a commitment to private 
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Court “transformed the traditional notion of family privacy into a 
doctrine that focused directly on individual choice and that elevated 
to constitutionally protected status a wide range of individual 
decisions regarding marriage, parenthood and procreation.”30  
Marriage came increasingly to be viewed as a private relationship 
intended to promote individual happiness, which in turn supported 
an approach to legal regulation that emphasized privacy and 
decisional autonomy: individuals should decide for themselves when 
and how to enter into and exit from relationships. 
This privatization is part of a more general transition of family law 
from status to contract, and the increasing emphasis on individualism 
in the legal regulation of the family.31  The formal status of marriage 
has become less important in determining individual rights and 
responsibilities within the family, as greater latitude is given to 
individual choices.  Yet, it is a process that remains incomplete.32  
Singer, amongst others, has observed that this privatization of the 
family, with its emphasis on the private contractual nature of 
marriage, has been uneven, citing, for example, the increased 
government involvement in the legal regulation of domestic violence 
and child support.33  The law continues to impose limits on how far 
spouses can contract out of the rights and responsibilities once 
associated with the status of marriage. 
The normative evaluation of this privatization of the family is 
                                                          
ordering of family behavior, but rather the substitution of the family for the 
state as the relevant source of public norms. 
Id. 
 30. Id. at 1510. 
 31. See, e.g., SIR HENRY SUMNER MAINE, ANCIENT LAW: ITS CONNECTION WITH THE 
EARLY HISTORY OF SOCIETY, AND ITS RELATION TO MODERN IDEAS 165 (Ashley Montagu 
ed., 1986) (originating the idea of the transformation of marriage from status to 
contract); see also MARY ANN GLENDON, THE NEW FAMILY AND THE NEW PROPERTY 43 
(1981) [hereinafter GLENDON, THE NEW FAMILY] (“Maine was more right than he 
knew. . . .  [S]ince the 1960s, the law in the countries discussed here has come 
increasingly to emphasize the individuality of the members of the conjugal family as 
well as to facilitate their independence from it and each other.”).  See generally 
MICHAEL GROSSBERG, GOVERNING THE HEARTH: LAW AND THE FAMILY IN NINETEENTH-
CENTURY AMERICA (1985); MILTON C. REGAN, JR., FAMILY LAW AND THE PURSUIT OF 
INTIMACY (1993); Carl E. Schneider, Moral Discourse and the Transformation of 
American Family Law, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1803 (1985); Singer, supra note 9. 
 32. See REGAN, supra note 31, at 39-41 (explaining that formal recognition of 
relationships has become less important, and the law increasingly recognizes 
individuals); see also JEAN L. COHEN, REGULATING INTIMACY: A NEW LEGAL PARADIGM 
(2002). 
 33. See Singer, supra note 9, at 1555 (observing that “although the law today 
generally accords spouses great latitude in structuring their post-divorce financial 
affairs, this latitude does not extend to agreements regarding child support or child 
custody.”); see also Theodora Ooms, The Role of the Federal Government in 
Strengthening Marriage, 9 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 163 (2001). 
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divided.  Some commentators have argued strongly for the 
progressive potential of this privatization.34  Both Martha Ertman and 
Nancy Ehrenreich, for example, have suggested that the increasing 
emphasis on private choice through the privatization of marriage 
might have positive effects for gays and lesbians.35  Jack Beerman has 
similarly commented on the deregulation of intimate relationships 
through the shift to no-fault divorce and a greater willingness on the 
part of the courts to enforce intimate contracts, as well as the 
potential for the further deregulation of marriage as part of the 
process of privatization.36  Others have argued against this 
privatization.  Communitarians, for example, have been highly critical 
of the increased emphasis on individualism and private choice law.37  
Some of these critics argue for a reversal of this process of 
privatization and a return to status.38 Others, including Singer, take 
the position that this privatization of the family is ambivalent, 
producing both advantages and disadvantages.39  But, the idea of the 
privatization of the family as a preference for private over public 
ordering is a theme that runs throughout this literature. 
C.  Privatization as the Re-articulation of the Traditional Family 
A third vision of privatization of the family that underlies 
contemporary public policy debates involves a return to the 
“traditional family” and the sanctity of marriage.40  In this social 
                                                          
 34. See Martha Ertman, Marriage as a Trade: Bridging the Private/Private 
Distinction, 36 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 79 (2001) (arguing that the privatization of 
family law helps undermine traditional sex, gender, race and class hierarchies that 
marginalize a range of intimate relationships); See generally Ehrenreich, supra note 
11; Eric Rasmusen & Jeffrey Evans Stake, Lifting the Veil of Ignorance: Personalizing 
the Marriage Contract, 73 IND. L.J. 453 (1998) (arguing for more private choice in 
the structuring of marital relationships); Elizabeth S. Scott & Robert E. Scott, 
Marriage as Relational Contract, 84 VA. L. REV. 1225 (1998). 
 35. See Ertman, supra note 34; Ehrenreich, supra note 11. 
 36. See Beermann, supra note 4, at 1530-31 (noting that the deregulation of 
marriage may expand the possibilities for the meaning of marriage and increase 
individuals’ privacy rights). 
 37. See, e.g., Bruce Hafen, Individualism and Autonomy in Family Law: The 
Waning of Belonging, 1991 BYU L. REV. 1 (1991) (arguing that the increased 
emphasis on private choice and autonomy in family law undermines the family as a 
site of community, relationship and belonging).  “In family law, as in family life, the 
individualistic cultural currents of the past quarter century have eroded the mortar of 
personal commitment that traditionally held the building blocks of family life—
people—together in intimate relationships.”  Id. at 2; see also REGAN, supra note 31, 
at 89-117; Laura Weinrib, Reconstructing Family: Constructive Trust at Relational 
Dissolution, 37 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 207 (2002) 
 38. See REGAN, supra note 31, at 89-117. 
 39. See Singer, supra note 9, at 1531-67. 
 40. Admittedly, the proponents of this view do not generally describe their 
position in the language of privatization.  However, I believe that it is possible to cast 
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conservative vision, the family with its highly gendered roles is 
envisioned as the natural site for a range of care giving 
responsibilities.41  This family needs to be restored to its once 
privileged position.  A host of social problems—rising crime rates, 
domestic violence, abortion, welfarism, child poverty, high risk 
behaviors—are ascribed to the decline of the traditional family.42  
Social conservatives seek to reverse this decline by promoting 
marriage and traditional family forms.43  Their many strategies 
include an effort to reduce single motherhood by reducing both non-
marital births and high divorce rates.  Non-marital births can be 
reduced by promoting abstinence and, if that fails, marriage.  High 
divorce rates can be countered by reforming no-fault divorce laws, 
replacing them, for example, with covenant marriage laws that impose 
more onerous conditions for divorce.44  The trend toward 
                                                          
this social conservative attempt to resurrect the traditional family as a position on 
privatization, returning the family to its purportedly natural and private form. 
 41. See Lynn Wardle, Relationships Between Family and Government, 31 CAL. W. 
INT’L L.J. 1, 21 (2000) [hereinafter Wardle, Relationships] (“Fathers must selflessly 
return to their role as providers and protectors of their families, and mothers must 
return lovingly to nurture their children.”); see also Bruce C. Hafen, The Touch of 
Human Kindness: Motherhood and the Moral Influence of Women, 67 VITAL 
SPEECHES 1, (2001), 2001 WL 12792028 (urging women to return to their roles as 
nurturers within the family). 
 42. See Lynn Wardle, Is Preference for Marriage in the Law Justified?, 1999 
WORLD FAM. POL’Y FORUM 44, at http://www.worldfamilypolicy.org/New%20Page/ 
Forum/1999/Wardle.pdf (last visited July 31, 2005); Wardle, Relationships, supra 
note 41 (describing the breakdown of marriage as leading to poverty, high risk 
behaviors such as teenage pregnancy and drug abuse by children, increased crime 
and broader social instability); see also DAVID BLANKENHORN, FATHERLESS AMERICA: 
CONFRONTING OUR MOST URGENT SOCIAL PROBLEM 25-48 (1995) [hereinafter 
BLANKENHORN, FATHERLESS AMERICA] (insisting that separating children from their 
fathers is a major cause of crime, emotional problems, teenage pregnancy, child 
sexual abuse, and domestic violence towards women).  See generally MAGGIE 
GALLAGHER, THE ABOLITION OF MARRIAGE:  HOW WE DESTROY LASTING LOVE (1996); 
REBUILDING THE NEST: A NEW COMMITMENT TO THE AMERICAN FAMILY (David 
Blankenhorn et. al. eds., 1990); BARBARA DAFOE WHITEHEAD, THE DIVORCE CULTURE 
(1996). 
 43. See David Blankenhorn, The State of the Family and the Family Policy 
Debate, 36 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 431, 436 (1996) (noting that conservatives may be 
divided between those who seek to address the consequences of the decline of the 
family by building more prisons, urban boarding schools, and orphanages and those 
who seek to reverse the trend by “strengthening the institution of marriage and 
seeking to create cultural change in favor of the idea that unwed childbearing is 
wrong, that our divorce rate is too high, and that every child deserves a father”).  See 
generally PROMISES TO KEEP: DECLINE AND RENEWAL OF MARRIAGE IN AMERICA (David 
Popenoe et al. eds., 1996); REVITALIZING THE INSTITUTION OF MARRIAGE FOR THE 
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY: AN AGENDA FOR STRENGTHENING MARRIAGE (Alan J. Hawkins et 
al. eds., 2002). 
 44. See, e.g., Margaret Brinig & Steven Nock, Covenant and Contract, 12 REGENT 
U. L. REV. 9, 24-26 (1999/2000); Katherine Shaw Spaht, For the Sake of the Children: 
Recapturing the Meaning of Marriage, 73 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1547 (1998); 
Katherine Shaw Spaht, Louisiana’s Covenant Marriage: Social Analysis and Legal 
Implications, 59 LA. L. REV. 63, 74-75 (1998); Lynn Wardle, Divorce Reform at the 
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cohabitation can be reversed by greater support for and promotion of 
marriage.  Through the 1990s, the discourse of this social conservative 
position has also been articulated more explicitly in terms of 
children’s need for a two-parent family, and the problem of 
“fatherless” children.45  The solution, then, is seen in terms of 
promoting this two-parent family, and ‘responsible fatherhood’.  
Moreover, in this social conservative vision, the traditional two parent 
heterosexual nuclear marital family is to be supported to the 
exclusion of all other family forms.  Social conservatives thus oppose 
any movement toward same sex relationship recognition as 
representing a fundamental threat to the traditional family. 
In this vision of privatization there continues to be a strong role for 
government regulation.  David Blankenhorn, a leading conservative 
family policy critic has, for example, noted the distinction between 
laissez faire approaches that identify government as the problem and 
seek to dismantle the welfare state “so that families can form and 
thrive on their own and in local communities, unharmed by the 
policies of the welfare state,” and a more welfare state approach which 
seeks to use the “instruments of government to meet human needs.”46  
He explicitly rejects the laissez faire approach, arguing instead that 
“society needs to use the tools of government and other tools at its 
disposal to strengthen the basic institution of the civil society, 
especially the institution of marriage, and to promote a cultural shift 
an attitudinal changes toward the view that every child deserves a 
father and that more children ought to be growing up with their two 
married parents.”47 
Similar themes are developed by Lawrence Mead, an influential 
conservative critic, who advocates in favor of a “new paternalism” in 
social welfare policy as a solution to the problems of poverty, welfare 
                                                          
Turn of the Millennium: Certainties and Possibilities, 33 FAM. L.Q. 783, 790-91 (1999) 
(arguing in favor of divorce reform and covenant marriage); see also Katharine T. 
Bartlett, Saving the Family from the Reformers, 31 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 809 n. 7 (1998) 
(observing that the divorce reform and the reintroduction of fault is also supported 
“by some commentators representing a more progressive legal tradition”).  The 
author cited, among others, Margaret Brinig & Steven Crafton, Marriage and 
Opportunism, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 869 (1994), and also those from a more liberal 
tradition, such as Elizabeth S. Scott, Rational Decisionmaking About Marriage and 
Divorce, 76 VA. L. REV. 9, 80-91 (1990), who urged enforcement of pre-commitment 
contracts to limit the availability of divorce.  Id. 
 45. See, e.g., BLANKENHORN, FATHERLESS AMERICA, supra note 42; DAVID POPENOE, 
LIFE WITHOUT FATHER: COMPELLING NEW EVIDENCE THAT FATHERHOOD AND MARRIAGE 
ARE INDISPENSABLE FOR THE GOOD OF CHILDREN AND SOCIETY (1996). 
 46. Blankenhorn, supra note 43, at 436-37. 
 47. Id. at 437; see also Hafen, supra note 37. 
16
Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law, Vol. 13, Iss. 3 [2005], Art. 1
http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/jgspl/vol13/iss3/1
2005] CONTESTING CONSERVATISMS 431 
 
dependency and the decline of the family.48  As Mead describes, this 
paternalism is “pro-government.  Far from reducing the welfare state, 
as conservatives usually ask, paternalism expands it.”49  Mead contrasts 
the new paternalism with traditional Republican or conservative 
approaches: “The traditional Republic approach to poverty was simply 
to cut back government programs and benefits and rely more on the 
private sector to generate opportunities for the downtrodden.  
Paternalism is a big-government form of conservatism, and this has 
caused some in the GOP to reject it.”50  Mead notes that conservative 
advocates of paternalism do not necessarily favor the privatization of 
welfare, as understood as the transfer of government goods and 
services to the private market or charitable actors: 
Most of us think . . . it unlikely and undesirable that antipoverty 
policy should be privatized.  After all, one reason that public social 
policies arose in the Progressive and New Deal Eras was that private 
charity could not cope with the scale of urban poverty.  The public 
now expects that the most destitute will be cared for, whether or 
not private aid is available, and for this a welfare state is 
indispensable.51 
Mead further argues that the private sector—particularly the 
charitable sector—will be unlikely to provide the kind of supervision 
required to change the behavior of the poor.52 
D.  Contradictory Relationships and Contesting Political Visions 
These different visions of family and the contradictory pressures on 
the legal regulation of the family reflect three very different political 
normative visions: fiscal conservatism, libertarianism and social 
conservatism.53  At times, analysts interchangeably use these terms to 
                                                          
 48. See Lawrence Mead, The Rise of Paternalism, in THE NEW PATERNALISM: 
SUPERVISORY APPROACHES TO POVERTY 1, 2 (Lawrence Mead ed., 1997); see also 
Rebecca Maynard, Paternalism, Teenage Pregnancy Prevention, and Teenage Parent 
Services, in THE NEW PATERNALISM: SUPERVISORY APPROACHES TO POVERTY 89, 90 
(advocating paternalism as the best approach to reducing illegitimacy: “Not only are 
more paternalistic policies crucial to maintaining public support for social programs 
such as welfare, but they also offer the most promise for preventing teenage 
pregnancy and mitigating adverse consequences when it does occur”). 
 49. Mead, supra note 48, at 11. 
 50. Id. at 12-13. 
 51. Id. at 10. 
 52. Id. (“Community organizations outside government cannot do much to force 
the poor to follow a better lifestyle as long as public aid programs demand little.”). 
 53. MELVIN THORNE, AMERICAN CONSERVATIVE THOUGHT SINCE WORLD WAR II: THE 
CORE IDEAS 97 n.28 (Bernard K. Johnpoll ed., Greenwood Press 1990) (noting, “it 
should be remembered that these labels, libertarian conservative and traditionalist 
conservative, fit arguments and positions better than they fit people.”).  The 
distinctions set out here serve to provide an analytical model, rather than a 
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refer to the conservative policies of privatization, the dismantling of 
the welfare state and the promotion of traditional (often family) 
values, collapsed under the rubric of the “New Right.”  This 
conflation, however, obscures important differences between these 
political philosophies and their respective adherents.54  Although 
often cast within the language of conservatism (i.e. social 
conservatives versus fiscal conservatives55) the divide is actually one 
between conservatism and liberalism.  Social or moral conservatives 
are the true inheritors of a conservative political philosophy with its 
emphasis on community, authority, social order and tradition.56  In 
this philosophy, individuals are first and foremost members of 
                                                          
description of the views of particular individuals or groups.  In practice, a particular 
individual, organization or political party may (and often does) adopt a social 
conservative position on one issue, and a fiscal conservative view on another.  Many 
Republicans, for example, may adopt a fiscal conservative stance on child support (in 
favor of tougher laws cracking down on deadbeat parents), while adopting a 
resolutely anti-gay position in terms of same sex marriage.  Similarly, the Heritage 
Foundation, a ‘conservative’ think tank committed to promoting the public policies 
based on the principles of free enterprise, individual freedom and limited 
government, also supports the promotion of ‘traditional American values’, which 
includes the promotion of marriage and the traditional family.  See About the 
Heritage Foundation, available at http://www. heritage.org/about/ (last visited July 
9, 2005).  Nor are these positions exclusively adopted by Republicans.  As the review 
of Congressional debates below reveals, Democrats may similarly adopt fiscal and/or 
social conservative positions.  The analytical distinctions set out here help illuminate 
the internal contradictions animating public policy debates, as well as the 
contradictions that may inhere within individual actors, groups or parties. 
 54. See, e.g., Ernest Young, Judicial Activism and Conservative Politics, 73 U. 
COLO. L. REV. 1139, 1142, 1181-1202 (2002) [hereinafter Young, Judicial Activism] 
(distinguishing between three categories of conservative politics: “situational or 
‘Burkean,’ political, and institutional”); Ernest Young, Rediscovering Conservatism: 
Burkean Political Theory and Constitutional Interpretation, 72 N.C. L. REV. 619, 661 
(1994) [hereinafter Young, Rediscovering Conservatism] (explaining that “American 
conservatism is highly splintered,” such that the various factions cannot agree on one 
direction for conservative constitutionalism); see also Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The 
“Conservative” Paths of the Rehnquist Court’s Federalism Decisions, 69 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 429, 447-51 (2002) (distinguishing between substantial, methodological and 
institutional conservatism); Robin West, Progressive and Conservative 
Constitutionalism, 88 MICH. L. REV. 641, 654-59 (1990) (distinguishing between social 
conservatives, legal conservatives and libertarian conservatives). 
 55. See, e.g., CHARLES DUNN & DAVID WOODARD, AMERICAN CONSERVATISM FROM 
BURKE TO BUSH: AN INTRODUCTION 173 (1991). 
An economic conservative, especially one with libertarian tendencies, wants 
to have a very small government that interferes as little as possible in the lives 
of Americans.  A traditional or religious conservative, on the other hand, may 
appreciate a larger government in order to protect its moral values as the 
norms of society’s behavior. 
Id.; see also THORNE, supra note 53 at 83-91 (discussing the distinction between 
libertarian and traditional conservatism). 
 56. See Robert Nisbet, Uneasy Cousins, in FREEDOM AND VIRTUE: THE 
CONSERVATIVE/LIBERTARIAN DEBATE 38-39 (George Carey ed., 1998)  (explaining that 
modern conservatism stems from Burkean ideals of rights of society and historical 
groups [like families and churches] as a barrier to government control over the 
individual). 
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communities, united by common morals values and traditions.57  
While conservatives are wary of arbitrary state power, they are not 
adverse to the state but rather see it as a necessary component of 
social order and the promotion of virtue.58  Within this vision, the 
family is a basic unit of society, forging individuals together through 
its moral authority, instilling children with moral values and 
traditions.59 
By way of contrast, both fiscal conservatism and libertarianism 
derives from classic liberal theory.60  Within classical liberalism, the 
individual is an autonomous, rational, self-interested actor, endowed 
with free will, whose liberty to pursue his own interest merits 
protection above all else.61  Individuals must be free to make their 
own choices, and pursue their own conception of the good.62  
According to classical liberal theory, this liberty thrives on the 
economic liberty of a free market, and the political liberty of a 
minimal state.63 
These tensions between conservative and liberal political 
philosophies have long been visible in American conservative politics. 
Lipset and Raab’s study of the American Right, for example, found an 
on-going alliance between these two groups – one drawn primarily 
from lower income brackets, who follow the religious, non-economic 
                                                          
 57. See id. at 45-46 (recounting that conservatives, from Burke forward, view 
individuals as inseparable members of natural groups and associations with which 
they live: “family, locality, church, region, social class, nation, and so on”). 
 58. See Russell Kirk, A Dispassionate Assessment of Libertarians, in FREEDOM AND 
VIRTUE: THE CONSERVATIVE/LIBERTARIAN DEBATE 183-84 (George Carey ed., 1998). 
[T]he conservative finds that the state is natural and necessary for the 
fulfillment of human nature and the growth of civilization . . . .  In Burke’s 
phrases, “He who gave us our nature to be perfected by our virtue, willed also 
the necessary means of its perfection—He willed therefore the state.” 
Id. 
 59. See, e.g., DUNN & WOODARDS, supra note 55, at 170 (“The basic ties of the 
family are the heart of society . . . and the very nursery of civic virtue.”). 
 60. See Nisbet, supra note 56, at 40 (tracing the “foundations of contemporary 
liberalism, of classical liberalism” to the work of Locke, Smith, and J.S. Mill’s On 
Liberty). 
 61. See C.B. MACPHERSON, THE REAL WORLD OF DEMOCRACY 6-7 (1965) (finding 
that in a classic liberal democracy, individuals become free to choose religions, 
occupations, family arrangements, and economic strategies). 
 62. See id. at 7 (reporting that new liberalized democracies in fact forced 
freedom on individuals). 
 63. See Nisbet, supra note 56, at 42-43 (providing that freedom from intrusive 
government intervention and individual economic freedom are the anchors of classic 
liberal theory).  See generally MILTON FRIEDMAN, CAPITALISM AND FREEDOM 7-21 (1962) 
(analyzing the relationship between economic and political freedom in the liberal 
context); FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, THE CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY (1960) (examining the 
history and institutions of liberty through the lens of political philosophy and 
application in modern economic society). 
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issues of conservative politics, and the other drawn from higher 
income brackets, a highly educated group, attracted primarily to the 
economic issues of conservative politics.64 Conservative political 
theorists have themselves long debated the relative merits of freedom 
and authority, with more libertarian conservatives emphasizing the 
primacy of freedom, and more social or traditional conservatives 
emphasizing the primacy of authority and social order.65  These 
tensions continue to be visible in the rise of the New Right in America 
since the 1970s, and the resurgence of a number of different 
conservative political philosophies.66  Ernest Young has observed, 
“American conservatism is highly splintered,” encompassing a very 
broad array of philosophical positions not easily united.67  Young 
identifies six different strands of conservatism: economic 
conservatives,68 libertarians,69 traditionalists,70 social/religious 
conservatives,71 neo-conservatives72 and anti- communists,73 and 
                                                          
 64. See SEYMOUR MARTIN LIPSET & EARL RAAB, THE POLITICS OF UNREASON: RIGHT-
WING EXTREMISM IN AMERICA, 1790-1970  449-56 (1970) (parceling the extreme right 
into two factions: one consisting of low status, under-educated, religious and 
provincial peoples who espouse intolerance of minorities and diversity; the other 
consisting of wealthier, privileged peoples who focus on economic conservatism).  
Underlying both groups is a common thread of opposition to the welfare state and 
state power.  Id. at 449. 
 65. See DESMOND S. KING, THE NEW RIGHT: POLITICS MARKETS AND CITIZENSHIP 2 
(1987) (defining two strands of thought within the New Right: “liberalism, which 
comprises the restoration of the traditional liberal values of individualism, limited 
government and free market forces; and conservatism, which consists of claims about 
government being used to establish societal order and authority based on social, 
religious and moral conservatism”).  See generally FREEDOM AND VIRTUE: THE 
CONSERVATIVE/ LIBERTARIAN DEBATE (George W. Carey ed., 1998) (contrasting 
libertarian and social conservatives in order to discern their common ground). 
 66. See generally KING, supra note 65 (examining the contradictions and 
accommodations between liberalism, libertarianism and conservatism in the rise of 
the New Right in the United States and England in the 1970s and 1980s). 
 67. Young, Rediscovering Conservatism, supra note 54, at 661. 
 68. See Young, Judicial Activism, supra note 54, at 1192 (defining, in self-
admitted thumbnail sketches of complicated philosophies, economic conservatives as 
those who emphasize individualism and private property, and are highly skeptical of 
“government regulation and redistribution of wealth”). 
 69. See id. (“Libertarians take the economic conservative’s aversion to 
government intervention in economic affairs and universalize it, advocating ‘[t]he 
maximum reduction of social and government action . . . so that the greatest possible 
room is left for each individual to act.’”). 
 70. See id. at 1193 (defining traditionalists as those who look back to Burke’s 
emphasis on community and virtue, and who “typically combine the situational 
conservative’s critique of rationalism and respect for prescriptive wisdom with more 
substantive or ideational elements such as a belief in community and a religious 
moral order.”). 
 71. See id. (defining social and religious conservatives of the 1980s New Right as 
those who “shared the traditionalists’ concern for a religious moral order, although 
they tended to be uninterested in the particular intellectual traditions espoused by 
the traditionalists.”). 
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argues that “[f]ew, if any, underlying themes unify these diverse 
groups; indeed their basic assumptions tend to be more contradictory 
than their surface policy prescriptions.  Economic conservatives and 
libertarians are highly individualistic, while traditionalists, neo-
conservatives and New Righters emphasize communities and 
families.”74  Conservative critiques continue to disagree with one 
another along this social/ fiscal, conservative/ libertarian axis.75 
These differences are particularly salient in the context of family 
and social welfare policy. Social conservatives see the welfare state as 
responsible for breaking down the moral basis of society.76 These 
conservatives hold the decline of the traditional family through 
welfarism, day-care, divorce, affirmative action, abortion, and gay 
rights, to name but a few of their favorite targets, responsible for the 
political, economic and moral decay of society.77  Social conservatives 
                                                          
 72. See id. at 1194 (describing neo-conservatives as “a loosely-affiliated group of 
intellectuals who became an important ideological force in the aftermath of the 
1960s”).  Young describes them as particularly difficult to define because they started 
out as liberals, accepting “in principle of the modern welfare state,” although they are 
critical of particular liberal policies.  Id. 
 73. See id. 
Hostility to communism has been a critical unifying force among the 
otherwise diverse strands of American conservatives, and for many 
conservatives it was long the essential characteristic of conservative ideology.  
The particular reason for opposing communism naturally varied according to 
one’s affinities with the various sorts of conservatism already listed—that is, 
an economic conservative might oppose the nationalization of industry, while 
a traditionalist would abhor the destruction of traditional religions. 
Id. 
 74. Id. at 1194-95; see also KING, supra note 65, at 160-61 (analyzing some of the 
ways in which these contradictions have informed the public policy of the Reagan 
administration, pursuing liberal economic policies and conservative social policies).  
“Liberalism and conservatism . . . contradict one another on a number of important 
issues including the role allocated to the state; the role of the individual; the nature 
and scope of freedom; and the importance of religious and familial values in society.”  
Id. at 24.  “Implementing these liberal minimal state objectives has required an 
activist government . . . .  This paradox is especially apparent in the Reagan 
Administration’s support for conservative issues: school prayer and anti-abortion, for 
example, and opposition to affirmative action or the rights of minorities.”  Id. at 161. 
 75. See, e.g., DUNN & WOODARD, supra note 55, at 173 (illustrating the 
divergences between economic and social conservatives in the different positions of 
William Buckley and William Bennett on the solution to American’s drug crisis).  
While Buckley favors a libertarians’ approach of legalization, Bennett advocates a 
social conservative approach of tougher sentences and more stringent enforcement.  
Id. at 173-74. 
 76. See, e.g., GEORGE GILDER, SEXUAL SUICIDE 138 (1973) (“Our welfare program . 
. . is tragic because, as currently designed, it promotes social disintegration”).  See 
generally PAMELA ABBOTT & CLAIRE WALLACE, THE FAMILY AND THE NEW RIGHT 22-36 
(1992); BLANKENHORN, FATHERLESS AMERICA, supra note 42; Wardle, Relationships, 
supra note 41. 
 77. See BLANKENHORN, FATHERLESS AMERICA, supra note 42, at 25-48; Wardle, 
Relationships, supra note 41, at 10-14. 
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believe that family breakdown and its resulting moral decay has been 
caused by the nature of the extensive state intervention in the private 
spheres of the family and the economy.78  Accordingly, the answer for 
social conservatives is simple: strengthen the traditional family, and its 
traditional, hierarchical gender roles.  An explicitly religious 
dimension sometimes informs this social conservative vision.  
According to this Religious or Christian Right, religious belief dictates 
the privatization of the family with a need to restore the sacred nature 
of marriage as a unity of man and woman in the eyes of the God.79 
Fiscal conservatism (sometimes referred to in the literature as neo-
liberalism,80 thus making visible its historical antecedents) and 
libertarianism identify the basic problem of modern society as the 
“erosion of liberty” that has accompanied the growth of the Keynesian 
welfare state.81  Individuals have lost their sense of economic initiative 
and enterprise by over-reliance on the state.  The answer for both 
fiscal conservatives and libertarians is also simple—restore the 
economic and political liberty of the individual through the 
promotion of the free market and the radical reduction of the state.  
The family does not feature as prominently as it does within the social 
conservative vision. Its primary focus is on restoring the individual to 
his (and now her) place as autonomous, industrious market actors.  
But, against the backdrop of its concern with the impact of welfare 
dependency, fiscal conservatism and libertarianism “promises to 
restore the State’s distance from the family.  In short, neo-liberalism 
suggests and needs the family to take some responsibility for itself.”82 
Fiscal conservatives and libertarians at times diverge, however, in 
how to best accomplish this goal.  One way of restoring the family to 
the private sphere is through an increasing emphasis on private 
choice, placing the family beyond the realm of appropriate state 
regulation (corresponding to the privatization as private choice 
approach).83  A second way is to transfer the public responsibility for 
the meeting the needs of individual family members back to the 
family (corresponding to the privatization as transfer of public goods 
                                                          
 78. See generally ABBOTT & WALLACE, supra note 76; Rebecca Klatch, Coalition 
and Conflict Among Women of the New Right, 13 SIGNS 671 (1988). 
 79. See DIDI HERMAN, THE ANTI-GAY AGENDA: ORTHODOX VISION AND THE 
CHRISTIAN RIGHT (1997). 
 80. See generally McCluskey, supra note 1 (providing a discussion of neo-
liberalism). 
 81. Klatch, supra note 78, at 676. 
 82. Vikki Bell, Governing Childhood: Neo-liberalism and the Law, 22 ECON. & 
SOC’Y 390, 395 (1993).  
 83. See generally Rasmusen & Stake, supra note 34. 
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and services to the private sector).84  Both of these approaches are 
consistent with the tenets of classic liberalism – of reducing the role of 
government in meeting the needs of individuals.85  The approaches 
diverge, however, over the relative importance of individual choice 
versus individual responsibility, with the former giving primacy to 
choice, while the latter is sometimes prepared to override it in the 
interests of reducing government spending and promoting 
responsibility.86  It is important then to distinguish these two 
approaches, with the private choice approach more closely 
approximating a libertarian strand of liberalism, and the transfer of 
public goods and services approach corresponding to the fiscal 
conservative, deregulatory or neo-liberal strand of liberalism. 
There is certainly some overlap between these three visions. For 
example, social conservatives, fiscal conservatives and libertarians 
share contempt for the welfare state agreeing that it is responsible for 
a range of social and economic problems.  All three agree that the 
solutions to these problems lie in reducing and eliminating welfare 
dependency.  Further, while fiscal conservatism is itself morally 
agnostic on the family, there is much in the social conservative 
strategy of rearticulating familial ideology that supports the fiscal 
conservative privatization project.  The idea of the family as a natural 
and timeless institution, responsible for the welfare of its members, 
could provide ideological support for the renegotiation of the 
public/private spheres of responsibility. The highly gendered roles 
and responsibilities within the family could also help legitimate the 
transfer of social and economic responsibilities from the public to the 
private. 
But, there are many ways in which the normative visions and 
strategies of the social conservatives, fiscal conservatives and 
libertarians diverge.  Despite their mutual condemnation of welfarism, 
their diagnoses of the particular ills of the welfare state diverge, as do 
their prescriptions.  Fiscal conservatives and libertarians emphasize 
the way in which the welfare state has undermined individual initiative 
and enterprise, while social conservatives emphasize moral decay and 
                                                          
 84. See generally Fineman, supra note 21. 
 85. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 63; HAYEK. supra note 63; Nisbet, supra note 56. 
 86. This conflict does not arise as explicitly in the context of privatization as the 
transfer of public goods and services to the private realm of the market, where it is 
believed that individual private choice will then structure the distribution of goods 
and services.  However, as with the transfer of public goods and services to the family, 
there remains significant albeit shifting forms of state regulation in the context of 
market privatization, through a range of both public and private law.  See 
PRIVATIZATION, supra note 1, at 19-22. 
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the undermining of the traditional family.87  Social conservatives are 
not adverse to a continuing role for the state in promoting the 
family,88 whereas libertarians deplore state intervention in the 
“private” sphere.89  Social conservatives strive to reinscribe a highly 
gendered world, in which women and men are naturally different, 
and therefore perform naturally different roles and responsibilities.90  
Fiscal conservatives and libertarians, by contrast, reject the relevance 
of gender, and seek to promote an abstracted individual, a 
disembodied market citizen.  Both fiscal conservatives and libertarians 
can support a broader definition of family, with fiscal conservatives 
doing so on the basis of broadening the web of private 
responsibilities, while libertarians would do so on the basis of 
respecting private choice and individual autonomy.  Social 
conservatives, by contrast, would categorically oppose any departure 
from the traditional family.91 
These very different underlying political philosophies thus produce 
three very different privatization projects.  Fiscal conservatism’s 
project is primarily an economic one of reducing the role of the state, 
and transferring public responsibilities to the private sphere 
(Privatization I).  Libertarianism’s project is to reduce the role of the 
state by promoting private choice (Privatization II).  Social 
conservatism’s project is one of reinscribing traditional familial 
ideology, and with it, a traditional, hierarchical family structure 
(Privatization III).  These three versions of privatization align 
differently, depending on the particular public policy issue and the 
nature of the regulation.  For example, expanding the scope and 
content of family law in conjunction with the retraction of public 
responsibility for financial need (Privatization I) is consistent with the 
emphasis on private decision-making (Privatization II) to the extent 
that both of these approaches would recognize the voluntary 
assumption of private responsibility beyond the traditional family.  
Both of these approaches to privatization would recognize the 
voluntary assumption of mutual responsibility within same sex 
                                                          
 87. See generally BLANKENHORN, FATHERLESS AMERICA, supra note 42 (discussing 
how welfare undermines the family); MICHAEL TANNER, CATO INSTITUTE, THE END OF 
WELFARE: FIGHTING POVERTY IN THE CIVIL SOCIETY (1996) (discussing how welfare 
undermines individual enterprise). 
 88. See HERMAN, supra note 79. 
 89. See CHARLES A. MURRAY, LOSING GROUND: AMERICAN SOCIAL POLICY, 1950-1980 
(1984) (arguing for the abolition of welfare); see also MICHAEL TANNER, CATO 
INSTITUTE, WELFARE REFORM: LESS THAN MEETS THE EYE 1, Policy Analysis No. 473 (Apr. 
1, 2003). 
 90. See generally Klatch, supra note 78. 
 91. See generally BLANKENHORN, FATHERLESS AMERICA, supra note 42. 
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relationships.  But, expanding the scope and content of family law 
beyond such voluntary arrangements would run counter to the latter’s 
emphasis on private decision making in family law.  According to 
privatization as private choice, private rights and responsibilities can 
only be imposed if individuals have expressly chosen to assume them.  
As a result, this vision of privatization would oppose the imposition of 
rights and responsibilities on unmarried cohabitants, in the absence 
of a contract in which the individual cohabitants expressly assumed 
them. 
The relationship between privatization as transfer of once public 
goods (Privatization I) and privatization as the rearticulation of the 
traditional family (Privatization III) is similarly contradictory.  The 
transfer of public goods and services to the family might be consistent 
with social conservative emphasis on renaturalizing the family, 
transferring responsibility for the financial welfare of family members 
from the state to the family.  However, this social conservative vision 
would insist that private rights and responsibilities only fall on 
married, heterosexual couples, and not unmarried cohabitants or 
same sex couples.  Thus, privatization as restoring the traditional 
family would oppose any effort by privatization as the transfer of once 
public goods to the family to expand the scope and content of family 
law to non-marital, non-heterosexual couples as a way of broadening 
private responsibility and reducing government responsibility. These 
three versions of privatization of the family, their convergences and 
contradictions, animate much of the public policy debate over the 
legal regulation of the family.  Their conflations and conflicts help to 
explain the successes and failures, political stalemates and 
compromises, shifting alliances and strategies that characterize a 
range of public policy initiatives on the legal regulation of the family. 
II.  PRIVATIZING PROJECTS IN FAMILY/SOCIAL WELFARE LAW 
In this section, this article examines the ways in which the tensions 
and conflicts between these three visions play out in concrete 
instantiations of public law and policy. These contradictions in the 
privatization project surface in the context of three areas: (1) 
legislative reforms to strengthen child support obligations and 
enforcement, and the recent shift in public policy to promoting 
‘responsible fatherhood;’ (2) the federal restructuring of social 
welfare entitlements, particularly in relation to single mothers; and 
(3) same-sex couples and the politics of marriage.  By examining each 
of these different issues, the goal is to highlight the very particular 
ways in which fiscal conservative, libertarian and social conservative 
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approaches to privatization diverge, and explore the how these 
divergent discourses materialize in law. 
A.  Privatizing Public Costs in Welfare Reform: Child Support and 
Social Welfare 
In the last three decades, welfare dependency has occupied center 
stage as a shared demon of fiscal conservatives, libertarians and social 
conservatives alike.  As part of more general attack on dependency, 
each tells a tale of the need to reverse the demise of personal 
responsibility.92  The story of welfare reform features two 
protagonists—the single welfare mom and the deadbeat dad—both 
cast as irresponsible citizens, culpable for spiraling welfare costs, 
chronic welfare dependency and a host of related social problems.  
While welfare reform has, each step of the way, developed policies 
directed at both welfare moms and deadbeat dads with the shared 
goal of reducing welfare dependency, it is useful to separate these two 
sets of policies.  Child support laws have targeted deadbeat dads, while 
a host of eligibility and entitlement rules for welfare assistance target 
welfare moms.93  This welfare reform has been an area where 
privatization as the transfer of once public responsibilities to the 
private sphere of the family has been most explicit.  Both child 
support and welfare eligibility reform share a basic objective of 
                                                          
 92. See KATZ, supra note 1, at 26 (“In the brave new market-governed world, 
dependence—reliance for support on someone else—signifies failure and the receipt 
of unearned benefits.”); Nancy Fraser & Linda Gordon, A Genealogy of 
‘Dependency’: Tracing a Keyword of the U.S. Welfare State, 19 SIGNS 309, 324 (1994) 
(illustrating the extent to which dependency has been pathologized in social policy 
debates: “With all legal and political dependency now illegitimate, and with wives’ 
economic dependency now contested, there is no longer any self-evidently good adult 
dependency in postindustrial society. Rather, all dependency is suspect, and 
independence is enjoined upon everyone.”).  Fraser and Gordon examine the way in 
which the pathologization of dependency has played out in the context of welfare 
reform, undermining the legitimacy of single mother’s claim to social support.  Id.; 
see also Sanford Schram & Joe Soss, Success Stories: Welfare Reform, Policy Discourse 
and the Politics of Research, in LOST GROUND: WELFARE REFORM, POVERTY AND BEYOND 
64 (Randy Albelda & Ann. Withorn eds., 2002) (discussing the centrality of the 
discourse and dependency on constructing a welfare crisis).  “Gradually, 
permissiveness and dependency displaced poverty and structural barriers to 
advancement as the central problems drawing attention from those who designed 
welfare policy.”  Id.  According to Schram and Soss, dependency became a 
“synecdoche for diverse social ills,” for “underclass pathology,” and a “basis for a 
powerful crisis narrative in the 1980s and 1990s.”  Id. at 64-65. 
 93. Yet, the two sets of policies intricately intertwine, in so far as child support 
enforcement has become part of the eligibility rules.  Welfare reform has increasingly 
required that women participate in establishing paternity and child support 
enforcement in order to qualify for welfare assistance.  See Personal Responsibility 
and Work Reconciliation Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-193, § 333, 110 Stat. 2105 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.) (requiring applications for 
assistance to cooperate with paternity establishment).  The distinction is, therefore, 
somewhat artificial. 
26
Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law, Vol. 13, Iss. 3 [2005], Art. 1
http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/jgspl/vol13/iss3/1
2005] CONTESTING CONSERVATISMS 441 
 
privatizing the costs of raising families, by transferring responsibility 
from the state to the family.94  But, as the following sections reveals, 
both sets of policies are also characterized by a range of internal 
tensions and contradictions, as different normative visions of the 
family and the privatization project contend for dominance in public 
policy debates. 
1.  Toughening Child Support Laws 
Beginning in the 1970s, and continuing through the 1980s, an 
apparent consensus emerged on the issue of child support: parents 
should be responsible for supporting their children.95  Liberals and 
conservatives alike agreed that it was time to get tough on those 
parents who attempted to evade their obligations.96  While the 
differences between liberal and conservatives have been recognized,97  
rather less attention has been directed to the differences between and 
amongst conservatives.  Yet, the conservative side of this apparent 
consensus has been characterized by two divergent normative visions 
of the family: a fiscal conservative vision that dominated the first 
rounds of reform and a social conservative vision that has begun to 
dominate more recent public policy debates.  The private choice 
emphasis of a libertarian position has had rather less resonance within 
child support debates; the idea that individuals should be able to 
structure their intimate relationships as they see fit simply does not 
extend to child support obligations.  Rather, there appears to be a 
widespread belief in public policy debates that “people who bring 
                                                          
 94. See generally Brito, supra note 22; Morgan, supra note 22, at 708-09; Smith, 
supra note 22, at 210-211. 
 95. See Chambers, supra note 22, at 2588 (describing the bipartisan support for 
toughening child support obligations). 
 96. See id. 
Nearly everyone on the right and left . . . accepts President Clinton’s starting 
point: people who bring children into this world must not walk away from 
them.  The duty that parents have to support their children rests, in our 
culture, on the widely shared belief in each person’s responsibility for his 
voluntary actions and in deeply rooted notions of what it means to be a 
parent. 
Id. 
 97. See KATZ, supra note 1, at 68-69 (quoting Edelman and describing how child 
support developed bipartisan support in the 1970s). 
‘Liberals (liked it) because stricter child support enforcement would make 
mothers financially better off; conservatives because financially better-off 
mothers would be less dependent on welfare; both sides, but especially 
conservatives because unlike every other social program, child support, on 
balance brought more money into government coffers than it spent and 
helped defray welfare costs as a result.’  Both sides also agreed on principle 
that absent fathers should support their children. 
Id. 
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children into this world must not walk away from them.”98  Individuals 
are free to choose to have children, but cannot then choose whether 
or not to support them.99 
This section explores these differences between fiscal and social 
conservative approaches to child poverty, welfare dependency and the 
responsibilities of fathers.  It illustrates the extent to which fiscal 
conservatism has been the dominant voice in debates around the 
Child Support Act of 1974,100 the Family Support Act of 1988,101 and 
the Child Support Recovery Act of 1992.102 These reforms were very 
much about the privatization of public responsibility, transferring 
responsibility for the support of children from taxpayer to parent.  
However, by 1996 a social conservative discourse and its emphasis on 
promoting the traditional family was becoming more evident in the 
public policy debates and the Personal Responsibility and Work 
Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996103 represents more of a 
hybrid of fiscal and social conservatism.  More recently, in debates 
about welfare reauthorization, social conservatism has emerged as a 
dominant voice, promoting marriage and responsible fatherhood. 
a.  Child Support, Welfare Reform and Divergent Visions of 
Fatherhood 
The federal government’s efforts to reform and enforce child 
support obligations have for decades been associated with welfare 
reform.104  There is, of course, nothing new about the connection 
between welfare and support.  Many commentators have observed a 
                                                          
 98. Chambers, supra note 22, at 2588.  Interestingly, the idea is itself cast in the 
language of private choice and the autonomous actions of individuals.  Individuals 
can ‘choose’ to have children; individuals are ‘responsible’ for their ‘voluntary 
actions’. 
 99. An element of libertarianism is at times evident in the oppositional rhetoric of 
the father’s rights movement, which has often opposed efforts to toughen child 
support obligations.  However, the lack of resonance about the choice to support 
one’s children has made the father’s rights movement more effective when it casts its 
rhetoric in more anti-feminist terms opposing the alleged biases in the child custody, 
support and access regimes in favor of mothers.  Indeed, the father’s rights 
movement is most effective when it focuses on trying to limit the choices of mothers 
who are cast as unfairly denying custody and access to their children. 
 100. The Child Support Act, Pub.L.No. 93-647, 88 Stat. 2337 (1974) (codified as 
amended in 42 U.S.C. §§ 651-60 (1975)). 
 101. The Family Support Act of 1988, Pub. L.No. 100-485, 102 Stat. 2343 (1988). 
 102. The Child Support Recovery Act of 1992, 18 U.S.C. § 228 (1992). 
 103. See Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act 
(overhauling the nation’s welfare system). 
 104. See Brito, supra note 22, at 254 (stating that the “history of child support law 
represent[s] a literal joining of family law and welfare law”). 
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similar trend going back to the Elizabethan poor laws.105  Since the 
1960s, Congress has expressed its concern with rising welfare 
dependency of women and children, and the extent to which their 
economic need was a result of fathers who did not support these 
families.106  For conservatives, the apparent consensus that emerged 
in favor of getting tough on child support was born of a shared 
contempt for chronic welfare dependency.107  The desire to reform 
welfare to reverse the demise of personal responsibility animated both 
fiscal and social conservatives.  Both agreed that children should not 
be forced to rely on welfare for their support.  To differing degrees, 
both have targeted the “deadbeat dad” as culpable for their children’s 
poverty and welfare dependency, and both seek to promote personal 
responsibility by enforcing the private support obligations of fathers. 
But their normative agendas for these “deadbeat dads” diverge, as 
do the particular ways in which they connect welfare dependency, 
child support and fatherhood. 
Fiscal conservative discourse aims to get tough on deadbeat dads by 
forcing them to take financial responsibility for their children 
following divorce or non-marital births.  It targets these irresponsible 
parents as the source of the problem of child poverty and welfare 
                                                          
 105. See Harris, supra note 22, at 630 (“The desire ‘to keep the bill down’ has 
continued to govern the dual system of family law ever since the Elizabethan Poor 
Law.”); see also Morgan, supra note 22, at 706-07 (tracing the history of private 
support for families to Elizabethan Poor Law).  See generally LINDA GORDON, PITIED 
BUT NOT ENTITLED: SINGLE MOTHERS AND THE HISTORY OF WELFARE 1890-1935 (1994) 
(arguing that child support was a key factor in the growth of the American welfare 
state); WALTER TRATTNER, FROM POOR LAW TO WELFARE STATE: A HISTORY OF SOCIAL 
WELFARE IN AMERICA (2d ed. 1979) (discussing the connection between support and 
welfare in the history of American welfare). 
 106. See Brito, supra note 22, at 252-53 (noting that congressional concern 
focused on the welfare need resulting from “voluntary absence—rather than the 
death—of the non-custodial parent”); Harris, supra note 22, at 633 (reporting that in 
the late 1960s, Congress began to require state welfare agencies to enforce child 
support enforcement and to undertake paternity testing as conditions for receiving 
federal funding for welfare). 
 107. See Roger J. R. Levesque, Looking to Unwed Dads to Fill the Public Purse: A 
Disturbing Wave in Welfare Reform, 32 U. LOUISVILLE J.FAM. L. 1, 4 (1993/94) 
(suggesting that the aspects of welfare reform that encourage un-wed fathers to take 
responsibility for their children, such as providing information on how these 
obligations can be met and listing those who fail to pay, are generally agreed to be 
necessary steps in getting fathers involved with their children’s financial needs); 
Stephan Sugarman, Financial Support of Children and the End of Welfare as We 
Know It, 81 VA. L. REV.  2523, 2524-526 (1995) (arguing that the conservative view of 
child support is centered on the notion that moral obligations attach to the decision 
to have and raise a child); Catherine Wimberly, Deadbeat Dads, Welfare Moms and 
Uncle Sam: How the Child Support Recovery Act Punishes Single-Mother Families, 53 
STAN. L. REV. 729, 736-38 (2000) (indicating that new provisions in the Child Support 
Recovery act are designed to impose harsher sanctions on those who fail to abide by 
their child support obligations, while also discouraging reliance on federal funds to 
meet these needs ). 
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dependency, and emphasizes strengthening child support laws in 
order to get tough on the private responsibilities of these individual 
parents.  Child poverty has been recast as an individual pathology, as a 
problem of fathers who refuse to take responsibility for their children.  
These ‘deadbeat dads’ are not only abdicating their moral obligations 
to provide for their children, but are also demonized as bad citizens 
for their flagrant abuse of the American taxpayer, who must subsidize 
the resulting welfare dependency.  If individuals could be made to 
fulfill their responsibilities to their children, the problems would be 
eliminated.  The focus, then, is on individualizing the problem and 
shifting the responsibility for this individual problem from the public 
to the private sphere.108  Individual fathers must be made to assume 
their personal responsibility by financially supporting their children.  
And personal responsibility is cast in largely economic terms. 
While social conservatives agree with the idea of promoting 
personal responsibility, they seek to do so by promoting the 
traditional family.  Social conservatives aim to prevent dads from 
becoming dead-beat, by encouraging marriage and preventing 
divorce, thereby reducing the number of single parent families in 
need of child support.109  Marriage should be encouraged to curb the 
increase in children born out of wedlock.110  Divorce, it is said, should 
be made more difficult, so that families—traditional families—can 
remain intact.111  Fathers must become more involved in the lives of 
their children not after a divorce, but during the marriage.112  And 
the nature of this involvement is as a traditional father, responsible 
not only for the child’s financial welfare, but also for providing a 
                                                          
 108. See Morgan, supra note 22, at 709-10 (discussing the process of shifting 
responsibility from public to private spheres by establishing firmer child support 
guidelines for those obligated to pay); see also Brito, supra note 22, at 253-56 
(indicating that although state control of reproduction is beyond the realm of reason, 
the state should play a limited role in encouraging families to stay together and 
imposing financial liability). 
 109. See Sugarman, supra note 109, at 2527-30 (arguing that the prevention of the 
dissolution of marriage is a major theme in conservative constructions of child 
support policies). 
 110. See id. at 2528 (indicating that although the government should not have the 
right to dictate who may have children, it should provide incentives to ensure that 
having children in wedlock is more attractive than having children outside of 
wedlock). 
 111. See POPENOE, supra note 45, at 222-23 (arguing that divorce should be more 
difficult for marriages with minor children). 
 112. See generally THE FATHERHOOD MOVEMENT: A CALL TO ACTION (Wade Horn et 
al. eds., 1999); POPENOE, supra note 45 (suggesting that penalties and incentives for 
paternal involvement in a child’s well-being would not be as effective if they only take 
effect once the family has dissolved); BLANKENHORN, FATHERLESS AMERICA, supra note 
42 (advancing the argument that a sustained paternal relationship during marriage 
would encourage the father to assume a more supportive role in their child’s life). 
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good, stable male role model for his children.  Child poverty and 
welfare dependency, alongside crime and other high-risk behaviors, 
are seen as caused by single parent families and the solution is 
therefore to promote a traditional two parent, marital family.113  For 
social conservatives, then, personal responsibility is cast in explicitly 
moral terms—it is about rearticulating traditional gender roles as a 
way of reversing the moral decline of the family. 
Since the 1990s, social conservatives have articulated an increasing 
compassion for the difficulties that low income fathers encounter, and 
sought to promote “responsible fatherhood” through a range of 
employment training programs that will allow fathers to assume their 
‘proper’ position as breadwinner of the family.114  The new emphasis 
on responsible fatherhood is, in part, a reaction to the assault on 
fatherhood in child support public policy debates.  For example, 
George Gilder writes, “[p]erhaps the most quixotic and perverse is the 
effort of the welfare state, after systematically destroying marriage, to 
replace it with so-called deadbeat dad crusades.”115  The crackdown is 
seen by some as too severe, and not sufficiently emphatic to the needs 
of low-income fathers.  Ronald Mincy and Hillard Pouncy write that 
                                                          
 113. See POPENOE, supra note 45 (discussing the link between welfare dependency 
and the moral deterioration associated with other high risk behavior); Blankenhorn, 
supra note 43 (arguing that the traditional family unit acts as an insulator against the  
increasing trend of welfare dependency); see also The Heritage Foundation 
Backgrounder, No. 1371, June 5, 2000 (discussing the negative effects of divorce on 
children, including poverty, crime, mental and physical health risks, and arguing that 
the federal government should therefore be promoting marriage and reducing 
divorce). 
 114. See George W. Bush, A Blueprint for New Beginnings, Feb. 28, 2001 
(developing a Fatherhood Initiative, designed to “make committed, responsible 
fatherhood a national priority”), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/ 
usbudget/blueprint/bud12.html (last visited July 9, 2005).  President Bush pledged 
his support for the promotion of Responsible Fatherhood.  Id.  The Blueprint states 
that “[w]hile fathers must fulfill their financial commitments, they must also fulfill 
their emotional commitments.  Dads play indispensable roles that cannot be 
measured in dollars and cents: nurturer, mentor, disciplinarian, moral instructor, and 
skills coach, among other roles.”  Id.  Indicating a shift in approach to fathers, the 
Blueprint states “[g]overnment’s traditional answer to the absence of fathers from the 
lives of their children has been to focus on child support enforcement.”  Id.  While 
this enforcement continues to be important, “research shows that a large portion of 
fathers who do not pay child support are themselves poor.  Many have limited 
education and are unemployed or underemployed.”  Id.; see also Wade F. Horn, Did 
You Say “Movement”?, in THE FATHERHOOD MOVEMENT 7-9 (Horn et al. eds., 1999) 
(explaining the core idea of the fatherhood movement is based on three 
assumptions: “(1) responsible and committed fatherhood ought to be the norm of 
masculinity; (2) fathers are different from mothers in important ways; and (3) the 
father-child bond is important to the healthy development of children”). 
 115. George Gilder, Sex, Families, Race, Poverty, Welfare: A Symposium ‘Revisiting 
the’ Moynihen Report of its Thirtieth Anniversary, THE AMERICAN ENTERPRISE 
MAGAZINE, Jan/Feb. 1995, available at http://www.taemag.com/issues/articleID. 
16708/article_detail.asp (last visited June 4, 2005). 
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“[i]t is not enough, experience has proven, simply to crack down on 
‘deadbeat dads’.  Disadvantaged fathers also need help to pay their 
judgments.  And at its frontier, child support policy actually can help 
strengthen fragile families.”116  They argue that “the only real solution 
of the child support problem is rebuilding the family.  Only then do a 
mother and her children get secure support . . . and only then does a 
father get the emotional support that he needs to work steadily.”117  
Social conservatives want fathers to be responsible—to pay for their 
children—but they see the solution to child poverty and welfare 
dependency to lie in the rearticulation of the traditional family with 
the father at its helm. 
The federal public policy initiatives to toughen child support laws 
in the 1980s and early 1990s, while often cast in the language of 
personal responsibility, were intricately tied to welfare rhetoric and 
informed by a fiscal conservative rhetoric of reducing government 
spending and the burden on the American taxpayer.  Social 
conservative discourse, to the extent that it appeared in the public 
policy debates, sought to encourage traditional family values and 
discourage out-of-wedlock births.  But, this general rhetoric did not 
translate into concrete public policy initiatives in the child support 
arena.  Rather, the Child Support Enforcement Amendments Act of 
1984,118 the Family Support Act of 1988,119 and the Child Support 
                                                          
 116. See Ronald Mincy & Hillard Pouncy, Paternalism, Child Support 
Enforcement, and Fragile Families, in THE NEW PATERNALISM: SUPERVISORY 
APPROACHES TO POVERTY 130 (Lawrence Mead ed., 1997) (explaining a position that 
this assertion is consistent with the new paternalism of Lawrence Mead, and with a 
socially conservative agenda that supports the family).  However, Mincy’s work on 
fragile families, black fathers and social policy is more complex and nuanced, defying 
any simple categorization as conservative or liberal.  Id.  For example, while 
supportive of responsible fatherhood, Mincy is highly critical of the Bush 
administration’s promotion of marriage, on the ground that it may actually 
undermine efforts to bring unmarried black fathers back into relationships with their 
children. Id.; see also Ronald Mincy, What About Black Fathers?, THE AMERICAN 
PROSPECT ONLINE, Apr. 7, 2002 (illustrating that responsible fatherhood projects may 
be supported by liberals and conservatives alike), available at http://www.prospect. 
org/web/page.ww?section=root&name=ViewPrint&articleId=6235 (last visited June 4, 
2005).  The differences in family formation that occur in different cultures and races 
could have a negative impact on the effectiveness of the Bush administration’s child 
care policies.  Id.  While social conservatives have relied on some of Mincy’s work, it is 
by no means consistent with the ideology of social conservatism.  It highlights again 
the extent to which the labels deployed in this paper describe positions better than 
people, and may at times, not even do justice to positions. 
 117. See Mincy & Pouncy, supra note 116, at 157 (advocating a child support 
regime that focuses on fragile families—that is, that treats the non-resident parent 
and the resident parent as a single unit of intervention, and focuses on the “inner 
problems of the fragile family”).  “Family life among the seriously poor has 
deteriorated so badly that mending it must become a priority as great as finding 
economic support for poor families.”  Id. at 152. 
 118. Child Support Enforcement Amendments of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-378, 98 
Stat. 1305 (1984). 
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Recovery Act of 1992120 were overwhelmingly cast in the fiscal 
conservative discourse of reducing welfare dependency and 
government spending by ensuring that parents not taxpayers assumed 
the financial responsibility of providing for their children. 
Some commentators have suggested that a strong social 
conservative normative vision informed these child support 
initiatives.121  In my view, however, this argument obscures and 
flattens important normative differences and shifting alliances 
between competing visions of the family.  While it is true that social 
conservatives seek to promote this vision of the family, it is not at all 
clear that it was an animating vision of the early child support 
initiatives between 1974 and 1992.  However, this vision has become 
evident in more recent shifts in emphasis in child support initiatives.  
Beginning with debates around the Fathers Count Act, which was 
never passed by Congress, and as now incorporated in the bills before 
Congress reauthorizing TANF, the social conservative vision of 
promoting traditional families has emerged in concrete public policy 
terms.122 
b.  Federal Child Support Initiatives 
The initial federal efforts to strengthen child support enforcement 
were overwhelmingly animated by the goal of reducing federal 
spending of welfare.123  In 1974, the federal government enacted the 
Child Support Act, creating Title IV-D of the Social Security Act, 
creating a federal Office of Child Support Enforcement and requiring 
states receiving AFDC funds to establish child support offices to assist 
                                                          
 119. Family Support Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-485, 102 Stat. 2343 (1988). 
 120. Child Support Recovery Act of 1992, 18 U.S.C. § 228 (1992). 
 121. See Wimberly, supra note 107, at 757-58 (arguing that the Child Support 
Recovery Act was passed with the intent to “reaffirm the favored status of the nuclear 
family by attaching punitive consequences to divorce” and the failure of some couples 
to marry at all); see also Harris, supra note 22, at 651-52 (discussing the purported 
‘social benefits’ of fatherhood, which include a decrease in welfare dependency and 
crime). 
 122. See Fathers Count Act of 1999, H.R. 3073, 106th Cong. (1999) (indicating 
that the proposed legislation was designed to promote better relationship skills 
among fathers, curb aggressive behavior, teaching good parenting skills, building 
relationships between fathers and their children, and helping them avoid welfare 
dependency); Temporary Aid to Needy Families, 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-619 (1997) 
(incorporating aspects of the Fathers Count Act into law by encouraging counseling 
and parental responsibility over welfare dependency). 
 123. See Harry Krause, Child Support Reassessed: Limits of Private Responsibility 
and the Public Interest, 24 FAM. L.Q. 1, 6 (1990) (stating that Congress’s primary goal 
in strengthening the enforcement of child support obligations was to reduce the 
federal funds allocated for the AFDC program). 
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parents in establishing and enforcing child support obligations.124  IV-
D programs included locating absent parents, establishing paternity 
and obtaining and enforcing child support orders.  Custodial AFDC 
parents were required to assign their right to collect child support 
payments to the state, and child support collected on behalf of AFDC 
families was used to reimburse governments for welfare benefits paid 
to the family.125  The primary goal of the Child Support Act was to 
reduce the federal government’s spending on AFDC: “the more child 
support collected, the less the cost of AFDC to the federal 
government.”126  This objective, and the beginnings of rhetorical 
attack on deadbeat dads, was made abundantly clear in the words of 
Senator Long, a leading sponsor of the legislation: 
Should our welfare system be made to support the children whose 
father cavalierly abandons them—or chooses not to marry the 
mother in the first place?  Is it fair to ask the American taxpayer—
who works hard to support his own family and to carry his own 
burden—to carry the burden of the deserting father as well?  
Perhaps we cannot stop the father from abandoning his children, 
but we can certainly improve the system by obtaining child support 
from him and thereby place the burden of caring for his children 
on his own shoulders where it belongs.  We can—and we must—
take the financial reward out of desertion.127 
It was, in other words, all about the privatization of welfare costs.  As 
Laura Morgan has observed, “[c]learly, Congress was seeking to shift 
the burden of support from the public to the private sphere, and 
would so through massive enforcement mechanisms.”128 
While the original program was limited to AFDC families, in 1984 
Congress expanded the program to include all families eligible for 
child support with the Child Support Enforcement Amendment.129  
                                                          
 124. See The Child Support Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 651-660, § 651 (1975) (allocating 
funds on the basis of enforcing support obligations, locating non-custodial parents, 
establishing paternity, obtaining support, and assuring that assistance in obtaining 
support will be available). 
 125. See 42 U.S.C. § 657 (stating that the first fifty dollars of child support 
payments is directed to the families, but all additional child support collected is 
channeled directly to government). 
 126. See Morgan, supra note 22, at 708 (analyzing the historical shift from the 
1970’s that began to put the burden on private support rather than public assistance); 
see also Krause, supra note 123, at 6 (examining the growing emphasis on private 
support). 
 127. Harris, supra note 22, at 634 (quoting 118 Cong. Rec. 8291 (1972) (statement 
of Sen. Long)). 
 128. Morgan, supra note 22, at 708. 
 129. See Child Support Enforcement Amendments, Pub. L. No. 98-378 (“striking 
out ‘and obtaining child and spousal support,’ and inserting in lieu, thereof, 
“obtaining child and spousal support, and assuring that assistance in obtaining 
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Congress also broadened the scope of the law to include automatic 
wage withholding for overdue child support payments, impositions of 
liens against property of defaulting parents, and the interception of 
federal and state tax refunds.  The amendments further required 
states to develop advisory guidelines that could be used by courts in 
setting child support awards. 
In 1988, Congress once again expanded the scope of its child 
support programs.  The Family Support Act of 1988130 required that 
all states implement mandatory presumptive child support guidelines 
by 1994.  The legislation also created the U.S. Commission on 
Interstate Child Support to consider how the child support system 
could be further improved.  The Act provided for more immediate 
wage withholding, as well as a new focus on establishing paternity. 
The child support provisions were explicitly tied to the reduction of 
welfare dependency, and in turn of government spending. 
Representative Roukema, in the House debates on the Conference 
Report, stated that the child support provisions 
[A]re fundamental to lifting family after family from the welfare 
rolls.  Those states which have already enacted wage withholding 
have seen dramatic increases in collection.  Take Virginia for 
example, in 1986 only 107 mothers on welfare got enough support 
payments to get off welfare.  The first [eight] months of 1988, after 
wage withholding was enacted, about 3,100 have received enough 
support to get off welfare.131 
Representative Gunderson specifically linked the child support 
provisions to fiscal savings, by stating, “[t]his legislation significantly 
improves the Child Support Enforcement Program under welfare so 
that within [four] years, child support collections should produce an 
increase of about [two-hundred] million [dollars] per year in Federal 
revenues and even more—about [fifty] percent more—in State 
revenues.”132  The Senate debates similarly cast the objective of the 
child support provisions as the reduction of welfare dependency 
through the promotion of parental responsibility.  Senator Cochran, 
for example, stated: 
This bill emphasizes parental support as the first line of defense 
against public dependency.  Vigorous child support enforcement 
does more than simply extract financial support from absent 
parents.  It makes a statement abut what our society believes the 
                                                          
support will be available under this part to all children (whether or not eligible for 
aid under Part A) . . . for whom such assistance is requested”). 
 130. Family Support Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-485, 102 Stat. 2343 (1988). 
 131. 134 Cong. Rec. H9098 (1988) (statement of Rep. Roukema). 
 132. Id. (statement of Rep. Gunderson). 
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role of parents to be.  Parents should provide for their children, 
and public policy should obligate parents to provide that support . . 
. .  These and other provisions are part of a new strategy for 
strengthening family cohesion and responsibility and for breaking 
the cycle of welfare dependency.133 
Senator Bradley similarly stated: 
[T]he Federal Government clearly has a major role in helping 
families escape poverty, but Federal help must supplement the 
primary responsibilities of families to help themselves.  Parents have 
a responsibility to care for their children.  Sadly, too often, 
noncustodial parents do not fulfill their responsibility.  We, as a 
nation, have a moral obligation to provide assistance to poor 
families and their children—but only after parents shoulder their 
own responsibilities.134 
Parental responsibility is understood in these debates in fiscal 
terms—individual parents must be made to provide financial support 
for their children.  The idea animating the child support provisions of 
the Family Support Act was that the cost of supporting children 
should be privatized to the fullest extent possible.  Individual 
parents—not the state—should have the primary responsibility for 
supporting children.  And doing so would produce significant fiscal 
savings for the state. 
In 1992, Congress passed the Child Support Recovery Act135 
intended to address problems associated with interstate child support 
enforcement by imposing criminal sanctions on non-custodial parents 
who willfully fail to pay child support obligations owed to a child 
living in another state.136  Criminalizing the evasion of child support 
represented a continuation of federal efforts to shift the cost of raising 
children from the federal government to parents.137  Throughout the 
                                                          
 133. 134 Cong. Rec. S13639 (1988) (statement of Sen. Cochran). 
 134. 134 Cong. Rec. 26597 (1988) (statement of Sen. Bradley); see also 134 Cong. 
Rec. 26578 (statement of Sen. Moynihen) (“We start out with the proposition that we 
cannot abandon children in this country with impunity.  You have a responsibility to 
them and if you do not exercise it on your own, society will see to it that you do.”). 
 135. 18 U.S.C. § 228 (1992). 
 136. See id. (providing that the penalty for a first offense is a fine and/or 
imprisonment for not more than six months).  Subsequent offenses carry a penalty of 
a fine and/or imprisonment for not more than two years.  Id.  The Act allows a court 
to make an order for restitution in an amount equal to the past due support 
obligations.  Id.  In addition, the Act gave federal courts the authority to make 
compliance with child support obligations a condition of probation in any federal 
criminal matter, and authorized ten million dollars in each of fiscal years 1994, 1995 
and 1996 for grants for states and local entities for development/enforcement of 
criminal interstate child support legislation. 
 137. See Morgan, supra note 22, at 709-12 (explaining that PRWORA radically 
changed the nature of welfare, in part, because the federal government would not 
“provide a guaranteed safety net of cash subsistence benefits”). 
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Congressional debates, the objective of privatizing the costs of welfare 
was readily apparent.  Deadbeat dads were vilified not only for failing 
to support their children, but also, for their abuse of the American 
taxpayer.  Representative Schumer, Chairman of the Subcommittee 
on Crime and Criminal Justice, and a leading sponsor of the bill, 
described the failure to pay child support as “a double robbery”: 
First more than a million children are robbed of a cumulative 
[eighteen] billion [dollars] in needed financial support . . . .  
Second the American taxpayer—people with good families, 
together families, nothing to do with child support themselves, are 
directly affected, because the taxpayer is robbed of billions of 
dollars when the children’s mothers can’t make ends meet and are 
forced to rely on welfare.138 
In the House of Representative debates, Schumer similarly stated: 
Every year more than [five] billion [dollars] in child support goes 
unpaid, forcing many families onto public assistance, especially 
AFDC and Medicaid.  And it is unfair to ask the American 
taxpayers, Mr. Speaker, these people, the taxpayers who work so 
hard to support their own families, insure their own bills, to carry 
the burden of a deadbeat parent as well.  We must help the States to 
collect the support these children desperately need by taking the 
incentive out of moving interstate to avoid payment.139 
Senate debates similarly emphasized the need to shift the burden of 
supporting children from taxpayers to fathers.  Senator Shelby, a 
leading sponsor of the Bill in the Senate, stated that child support was 
a federal issue because “the non-payment of child support costs the 
Federal Government, the taxpayer.”140  Further, Senator Shelby 
stated, “Considering the role of poverty among families due child 
support, the issue is not simply one of child poverty, it is also an issue 
of concern to the American taxpayer.”141  According to Senator 
Shelby, government spending on child support enforcement would 
be offset by government savings: 
[A]ny expenses incurred in enforcement and incarceration may be 
recouped through savings in social expenditures like AFDC 
                                                          
 138. Opening Statement to the Subcommittee on Crime and Criminal Justice, 
Committee on the Judiciary: Hearings on HR 1241 Before the House Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 102d Cong. (January 15, 1992) (statement of Rep. Schumer). 
 139. 138 Cong. Rec. H7324 (1992) (statement of Rep. Schumer); 138 Cong. Rec. 
31121 (1992) (statement of Rep. Sensenbrenner) (indicating that the passage of the 
Act will mean that “the deadbeat dads will end up paying the support rather than the 
taxpayers.”); see also 138 Cong. Rec. 21402 (statement of Rep. Fazio) (asserting that 
“[p]arents must be responsible for the financial welfare of their children”). 
 140. Statement Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 102d Cong. (July 29, 
1992) (Statement of Sen. Shelby). 
 141. Id. 
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benefits, food stamps, and other forms of public assistance.  The 
$2,500 average support level added to the average income of 
families owed by not receiving support could offset numerous social 
expenses incurred by the State and Federal Government.142 
While the language of personal responsibility ran through the 
debates, the particular understanding of personal responsibility 
animating the debates was largely fiscal conservative in nature, 
emphasizing the privatization of financial support for children. 
In 1996, Congress passed the Personal Responsibility and Work 
Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA).143  While the legislation 
is best known for its radical restructuring of welfare, eliminating 
AFDC entitlements and replacing it with a block grant program know 
Temporary Aid to Needy Families,144 it also introduced significant 
reforms to child support enforcement.  In order to qualify for a block 
grant, a state must operate a Title IV-D child support enforcement 
program.  Title III sets the new child support enforcement measures 
that states must implement to maintain eligibility.  These include an 
expansion of paternity establishment, enhanced access to information 
and mass data collection, and increased enforcement remedies. 
The paternity provisions attempt to bring a larger number of 
potential parents within the scope of private child support obligations, 
while enhanced access to information, data systems and remedies 
provide public mechanisms to enforce these private obligations.  The 
debates on the child support provisions continued the theme of 
cracking down on “deadbeat dads,” enforcing personal responsibility 
and saving money.  Senator DeWine stated, for example, that the bill 
would strengthen the ability of states 
[T]o go after the delinquent and deadbeat parents.  It is absolutely 
essential that we strengthen the ethic of personal responsibility in 
this way.  We need to make it absolutely clear—America demands 
that parents be responsible for their children.  Deadbeat parents 
cannot be allowed to walk away from their responsibilities.145 
This crackdown of deadbeat parents was at times in the debate 
expressly tied to the fiscal conservative objective of reducing the 
                                                          
 142. Id. 
 143. See 42 U.S.C. § 1305 (1996) (demonstrating congressional intent to create 
the Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act under the broader Social Security Act). 
 144. See Block Grants to States for Temporary Aid to Needy Families, 42 U.S.C. §§ 
601-19 (1997) (indicating that the substitution a block grant program for the old 
AFDC entitlements was intended to increase the States’ flexibility in servicing the 
needs of qualifying families). 
 145. 142 Cong. Rec. S9352 (1996) (statement of Sen. DeWine). 
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burden on the taxpayer.146  Representative Roukema, in the House 
Debates on the Conference Report, noting that many mothers go on 
welfare because they are not receiving support payments to which 
they are legally entitled, stated, “[w]ith the current system spending 
such a large portion of funding on these mothers, children are the 
first victims, and the taxpayers who have to support these families are 
the last victims.”147 
The major objective of the child support provisions, as reflected in 
the debates, was to get single mothers and their children off welfare 
by enforcing outstanding child support obligations. Both critics and 
proponents alike have thus observed that the major animus for the 
reforms to child support was to reduce welfare costs.148  As Laura 
Morgan describes, “it was the intent of Congress, by enacting 
PRWORA to eliminate, so far as it could, the public support of the 
family.”149  In the context of the paternity provisions in particular, 
Tonya Brito has similarly observed, 
The motivating factor here is simply the state’s fiscal concerns.  
Whereas in the past it was a private matter, now the state is much 
more involved in ensuring that paternity of nonmarital children is 
established.  States want to establish paternity to identify a child 
support obligator so that they can collect support payments to offset 
the costs of welfare.150 
While this fiscal conservative objective of privatizing the costs of 
raising families was undoubtedly a dominant animating factor in the 
paternity provisions, and the child support provisions more generally, 
a social conservative rhetoric was also evident in the PRWORA debates 
and legislation.  The stated purposes of the Act included reducing 
illegitimacy and promoting marriage and a traditional two-parent 
family; a classic social conservative vision of family.  Similarly, the 
findings portion of the Act focused considerable attention on high 
rates of illegitimacy and its association with welfare dependency.  The 
congressional debates frequently focused on the objective of reducing 
illegitimacy.  Senator Lieberman, for example, stated, “[t]he 
                                                          
 146. See Laura Curran & Laura Abrams, Making Men into Dads: Fatherhood, the 
State and Welfare Reform, 14 GENDER AND SOC’Y 622, 667 (2000) (analyzing the 
paternity provisions in PRWORA and explaining the adverse affects of the law on low-
income fathers). 
 147. 142 Cong. Rec. H9392 (1996) (statement of Rep. Roukema). 
 148. See Morgan, supra note 22, at 712 (stating that it was Congress’ intent to 
eliminate public support for families through the enactment of PRWORA); see also 
Brito, supra note 22, at 259 (asserting that the motivating factor behind these welfare 
reforms is the state’s fiscal concerns). 
 149. Morgan, supra note 22, at 712. 
 150. Brito, supra note 22, at 259. 
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conference bill also holds the hope of protecting children and 
reducing welfare spending by attacking the problem of unmarried 
teen parenthood.  Welfare will no longer encourage the proliferation 
of single and uneducated parents by automatically and 
unconditionally underwriting the mothers who bear children out of 
wedlock.”151 
While this concern with high rates of illegitimacy can be seen to 
inform the provisions on establishing paternity, it is not clear that the 
social conservatives’ objectives were very effectively translated into 
concrete public policy.  The paternity provisions do not expressly 
promote marriage.  Rather, they are intended to make women 
“appropriately” dependent on the biological fathers of their children, 
whether married or not, rather than the state.152  Like child support 
following marital breakdown, the paternity provisions are a second 
best solution for social conservatives, who as David Blankenhorn 
explained above, are at times divided over recognizing the reality of 
contemporary family formations and promoting a particular vision of 
the family.  The paternity provisions recognize the reality of the high 
rates of illegitimacy and attempt to privatize the costs of this 
illegitimacy.  While forcing women to rely on the biological father is 
better than relying on the state, it falls considerably short of actually 
promoting marital families, thereby creating a tension for a social 
conservative vision of the family.153  This tension characterizes the 
hybrid nature of the PRWORA, which seeks to promote both a fiscal 
conservative privatization of the once public costs of supporting 
families and a social conservative vision of the traditional family by 
reducing the number of births outside of marriage and promoting 
marriage.  Both agreed on the objective of promoting personal 
responsibility, but their respective visions of that personal 
responsibility were markedly divergent.  For fiscal conservatives, 
personal responsibility was cast in primarily financial terms, while for 
social conservatives, it was also cast in moral terms.  Yet, these very 
different visions of fatherhood and family were submerged by the 
                                                          
 151. 142 Cong.Rec. S9387-01 (1996) (statement of Sen. Lieberman). 
 152. See Ronald B. Mincy & Hillard Pouncy, There Must Be 50 Ways to Start a 
Family, in THE FATHERHOOD MOVEMENT 97-98 (Horn et al. eds., 1999) (explaining 
that one provision of PRWORA requires states to reduce a mother’s benefits if she 
does not identify the father of her child as a means of establishing paternity and 
thereby potentially collecting child support). 
 153. See 142 Cong. Rec. H9392 (1996) (statement of Rep. Meyers) (criticizing 
PRWORA for failing to go far enough to reverse the rate of illegitimacy and promote 
the two parent traditional family).  “The link between our ever-increasing illegitimacy 
rates and the growth in AFDC rolls are not casual.  They are cause and effect.  Why is 
it too much to ask that children have two responsible adults or parents?  Sadly we 
continue to encourage the opposite.”  Id. 
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shared discourse of personal responsibility. 
A stronger social conservative approach to child support, 
fatherhood and family became evident in the debates surrounding 
the introduction of the Fathers Count Act in 1999.154  The Fathers 
Count Act, passed by the House, but not the Senate, would have 
provided one-hundred and fifty-five million dollars in grants for 
programs that promote marriage and ‘responsible fatherhood’.  The 
objective of the Act was, like the previous child support initiatives, to 
reduce welfare dependency by privatizing the costs of supporting 
families.  However, the Act took a very different approach to realizing 
this objective.  Retreating from the demonizing rhetoric of deadbeat 
dads, the Act sought to encourage fathers to become responsible for 
their children.  Funding would be available for programs to teach 
parenting skills as well as enhance employability through job training 
to allow fathers to fulfill their child support obligations. 
The Fathers Count Act represents a significant normative shift in 
the approach to child support, fatherhood and family.  The approach 
is one that seeks to assist fathers meet their responsibilities rather than 
simply penalize them for failing to do so.  Through the 1990s, the 
responsible fatherhood movement successfully promoted its vision of 
fatherhood, family and welfare dependency, resulting in an easing of 
the demonization of fathers in federal public policy debates.155  The 
new approach emphasized the importance of fathers in their 
children’s lives, and the problem of welfare dependency was recast as 
a social epidemic of illegitimacy and single-parent families.  Women 
and children on welfare did not just need money or jobs; they needed 
fathers.  The responsible fatherhood movement sought to restore 
fathers to their rightful place at the helm of the family, and thereby 
remedy the broad range of social problems that resulted from 
                                                          
 154. H.R. 3073, 106th Cong. (1999). 
 155. See Mincy & Pouncy, supra note 152, at 96-101 (arguing that the success of 
the responsible fatherhood movement was attributable, in part, to its strong roots in 
the social conservative movement).  This social conservative position has been 
buttressed by the many studies and commentaries that have pointed out the limits of 
federal child support enforcement as a solution to child poverty and welfare 
dependency.  The fiscal conservative approach of penalizing fathers has been 
extensively criticized as failing to recognize the limits of these fathers.  Many are 
themselves poor, and do not have the financial resources to pay child support.  The 
limited amount that they can pay does not go very far in reimbursing the public 
purse, particularly when the costs of the child support enforcement regime is taken 
into account.  Social conservatives have been able to align with these critics, as well as 
fathers’ rights advocates who seek to minimize what they perceive to be the excessive 
demands being made on fathers.  The resulting vision of fatherhood is one that is 
more sympathetic to the plight of unemployed and low-income fathers who do not 
have the skills, financial or otherwise, to fulfill their responsibilities—sympathy that in 
turn extends to the challenges facing all fathers. 
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fatherless families.  The discourse is one of promoting responsibility 
and it is a decidedly gendered responsibility.  Fathers are responsible 
for financial support, and federal funding is to be made available to 
assist fathers assume their rightful place as the breadwinners of the 
family.  In conjunction with the provisions promoting marriage, the 
Fathers Count Act represented an attempt to rearticulate the 
traditional family, with the father at its helm.156  Moreover, while 
there remains a fiscal conservative concern with privatizing the costs 
of supporting families, the Act would have involved significant 
government spending and an expansion of government programs.  
The Fathers Count Act represented a social conservative approach to 
family that does not recoil from fairly extensive regulation in order to 
promote a particular substantive vision of family. 
While the Fathers Count Act was not passed into law, much of its 
substance has been incorporated into the Personal Responsibility, 
Work and Family Promotion Act of 2003.157  The bill would authorize 
federal spending on state and local programs designed to promote 
responsible fatherhood.  The purposes of the program, as outlined in 
the congressional findings, include promoting responsible 
parenting,158 enhancing the financial ability of fathers to provide for 
their children,159 improving fathers abilities to manage family 
business affairs160 and encouraging healthy marriages and married 
                                                          
 156. See Wimberly, supra note 107, at 747-48 (stating that services under this Act 
promoted marriage “as an end in itself and the best way to keep women and children 
off welfare”). 
 157. See Personal Responsibility, Work, and Family Promotion Act of 2003, H.R. 4, 
108th Cong. (1st Sess. 2003) (re-authorizing of the TANF bill, which was passed by 
the House on February 13, 2003 by a vote of 230 to 192, and is currently before the 
Senate). 
 158. See H.R. 4 § 441 (stating that one of the purposes of the bill is “[p]romoting 
responsible, caring and effective parenting through counseling, mentoring and 
parenting education, dissemination of educational materials and information on 
parenting skills, encouragement of positive father involvement, including the positive 
involvement on non-residential fathers”). 
 159. See id.  The purpose of the bill is to: 
[E]nhanc[e] the abilities and commitment of unemployed or low-income 
fathers to provide material support for their families and to avoid or leave 
welfare programs by assisting them to take full advantage of education, job 
training, and job search programs, to improve work habits and work skills, to 
secure career advancement by activities such as outreach and information 
dissemination, coordination, as appropriate with employment services and 
job training programs . . . encouragement and support of timely payment of 
current child support and regular payment toward past due child support 
obligations in appropriate cases. 
Id. 
 160. See id. (stating that a third purpose for the bill is to “[i]mprov[e] fathers’ 
ability to effectively manage family business affairs by means such as education, 
counseling, and mentoring in matters including household management, budgeting, 
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fatherhood.161  The responsible fatherhood provisions of the TANF 
reauthorization bill represent a fiscal and social conservative hybrid, 
promoting both the ability of low-income fathers to pay child support 
and promoting a two parent family thereby avoiding the need for 
child support in the first place, both of which are seen to reduce 
welfare costs to the state.  But, unlike previous federal child support 
initiatives, the emphasis is clearly on the latter.  Most of the provisions, 
and the programs they would authorize, emphasize helping fathers 
become responsible parents, which within the framework of the bill 
means married, employed and financially supporting their family. 
The shift in the discourse around child support initiatives should 
thus be apparent.  While the early reforms focused almost exclusively 
on reducing welfare dependency by getting tough on deadbeat 
fathers, the more recent debates have increasingly taken on the 
promotion of traditional families by preventing the situations that give 
rise to the need for child support—children born outside of marriage 
and divorce.  The fiscal conservative emphasis on reducing costs by 
paying support, while still allowing individuals the choice to exit 
relationships, has given way to an approach that seeks to reduce costs 
by promoting the traditional two-parent family.  The federal child 
support initiatives illustrate the extent to which fiscal and social 
conservatives agree on the overarching problem of welfare 
dependency and the need to promote personal responsibility, but 
diverge in their strategies and solutions.  Fiscal conservatives seek 
simply to privatize the costs.  Social conservatives, by contrast, seek to 
privatize the costs but only within the confines of the traditional 
family.  The two-parent, marital family with a breadwinner father is 
cast as the appropriate solution to welfare dependency.  Similarly, 
while fiscal conservatives have few qualms about getting tough on 
fathers—or anyone else defaulting on a private support obligation—
social conservatives, by contrast, have a very different vision of 
fatherhood.  They seek to empower fathers to assume their rightful 
                                                          
banking, and handling of financial transactions, time management and home 
maintenance.”). 
 161. See id.  A fourth purpose for the bill is to: 
[E]ncourag[e] and support[] healthy marriages and married fatherhood 
through such activities as premarital education, including the use of 
premarital inventories, marriage preparation programs, skills-based marriage 
education programs, marital therapy, couples counseling, divorce education 
and reduction programs, divorce mediation and counseling, relationship 
skills advancement programs, including those designed to reduce child abuse 
and domestic violence, and dissemination of information about benefits of 
marriage for both parents and children. 
Id. 
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position as the head of the family—a position that includes financial 
support, but not exclusively so.  Rather, fatherhood also includes 
other dimensions of parenting—fatherly involvement in the lives of 
their children, fatherly leadership of the family as a whole.  For social 
conservatives, financial support is but one of the many social benefits 
of two-parent, marital families. 
The policies may not appear to be entirely inconsistent.  Fiscal 
conservatism is not opposed to a two-parent, opposite-sex family; it is 
simply agnostic.  It seeks to reduce welfare dependency by increasing 
the responsibility of fathers to support their children—either inside 
or outside of marriage.  The social conservative vision of responsible 
fatherhood could be embraced by fiscal conservatism as one amongst 
a number of viable strategies for achieving the objective of reduced 
government spending.  Indeed, the responsible fatherhood programs 
are not replacing the child-support enforcement programs that have 
been put in place at the state and federal levels, but are envisioned as 
a supplement to these programs. 
There are, however, some levels on which the visions of fiscal and 
social conservatives are contradictory.  The fiscal conservative vision of 
the family is a highly individualized and degendered one.  It largely 
rejects the significance of gender, and seeks to promote an abstract 
individual, a disembodied market citizen, who should be made to be 
responsible for their individual children.  While a claim is being made 
on the family, it is a claim that is not invested in either gender or 
marital status.  Social conservatives, by contrast, are committed to 
reinscribing a highly gendered world, in which women and men are 
constituted as naturally different and therefore naturally assigned to 
different roles and responsibilities.162  Social conservatives are making 
a claim on—and seeking to reinscribe—a very particular, very 
traditional conception of the family.  The visions of family are thus 
quite different, and arguably, inconsistent: individual versus collective, 
hierarchical versus formally equal, gendered versus non-gendered.  
While the child support strategies may have been pursued in a 
conservative alliance, with different emphasizes at different moments, 
the alliance is, at best, a precarious one, given their fundamentally 
different visions of family. 
2.  Welfare Eligibility and Entitlements 
The efforts to reform welfare eligibility and entitlements have 
focused on the other irresponsible citizen in fiscal, libertarian and 
                                                          
 162. See generally Klatch, supra note 78. 
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social conservative stories of welfare: the single mother.  This welfare 
mother is cast as responsible for both a chronic drain on public 
resources and the American taxpayer, and a national epidemic of 
illegitimacy and all of its associated social evils.  Fiscal conservatives, 
libertarians and social conservatives have sought to demonize the 
‘welfare mother’ to justify their assault on the welfare system.  But, as 
this section will explore, their prescriptions for the welfare mother are 
somewhat different.  Social conservatives want to eliminate the 
phenomenon of illegitimacy and single motherhood, by reducing the 
number of children born outside of marriage, and by making welfare 
mothers ‘properly’ dependent on the father of their children.  
Mothers are expected to find a father, marry him and make him 
responsible for the financial wellbeing of his family.  By contrast, both 
fiscal and libertarian conservatives want to put the welfare mother to 
work, redefining “single mother” as a potentially employable worker.  
However, they have slightly different strategies for doing so.  The 
fiscal conservative will consider restoring the market through a range 
of public and private regulation.  The libertarian, by contrast, places 
greater emphasis on the market and its mode of private regulation by 
simply abolishing welfare.  Social, fiscal and libertarian conservatives 
each seek an end to the welfare mothers’ reliance on the state, but 
their vision of her fate is radically different.  This section will explore 
these subtle differences between fiscal conservative, libertarian and 
social conservative approaches to welfare mothers.  It argues that 
while fiscal conservatism dominated welfare reform in the 1970s and 
1980s, social conservatism made considerable inroads in welfare 
reform in the 1990s, and has become increasingly influential in the 
current debates over TANF reauthorization currently before 
Congress.  Libertarian conservatism, although present in the public 
policy debates, seems to have had rather less concrete impact in the 
development of public policy. 
The story of welfare reform is further complicated by the 
underlying racialization of the public policy debates.  As many have 
argued, welfare reform in America has long been a racialized 
subject.163  Many have sought to demonstrate the extent to which 
                                                          
 163. See, e.g., Theda Skocpal, African Americans in U.S. Social Policy, in 
CLASSIFYING BY RACE (Paul E. Pierson ed., 1995) (exploring the extent to which race 
has played a crucial role in welfare reform in the Progressive Era, the New Deal, and 
the War on Poverty).  See generally MICHAEL BROWN, RACE, MONEY AND THE AMERICAN 
WELFARE STATE (1999); KENNETH J. NEUBECK & NOEL CAZENAVE, WELFARE RACISM: 
PLAYING THE RACE CARE AGAINST AMERICA’S POOR (2001); ROBERT LIEBERMAN, SHIFTING 
THE COLOUR LINE: RACE AND THE AMERICAN WELFARE STATE (1998); FRANCIS FOX PIVEN 
& RICHARD A. CLOWARD, REGULATING THE POOR: THE FUNCTIONS OF PUBLIC WELFARE 
(1993); JILL QUADAGNO, THE COLOR OF WELFARE: HOW RACISM UNDERMINED THE WAR 
ON POVERTY (1994). 
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welfare reform since the 1960s, the period under analysis in this 
paper, has been informed and animated by racialized assumptions, 
images and inequalities.164  Yet, as Soss has observed, this period of 
welfare reform has been “marked by a racial discourse that is 
truncated and skewed.”165  The Author further explained that “we 
inhabit a discursive moment defined by a mixture of corrosive racial 
sentiments, fears of being labeled ‘racist’, and uncertainties about 
whether it is wise to speak of race at all.  Too often, race now operates 
by stealth, embedded in ostensibly neutral language.”166  Race all but 
disappears in contemporary public policy debates over welfare 
reform.  The discourse of fiscal conservatives, libertarians and social 
conservatives is, to a large extent facially neutral; it does not speak of 
race in general nor of African Americans in particular.  As such, a 
discursive analysis of these public policy debates runs the risk of 
collaborating in the erasure of race, and further obscuring the extent 
to which contemporary welfare reform is very much about race in 
America.  The difficulty lies in attempting to decipher the underlying 
differences between and among conservative discourses on the 
question of race and the racialized subject of welfare reform, when 
the discourses themselves no longer explicitly speak in the language 
of race. 
a.  The Welfare Crisis and its Solutions 
Since the 1970s, fiscal, libertarian and social conservatives have 
waged a war on chronic ‘welfare dependency’, casting it as a chronic 
problem in need of a radically new solution.167  In the 1960s, the size 
                                                          
 164. See Michael K. Brown, Ghettos, Fiscal Federalism, and Welfare Reform, in 
RACE AND THE POLITICS OF WELFARE REFORM 58-61 (Sanford F. Schram et al. eds., 
2003) (explaining that, historically, racial policies surrounding public assistance have 
shaped modern welfare reform).  See generally BROWN, supra note 163; MARTIN 
GILENS, WHY AMERICANS HATE WELFARE: RACE, MEDIA AND THE POLITICS OF ANTIPOVERTY 
POLICY (1999); LIEBERMAN, supra note 163; QUADAGNO, supra note 163. 
 165. Introduction to RACE AND THE POLITICS OF WELFARE REFORM 12 (Sanford F. 
Schram et al. eds., 2003). 
 166. See id. (noting that “[m]any conversations take on a ‘we know what we’re 
talking about feel, trading on race-coded euphemisms regarding ‘urban’ and ‘inner-
city’ problems, ‘cultural backgrounds,’ the need for ‘personal responsibility,’ the 
troubles of the ‘underclass’”); see also Lisa Crooms, Don’t Believe the Hype: Black 
Women, Patriarchy, and the New Welfarism, 38 HOW. L.J. 611, 613 (1995) (quoting 
Lucie E. White, No Exit: Rethinking “Welfare Dependency” from a Different Ground, 
81 GEO. L.J. 1961, 1966 (1993)) (“The racial sub-text of the rhetoric simply makes use 
of the explicit rhetoric unnecessary.  If ‘welfare is a fourth generation code word for 
[black],’ then there is no need to differentiate between welfare recipients and 
blacks.”). 
 167. See Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 638 (1969) (striking down AFDC 
residency requirements), overruled in part by Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 
(1974); see also King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 333-34 (1968) (striking down a state 
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and cost of AFDC soared.  The program grew from 3.5 recipients in 
1961 to 11 million in 1971.168  Moreover, the composition of welfare 
recipients changed significantly, as previously excluded single 
mothers, particularly, African American and never-married women, 
became entitled to AFDC.169  Congress attempted to tighten eligibility 
and reduce benefits, but the costs and numbers continued to rise.170  
“Welfare was now in ‘crisis.’”171 
A consensus emerged between fiscal conservatives, libertarians and 
social conservatives that it was time to break the cycle of welfare 
dependency, and get welfare mothers off welfare. All three shared a 
concern about moral hazard, that is, the idea that the availability of 
AFDC to poor single mothers reduced their incentives to avoid the 
costs of single motherhood and thereby created more dependents.172  
Indeed, it was the attack on welfare as undermining personal 
responsibility that helped to unite these divergent conservative 
factions.173  But, a closer look at the discourses of family and 
privatization reveal that fiscal, libertarian and social conservatives 
often diverge in their prescriptions for the ills of welfare dependency. 
Charles Murray, in his highly influential book Losing Ground, 
                                                          
substitute father provision that denied AFDC benefits to families on the grounds that 
the mother had a sexual relationship with a man). 
 168. See GWENDOLYN MINK, WELFARE’S END 51-52 (1998) (explaining that the 
continued growth of the welfare base will eventually make the program too costly to 
support). 
 169. See Joel F. Handler, Transformation of the Aid to Families with Dependent 
Children: The Family Support Act in Historical Context, 16 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. 
CHANGE 457, 488 (1987/88) [hereinafter Handler, Transformation] (explaining the 
racial discrimination in obtaining AFDC benefits prior to the 1960s, and stating that 
in many parts of the country AFDC rolls would close down when crops had to be 
harvested, thus forcing entire families, including children, into the fields); see also 
Tonya Brito, From Madonna to Proletariat: Constructing a New Ideology of 
Motherhood in Welfare Discourse, 44 VILL. L. REV. 415, 424 (1999) (stating that 
“court decisions, civil rights lawyers, and welfare rights activists” in the 1960s led to 
the end of arbitrary eligibility restrictions). 
 170. See Joel F. Handler, “Ending Welfare as We Know it”: The Win/Win Split or 
the Stench of Victory, 5 J. GENDER RACE & JUST. 131, 136 (2001) [hereinafter Handler, 
Ending Welfare] (arguing that congressional efforts to reform welfare have addressed 
the underlying social issues contributing to its continued growth). 
 171. Id. 
 172. See McCluskey, supra note 1, at 807-808 (defining “moral hazard” in 
economic terms and stating that those who are “insured” have no incentive to reduce 
costs).  In the welfare context, providing economic support to people in need 
encourages fewer individuals to take action to avoid poverty.  Id. 
 173. See Lucy Williams, The Right’s Attack on Aid to Families with Dependent 
Children, 10 PUBLIC EYE 1, *7-8, 12-14 (1996) (tracing the emergence of this 
coalition, noting its underlying ideological tensions and conflicts and stating that 
“[t]he majority of New Right groups coalesced around this ideological formulation 
that welfare causes the breakup of the American family, and decreases individual 
initiative and personal responsibility”). 
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argued that the welfare state actually created an underclass of chronic 
welfare dependency.  The availability of welfare created perverse short 
term economic incentives.  Young women no longer have to bear the 
real economic costs of bearing children out of wedlock.  Rather, they 
might actually be financially better off having the children and going 
on welfare than not having children and remaining in low paying 
employment.  Murray’s analysis was economic in nature, and his 
proscription libertarian.  The problem of welfare dependency could 
only be solved by abolishing welfare altogether. 
Fiscal conservatives shared the libertarian concern with reversing 
escalating costs of social welfare, and reconstituting welfare 
dependants into self sufficient individuals. The solution is an 
economic one of reversing moral hazard through marketized 
incentives.  However, fiscal conservatives stopped short of proscribing 
the complete elimination of welfare. For fiscal conservatives, welfare 
recipients must be transformed into workers, and in particular, single 
mothers dependent on welfare must be transformed into employable 
individuals, self reliant within the paid labor force.174  The strategy is 
an individualizing and degendering one—emphasis is placed on 
individual self-reliance.  Single mothers are thus being redefined as 
employable individuals, and their dependency on welfare is no longer 
a ‘natural’ feature of their status as mothers, but rather, a pathological 
dependency that needs to be fixed.175  Their familial roles are being 
rendered all but invisible, as single mothers are being reconstituted as 
abstract, disembodied market citizens. Welfare dependency more 
generally is recast as a temporary problem that can be fixed through a 
restructured welfare system that provides appropriate work incentives, 
training and employment opportunities.176  Thus, unlike libertarian 
                                                          
 174. See DAVID T. ELLWOOD, POOR SUPPORT: POVERTY IN THE AMERICAN FAMILY 128-
155 (1988) (explaining that the expectation that single mothers on welfare can work 
part-time jobs is problematic).  Ellwood states that “mixing work and welfare is not 
the answer” because of expenses such as child care.  Id. at 155; see also IRWIN 
GARFINKEL & SARAH MCLANAHAN, SINGLE MOTHERS AND THEIR CHILDREN: A NEW 
AMERICAN DILEMMA 174-175 (1986) (stating that although work requirements will 
reduce the amount of government support provided, some of the reduction will 
come not from the success of the program, but from single mothers who do not want 
the “hassles that accompany fulfilling the work requirement”). 
 175. See Fraser & Gordon, supra note 92 (discussing the transformation of the 
meaning of dependency from legitimate social condition to pathological personality 
disorder). 
 176. See id.; Patricia M. Evans, Gender, Income Security, and the Welfare State, in 
WOMEN AND THE CANADIAN WELFARE STATE (Patricia M. Evans and Gerda Wekerle eds., 
1997); Patricia Evans, Single Mothers and Ontario’s Welfare Policy: Restructuring the 
Debate, in WOMEN AND PUBLIC POLICY (Janine Brodie ed., 1995); Martha Minow, The 
Welfare of Single Mothers and their Children, 26 CONN. L. REV. 817 (1994); Fineman, 
supra note 20. 
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solutions, a fiscal conservative approach to welfare reform does not 
eschew continued government regulation. 
Social conservatives have a different emphasis and analysis of the 
problems of welfare dependency.  For social conservatives, single 
mothers on welfare are responsible for spiraling rates of illegitimacy, 
which is in turn cast as America’s single most devastating social 
problem.  The central goal of welfare reform is accordingly the 
reduction of illegitimacy by preventing non-marital (particularly teen-
age) births and promoting marriage.  Rather than transforming single 
mothers into employable individuals, social conservatives seek to 
prevent single motherhood in the first place.177  Women should be 
encouraged not to have children outside of marriage.  If the emphasis 
on abstinence fails, then women should be encouraged to marry the 
fathers of their children.  Any and all incentives to the contrary must 
be removed.  Social conservative discourse, in accordance with its 
emphasis on rearticulating the traditional family and traditional 
gender norms therein, thus seeks to strengthen marriage and the two-
parent family.  The solution to moral hazard thus lies not in economic 
incentives, but in moral regulation.178  In marked contrast to fiscal 
conservatives, the social conservative strategy is a familializing and 
gendering one.  Whereas fiscal conservatives see the market as the 
ultimate solution for single women’s poverty and chronic welfare 
dependency, social conservatives see the solution in marriage and the 
traditional family. 
Once again, social conservative approach to welfare reform does 
not shy away from government intervention in the intimate lives of its 
                                                          
 177. See STUART BUTLER & ANNA KUNDRATAS, OUT OF THE POVERTY TRAP: A 
CONSERVATIVE STRATEGY 146 (1987) (arguing that although promoting work and 
responsibility is important, “work requirements within the welfare system do not 
improve work incentives or opportunities for absent fathers; their effect is to 
transform mothers into primary earners . . . .  Thus, long-term welfare reform has to 
focus on strengthening the two-parent family”); see also BLANKENHORN, FATHERLESS 
AMERICA, supra note 42 (explaining the differences between those conservatives who 
seek to address the consequences of the breakdown of the family and those who seek 
to reverse the trend by restoring the traditional family).  Social conservatives do not 
oppose the workfare approach.  Rather, they agree with the underlying emphasis on 
personal responsibility, and have supported welfare reforms that have encouraged 
and/or mandated work.  BUTLER & KUNDRATES, supra at 177.  However, work appears 
to be a secondary to their emphasis on the traditional family as the solution to welfare 
dependency and poverty.  Id.  For social conservatives, transforming single women 
into workers is an inadequate solution, in so far as it addresses the problem after the 
fact.  Id.  Although it would reduce state expenditures on welfare, it would fail to 
reverse the problem of illegitimacy and all its attendant social costs.  Id. 
 178. See McCluskey, supra note 1, at 823-25 (describing the moral regulation 
rationale as ‘communitarian’, which includes both progressive and conservative 
critics, and the social conservative approach as corresponding to McCluskey’s 
conservative communitarians). 
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citizens.  For example, Mead’s ‘new paternalism’ in social welfare 
policy argues that the poor require not only financial assistance, but 
also direction and close supervision.179  Individuals cannot be 
assumed to maximize their own self-interest or that of society; they 
must be made to do so through government intervention.  Rather 
than a change in the scale of government, this paternalism represents 
a change in “the character of government,” whereby benefits are 
linked to behavior.180 
There are many ways in which these conservative politics appear to 
coalesce.  Fiscal conservatives, libertarians and social conservatives 
sought to change the behavior of welfare recipients, and specifically, 
of poor single women.  Each sought to reverse the problem of moral 
hazard created by AFDC.  These women needed to be encouraged to 
avoid the behavior that resulted in their welfare dependency, namely, 
single motherhood.  Each relied on the same underlying, racialized 
image of this single mother—the poor unmarried black woman—yet 
rarely spoke her name explicitly.181  Each sought to promote personal 
responsibility.182  But, their understanding of personal responsibility 
diverged.  For fiscal and libertarian conservatives, personal 
responsibility was primarily economic in nature—these women should 
work.183  For social conservatives, personal responsibility is primarily 
                                                          
 179. See Mead, supra note 48, at 2. 
 180. Id. (emphasizing on a paternalist approach to promote work over the 
traditional family values that are supported by social conservatives).  Workfare is an 
important part of Mead’s vision for reforming welfare.  Id.  This is yet another 
example of individual positions not mapping perfectly onto the three conservative 
positions, and of the “labels fitting arguments better than people.”  Id. 
 181. See Crooms, supra note 166, at 622. 
The image of the welfare queen was that of a poor black mother who first 
became pregnant as a teenager.  Her sexual irresponsibility resulted in her 
dropping out of high school and joining AFDC rolls.  Rather than marry the 
child’s father and make the best of the situation, she chose to remain single, 
to collect AFDC and to have more children by different fathers. 
Id.  This powerful image remains largely unspoken in welfare debates.  Id. 
 182. Similarly, fiscal conservatism is not so much opposed to shifting dependency 
from the state to the family as it is agnostic.  The ultimate fiscal conservative goal is to 
reduce welfare dependency.  Although it pursues this goal with its normative vision of 
the market as the primary mechanism for allocating wealth, it can accommodate 
other strategies provided that these strategies help reduce welfare dependency.  In 
the context of child support, fiscal conservatism supported the individualization and 
familiarization of support obligations in order to reduce welfare dependency.  At this 
level, however, fiscal and social conservative approaches to welfare reform may be 
viewed as mutually reinforcing.  However, at a deeper level, these distinct privatizing 
strategies have contradictory implications. 
 183. While fiscal conservatives sought to achieve this reconstitution of single 
mothers through government regulation and spending (for example, job training), 
libertarians sought to accomplish this goal simply by eliminating welfare, and allowing 
the market to restructure women’s choices. 
50
Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law, Vol. 13, Iss. 3 [2005], Art. 1
http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/jgspl/vol13/iss3/1
2005] CONTESTING CONSERVATISMS 465 
 
moral—these women should avoid pre-marital sex or marry the 
fathers of their children.  These differences in turn reflect a much 
deeper ideological divide.  Both fiscal conservative and libertarian 
approaches to reforming welfare are eroding the significance of 
gender and family, while social conservative approaches are 
intensifying gender and family. 
These distinctive approaches to welfare reform are evident in 
federal welfare reform.  On one hand, the federal government has 
sought to redefine single mothers as employable through increasingly 
strict workfare requirements.  On the other hand, the federal 
government has increasingly also sought to reduce the rates of single 
motherhood by reducing out-of-wedlock births and promoting 
marriage.  Both policies share the objective of reducing welfare 
dependency. But, beyond this shared objective, the political imaginary 
and concrete strategies of these policies diverge. 
b.  Federal Initiatives 
A dominant theme in welfare reform since the advent of the 
‘welfare crisis’ in the 1970s has been to eliminate welfare dependency 
by reintegrating welfare recipients into the labor market.184  This 
emphasis on work represented a shift in official welfare policy.  From 
its inception in 1935 until the late 1960s, AFDC expected eligible 
single mothers with young children to stay home to provide child 
care.185  Women who engaged in paid employment had their 
                                                          
 184. See Handler, supra note 169, at 467-70 (arguing that there is nothing new in 
welfare policy’s emphasis on work since welfare and work have been intricately 
connected since the formative period of welfare policy in the 1900s). 
 185. See id. at 476 (noting that historians of social welfare have illustrated the 
extent to which the idea that single mothers should be able to stay at home to care for 
their children was never realized by the vast majority of poor women).  “While the 
rhetoric of reform was the preservation of traditional patriarchy with the wife and 
mother at home caring for the family full time, the reality for the vast majority of 
poor women and mothers was work.”  Id.; see also Joel Handler, Constructing the 
Political Spectacle: The Interpretation of Entitlements, Legalization and Obligations 
in Social Welfare History, 56 BROOK. L. REV. 899, 919 (1990) (explaining that under 
both the Aid to Dependent Children program enacted in 1911, and its successor, the 
Aid to Families with Dependent Children enacted in 1935, highly restrictive 
conditions disqualified many single mothers, and work remained their only option).  
These maternalistic programs were primarily designed to benefit a subset of single 
mothers, namely, widows—who were single due to no fault of their own.  Id.  
“Through the use of “suitable home” and “employable mother” policies, states were 
able to exclude the unworthy, maintain labor markets, and reduce costs.  Even under 
the Social Security Act, ADC remained small and primarily for white widows.”  Id.  See 
generally MIMI ABRAMOVITZ, REGULATING THE LIVES OF WOMEN: SOCIAL WELFARE POLICY 
FROM COLONIAL TIMES TO THE PRESENT (1988); LINDA GORDON, PITIED, BUT NOT 
ENTITLED: SINGLE MOTHERS AND THE HISTORY OF WELFARE (1994); ALICE KESSLER 
HARRIS, OUT TO WORK: A HISTORY OF WAGE-EARNING WOMEN IN THE UNITED STATES 
(1982); Gwendolyn Mink, The Lady and the Tramp: Gender, Race and the Origins of 
the American Welfare State, in WOMEN, THE STATE AND WELFARE (London Gordon 
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earnings deducted from their assistance.  In the 1960s, attitudes about 
women’s roles began to change, with the dramatic increase in 
women’s labor market participation.  Some public policy reformers 
began to argue that mothers on welfare should similarly be expected 
to work.  Work requirements were first established with the 1967 
Work Incentive Program (“WIN”).186  In 1971, the program was 
replaced by WIN II, which introduced somewhat harsher work 
requirements and strengthened sanctions for non-compliance.187  
While WIN had initially been mandatory for men, but voluntary for 
women, WIN II required that women with children over the age of six 
years participate in job training or employment programs in order to 
qualify for AFDC.188  The amendments also shifted the focus from 
education and training to placement in entry level programs.189  
Neither WIN nor WIN II was particularly successful in reducing 
welfare dependency.190  In 1981, the Reagan administration 
introduced the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1981.  The 
amendments allowed the states to require welfare recipients to 
participate in Community Work Experience (“CWEP”), effectively a 
workfare program that would require recipients to work for public 
agencies in order to qualify for assistance.191  The amendments also 
allowed a number of states to experiment with work-relief programs. 
These work requirements reflected an emerging fiscal conservative 
vision of welfare reform that came to inform federal initiatives.  The 
objective of each of these programs was to transform AFDC into a 
temporary assistance program that focused on rehabilitation through 
job training and employment.  Welfare mothers whose dependency 
was once seen as a natural product of their roles as childcare 
providers were being reconstituted as employable individuals.192  
Despite the influence of Charles Murray in popularizing the attack on 
welfare, the policy reforms owed more to fiscal than libertarian 
conservatism.  This fiscal conservative impulse culminated in the 
Family Support Act of 1988, the first major welfare reform legislation 
                                                          
ed., 1990) (illustrating that social welfare programs were often highly racialized). 
 186. Social Security Amendments of 1967, Pub. L. 90-248, Title II, 81 (Stat. 821). 
 187. Pub. L. No. 92-223, 1971 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2435-39. 
 188. See Handler, Ending Welfare, supra note 170, at 188. 
 189. Handler, Transformation, supra note 169, at 490. 
 190. Id. at 491. 
 191. See generally Matthew Diller, Working without a Job: The Social Messages of 
the New Workfare, 9 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 19 (1998). 
 192. See I. GARFINKEL & S. MCLANAHAN, SINGLE MOTHERS AND THE CHILDREN 181 
(1986) (arguing that the AFDC should be transformed into a work-relief program for 
single mothers that emphasized the values of work and independence). 
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in decades.193  The primary objective of the Family Support Act was to 
integrate welfare recipients into the workforce, by mandating that 
single mothers work or train for work as a condition of eligibility.  The 
central plank of this strategy was the Job Opportunities and Basic 
Skills (“JOBS”), a program that required welfare recipients to work, 
while also offering opportunities for education, job training, skills 
development and childcare.194  Recipients with children under the 
age of three were exempt from participation in JOBS.195  In order to 
maintain funding, the states had to enroll fifteen percent of their 
AFDC caseload in a JOBS program by 1995. 
Throughout the Congressional debate, the emphasis was on 
breaking welfare dependency through work.  Senator Armstrong, a 
sponsor of the bill, highlighted the extent to which the Family 
Support Act embraced two different approaches to the question of 
work: “For many, education and training is the only way out of 
poverty.  For still many others, welfare ought to be conditioned on an 
obligation to work.  This bill is historic because these two philosophies 
of welfare reform are brought together.”196  The Family Support Act 
included provisions to promote work through both training and 
education and workfare.197  While the emphasis is quite different—
government spending on training programs versus work as a 
condition of eligibility—these different visions were united through a 
shared objective of transforming welfare dependents into workers.198  
Many, including Senator Armstrong, emphasized the normative value 
of work: 
[T]o me, the single most important reform in this bill is the work 
requirement.  It is, for the first time ever, conditioning the receipt 
of welfare assistance with a requirement to work . . . .  [I]nstalling 
this principle in our welfare system is a historic step.  Here is why I 
believe that is so.  First, I think it is simple justice.  Most people fully 
                                                          
 193. Pub. L. No. 100-485, 102 Stat. 2343. 
 194. See Williams, supra note 173, at *3 (arguing that many conservative think 
tanks such as the Heritage Foundation and the Free Congress Foundation did not 
support the job training programs of the Family Support Act, but rather were 
advocating for mandatory workfare and stronger behavior modification programs); 
see also Katz, supra note 1 (observing that some fiscal conservatives disliked job 
training because they distorted labor markets and inflated wages); id. at 65-66 
(discussing cuts to job training programs through the 1980s).  See generally Diller, 
supra note 191 (discussing general JOBS recipient requirements). 
 195. See 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(19)(C)(iii).  The states, however, had the option of 
limiting the exemption to parents of children under the age of one. 
 196. 134 CONG. REC. S13639 (statement of Sen. Armstrong). 
 197. See The Family Support Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-485, 102 Stat 2343; see 
also Diller, supra note 191, at 20-23. 
 198. See The Family Support Act of 1988. 
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share the view that those on welfare who are able to do so should 
work in return for the subsistence and support society is providing 
them.  That is simple fairness, equity, and common sense.  Second, 
work is good in and of itself.  By working, we gain dignity, a sense of 
purpose and self-respect.  We develop skills, become responsible, 
and are able to advance in life to better serve our fellow man.199 
The emphasis on work at times was linked explicitly with the fiscal 
conservative objective of reducing government spending.  Senator 
Kerry, for example, speaking of the experience of welfare reform in 
Massachusetts, stated: “In short, by offering people a hand up and a 
way out. [sic]  We can certainly expect to translate that experience to 
commensurate savings for the U.S. Treasury and in all of our 
States.”200  The link to the fiscal conservative objective of reducing 
government spending was sometimes made in more subtle ways.  
Representative Slattery stated: “The American taxpayer should be 
proud of this welfare reform legislation. It makes use of Federal funds 
by providing welfare recipients with the incentive to work and the 
education, training and support services needed to help them regain 
their place in society as productive, taxpaying citizens.”201  Rather 
than claiming that the welfare reform would result in immediate fiscal 
savings, the discourse advocated spending money to produce fiscally 
responsible, tax-paying citizens, a goal which presumably, in the long 
run, will reduce government spending. 
In 1996, Congress passed the Personal Responsibility and Work 
Opportunity Reconciliation Act (“PRWORA”).202  The legislation, 
famously described by President Clinton as “ending welfare as we 
know it” ended the federal entitlement to AFDC and replaced it with 
                                                          
 199. See 134 CONG. REC. S13639 (statement of Sen. Armstrong); see also id. 
(statement of Sen. Packwood) (“The bill requires that certain of those recipients 
work.  That is a good four-letter word, Mr. President—work.  We will try to educate 
them so that they can work in today’s society at a job at which they, hopefully, can 
work for the remainder of their life.”). 
 200. See 134 CONG. REC. S13639 (daily ed. Sept. 29, 1988) (statement of Sen. 
Kerry). But see 134 CONG. REC. H9098 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1988) (statement of Rep. 
Archer) (asserting that the bill did not deliver sufficient savings to the taxpayer). 
We should be able to say to taxpayers of this country that we have been able 
to encourage and to remove welfare recipients from the roles so that it results 
in a program which has fewer welfare recipients . . . .  We should be able to 
say to the working people of this country that the costs of this program will 
result after [five] years in reduced taxes to pay for welfare.  This bill fails on 
both accounts . . . the CBO projections . . . are that the cost of the bill will 
approach [one] billion [dollars] a year in extra spending at the conclusion of 
a [five]-year transition implementation period. 
Id. 
 201. 134 CONG. REC. 27180 (daily ed. Sept. 30, 1988) (statement of Rep. Slattery). 
 202. See Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act 
(implementing an overhaul of the nation’s cash welfare system). 
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block grants to the states known as Temporary Assistance to Needy 
Families (“TANF”).203  TANF established a five-year lifetime limit on 
welfare assistance and significantly toughened work requirements.204  
Parents receiving assistance must have engaged in work after receiving 
benefits for no more than 24 months.205  The legislation gave states 
broad discretion in deciding how to spend the block grant, provided 
that the expenditures promoted any of the four purposes of the 
law.206  States became free to establish their own eligibility rules for 
assistance.207  While federal law prohibits states from using TANF 
funds to assist certain categories of people, a family no longer has an 
entitlement to federal assistance, and, therefore, a state has no 
requirement assist any family.208  A state must spend a certain 
percentage of state money for benefits and services for “needy 
families” with children.209  States also must meet a set of work and 
participation rate requirements to avoid fiscal penalties.210  Most 
states developed time-limited assistance programs with an emphasis 
on work-related requirements.211  Congress eliminated many 
educational opportunities under the FSA, as TANF came to 
emphasize work over training.212 
                                                          
 203. Id. at § 103. 
 204. See id. at § 103; see also Diller, supra note 191, at 23-25. 
 205. See Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act § 103. 
 206. See id. 
 207. See id.; see also Diller, supra note 191, at 24-25. 
 208. See MARK GREENBERG, CTR. FOR LAW & SOC. POLICY, BEYOND WELFARE: NEW 
OPPORTUNITIES TO USE TANF TO HELP LOW INCOME WORKING FAMILIES, 1-2 (July 1999). 
 209. See MARK GREENBERG ET AL., CTR. FOR LAW & SOC. POLICY, WELFARE 
REAUTHORIZATION: AN EARLY GUIDE TO THE ISSUES 6 (July 2000) [hereinafter 
GREENBERG, WELFARE REAUTHORIZATION] (noting a state’s maintenance of effort 
(“MOE”) is eighty percent of the amount that the state spent in 1994 for a set of 
federal programs, or seventy-five percent if the state meets TANF participation rates), 
available at http:// www.clasp.org/publications/welfare_reauthorization_an_early_ 
guide.pdf (last visited July 20, 2005); see also MARK GREENBERG, CTR. FOR LAW & SOC. 
POLICY, THE TANF MAINTENANCE OF EFFORT REQUIREMENT 2 (2002) (describing 
possible ways for a state to support families in need by using MOE money as part of a 
cash assistance program or for programs of providing assistance for child care, 
education, job training, or paying administrative costs), available at 
www.clasp.org/TANF/moerev.htm (last revised Apr. 5, 2002). 
 210. See Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act § 103; 
see also Diller, supra note 191, at 24-25. 
 211. See GREENBERG, WELFARE REAUTHORIZATION, supra note 209, at 6; see also 
Jared Bernstein & Mark Greenberg, Reforming Welfare Reform, THE AM. PROSPECT, 
Vol. 12, Jan. 1-15, 2001, at 10-16, (noting that most states elected a five year limit while 
other opted for shorter limits), available at http://www.clasp. org/publications/ 
bernstein-j.html (lasted visted July 17, 2005). 
 212. See KATZ, supra note 1, at 326 (explaining that while unwed teen parents are 
required to attend school to receive benefits, for adult recipients, education does not 
fulfill work activity requirements, as the goal is  quick entry into the labor force); see 
also Diller, supra note 12, at 1755 (noting that welfare no longer has the purpose of 
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Throughout the Congressional debates, legislators saw PRWORA as 
a way to correct welfare dependency by making people work.213  The 
discourse of the debates highlighted breaking dependency by 
promoting work and personal responsibility.214  Many emphasized the 
way in which welfare has undermined self sufficiency.  Senator Shelby, 
for example, stated: 
The welfare system today encourages dependency, facilitates the 
breakdown of the family, demoralizes the human spirit, and 
undermines the work ethic that built our nation . . . .  People have 
become dependent on welfare because it completely destroys the 
need to work and the natural incentive to become self-sufficient.215 
PRWORA was then seen as reintroducing work incentives.  As 
Senator DeWine stated, “[t]his bill reestablishes the connection 
between work and income, the time-honored idea that people should 
work to get income.”216  Senator Burns similarly stated: 
And it pleases me to no end that the tough and real work 
requirements contained in this bill will get folks off the welfare rolls 
and into a productive job, job training program or community 
service. There is no doubt there will be exceptions, but the goal of 
welfare reform is independence, not government reliance.217 
The emphasis on work and individual self sufficiency was at times 
expressly tied to the fiscal conservative objective of reducing 
government spending.  Senator Helms stated: 
The welfare reform bill proposes to set welfare policy on the right 
course.  It requires welfare recipients to work; It promotes family 
and the work ethic; and [i]t exercises sound fiscal responsibility . . . 
.  [T]his legislation is fair to taxpayers because it saves [fifty-five] 
billion [dollars] of taxpayers’ money . . . .  Taxpayers are sick and 
tired of working hard, paying taxes and watching folks on welfare 
get a free ride.218 
The work-first emphasis of PRWORA further reinforced the 
individualizing and degendering strategy of fiscal conservatism. 
Congress removed government incentives that undermined individual 
self-sufficiency, reconstituted single mothers as employable citizens 
                                                          
providing ongoing support for families but, rather, attempts to accomplish specific 
outcomes related to work and self-sufficiency); ABRAMOVITZ, supra note 185, at 338 
(noting the 1967 amendments made a dramatic shift by requiring women on welfare 
to work rather than stay at home to care for children). 
 213. 142 CONG. REC. S9352 (daily ed. Aug. 1, 1996). 
 214. See id. 
 215. Id. (statement of Sen. Shelby). 
 216. Id. (statement of Sen. DeWine). 
 217. 142 CONG. REC. S9387 (daily ed. Aug. 1, 1996) (statement of Sen. Burns). 
 218. Id. (statement of Sen. Helms). 
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like any other, and cast the job market as the solution to welfare 
dependency.219 However, much of the political rhetoric around 
PRWORA—the stated objectives, the Congressional findings, and the 
Congressional debates—simultaneously reflected a social conservative 
shift.220  Three of the four main objectives of TANF involve the 
promotion of traditional families: 
(1) provide assistance to needy families so that children may be 
cared for in their own homes or in the homes of relatives; (2) end 
the dependence of needy parents on government benefits by 
promoting job preparation, work and marriage; (3) prevent and 
reduce the incidence of out-of-wedlock pregnancies and establish 
annual numerical goals for preventing and reducing the incidence 
of pregnancies; and (4) encourage the formation of two-parent 
families.221 
The Congressional findings similarly emphasized the importance of 
the traditional family and focused on the increase in illegitimacy and 
the resulting social harms.  The Act states, “(1) Marriage is the 
foundation of a successful society; (2) Marriage is an essential 
institution of a successful society which promotes the interests of 
children; [and] (3) Promotion of responsible fatherhood and 
motherhood is integral to successful child rearing and the well-being 
of children.”222 
PRWORA included a number of provisions designed to promote 
this social conservative vision of the traditional family.  In terms of 
reducing illegitimacy, the Act included an illegitimacy bonus of twenty 
million dollars to states that show the greatest decline in out of 
wedlock births without an increase in abortion rates.223  It allocated 
fifty million dollars a year for five years in block grants to states for 
                                                          
 219. See KATZ, supra note 1, at 324-25 (discussing the extent to which PRWORA 
reflected a market model by focusing on work and eliminating the moral hazard 
created by welfare entitlement). 
 220. See MARY PARKE, CTR. FOR LAW & SOC. POLICY, MARRIAGE-RELATED PROVISIONS 
IN RECENT WELFARE REAUTHORIZATION PROPOSALS: A SUMMARY 2 (2004) (noting that 
while Congress designed some substantive provisions with the objective of reducing 
illegitimacy and directed a few substantive provisions specifically towards the objective 
of promoting marriage, the shift was a result of increased flexibility given to states to 
spend their TANF block grants in accordance with the purposes of the legislation).  
Thirty-five states, however, used the increased flexibility they received to determine 
TANF eligibility to enable two-parent families to qualify for assistance more easily.  Id.  
States such as Oklahoma and Michigan have chosen to spend TANF funds on 
activities intended to strengthen marriages.  Id. 
 221. Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act § 103. 
 222. Id. (including in the note section Congressional findings demonstrating a 
detailed discussion of the alleged harms of illegitimacy by comparing the experiences 
of illegitimate children with the well-being of children raised in two-parent families). 
 223. See id. at § 403(a)(2). 
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abstinence only education programs.224  The programs had to adhere 
to specific guidelines advocating sexual abstinence outside of 
marriage and delineate harms to individuals, society, and children.225  
PRWORA denied federal assistance to some minor parents.226  
PRWORA effectively precludes states from spending TANF funds to 
assist unmarried, minor, custodial parents who do not participate in 
school or training rules, and who do not live with a parent, guardian 
or other relatives.227  While Congress ultimately rejected proposals to 
prohibit states from providing additional assistance for children born 
in welfare families, the block grant structure nevertheless permitted 
states to implement programs or related practices.228  The states that 
had established a family cap under an AFDC waiver prior to 1996 were 
now free to implement a cap without seeking waivers.229 
During the congressional debates senators, more often than not the 
same individuals who applauded the welfare to work strategies of fiscal 
conservatism, repeatedly stressed the objective of reducing 
illegitimacy.  Senator Burns, for example, stated in classic social 
conservative terms: 
                                                          
 224. See id. at § 912. 
 225. See id. (defining sexual abstinence education).  It is an educational program 
or motivational program that: 
(A) has as its exclusive purpose, teaching the social, psychological, and health 
gains to be realized by abstaining from sexual activity; (B) teaches abstinence 
from sexual activity outside marriage as the expected standard for all school 
age children; (C) teaches that abstinence from sexual activity is the only 
certain way to avoid out-of-wedlock pregnancy, sexually transmitted diseases, 
and other associated health problems; (D) teaches that a mutually faithful 
monogamous relationship in context of marriage is the expected standard of 
human sexual activity; (E) teaches that sexual activity outside of the context 
of marriage is likely to have harmful psychological and physical effects; (F) 
teaches that bearing children out-of-wedlock is likely to have harmful 
consequences for the child, the child’s parents, and society; (G) teaches 
young people how to reject sexual advances and how alcohol and drug use 
increases vulnerability to sexual advances; and (H) teaches the importance of 
attaining self-sufficiency before engaging in sexual activity. 
Id. 
 226. See id. at § 103. 
 227. See id. (allowing for some limited exceptions in which a parent, legal 
guardian, or other adult relative is not available, or when such a placement could 
result in harm to the minor and/or her child).  In these circumstances, a minor may 
be required to live in an adult-supervised living arrangement.  Id.  While it is the duty 
of the state to assist the individual in locating an appropriate adult supervised setting, 
a state could determine that a minor’s independent living arrangement is 
appropriate, and that it is in the best interest of the minor to make an exception.  Id. 
 228. See GREENBERG, WELFARE REAUTHORIZATION, supra note 209, at 13. 
 229. See generally JODIE LEVIN-EPSTEIN & SHELLEY STARK, CTR. FOR LAW & SOC. 
POLICY, EXCLUDED CHILDREN: FAMILY CAP IN A NEW ERA (Feb. 1999) (noting that 
approximately twenty states established a family cap under an AFDC waiver prior to 
1996, three more did so by 2000), available at http://www.clasp.org/publications/ 
excluded_children.pdf (last visited July 20, 2005). 
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The bill also contains provisions to strengthen families and personal 
responsibility, something I think is essential to getting at the root of 
our welfare problems.  In a scant few decades, we have seen the 
demise of families and family values in our country.  And 
illegitimacy rates are rising to almost dangerous levels.  These are 
the things that are contributing most to the decline in our society.  
More and more children are growing up without a father, without a 
solid family to support them, and crime statistics show that kids who 
are raised without a father commit more crimes . . . .  It is clear that 
our present welfare system encourages young mothers to have 
children, and many of these children are not being cared for.230 
Senator Helms similarly stated: 
[T]he human devastation caused by rising illegitimacy rates and the 
breakdown of the family is even more troubling than the cost of 
welfare programs . . . .  For [thirty] years, the welfare system 
rewarded idleness and illegitimacy and there has been a marked 
increase in both . . . .  [T]his bill takes a step in the right direction 
in helping reduce the rising illegitimacy rates by providing funds 
for abstinence education, and by allowing States the option of 
denying benefits to welfare recipients who already have children 
living on the public dole.231 
PRWORA thus represents a hybrid between fiscal conservatism’s 
emphasis on work, libertarianism’s emphasis on eliminating welfare 
(‘the end of welfare as we know it’) and social conservatism’s 
emphasis on family as the solution to welfare dependency.232 
Fiscal and social conservatives were able to unite, again under the 
sign of personal responsibility, yet their respective visions of this 
personal responsibility was measurably different.  The fiscal 
conservative vision cast personal responsibility in economic terms.233  
Welfare mothers were expected to transcend their economic 
dependency by becoming self-reliant market citizens.234  Libertarians 
                                                          
 230. 142 CONG. REC. S9387 (statement of Sen. Burns). 
 231. Id. (statement of Sen. Helms). 
 232. See Ann Marie Smith, The Politicization of Marriage in Contemporary 
American Public Policy: The Defense of Marriage Act and the Personal Responsibility 
Act, 5 CITIZENSHIP STUDIES 303, 315 (2001) (describing PRWORA as a hybrid between 
the religious right (social conservatives) and neo-conservative (fiscal conservative) 
discourse).  “The PRA expresses a remarkable hybrid discourse: it appropriates both 
the religious rights’ moralistic emphasis on patriarchal and heterosexist ‘family’ 
values and the neo-conservative emphasis on downsizing government and exposing 
the impoverished individual to the corrective rigors of the market.”  Id.; see also 
KATZ, supra note 1, at 326 (observing similarly the potential conflict between the 
visions of the religious right and neo-conservativists).  “Whether the two policy 
objectives—reversing out-of-wedlock births and supporting single mothers in their 
transition to word—would co-exist or collide no one yet knew, or had asked.”  Id. 
 233. See generally Crooms, supra note 166. 
 234. See id. at 623-26 (relating that according to the social sub-text of the welfare 
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similarly cast personal responsibility in marketized terms of restoring 
individual initiative.235  But, in the social conservative vision, personal 
responsibility was cast in moral terms.  The vision expected welfare 
mothers to modify their sexual and familial behavior.236  They were to 
avoid out-of-wedlock pregnancies, preferably by avoiding pre-marital 
sex and choosing marriage.  For both fiscal conservatives and 
libertarians, the problem was one of the welfare state having 
undermined individual initiative and self-reliance.237  The solution, 
then, lay in restoring that initiative, and allowing women to become 
completely self-sufficient.  But for social conservatives, the problem 
was that the welfare state had undermined the traditional family; the 
solution, then, lay in its restoration.238 
The social conservative vision of welfare reform has become more 
evident in the recent debates surrounding the reauthorization of 
TANF currently before Congress.239  Many believed that the family 
                                                          
reform rhetoric, this claim is about changing the behavior of black women by making 
them work; thus playing on the stereotype of the black single mother on welfare as 
lazy and lacking in work ethic, and its strategy as one of forcing her to work). 
 235. See MURRAY, supra note 89; see also TANNER, supra note 89. 
 236. See Crooms, supra note 166, at 612-13 (discussing the efforts of welfare 
reform to make mothers more responsible and the racialized stereotyping that 
welfare recipients are black, single, urban mothers).  Welfare reform punishes the 
black single mother on welfare because of her sexual promiscuity, her fertility and 
her moral failure for not marrying the father of her child.  Id. at 625.  Crooms wrote, 
Like the matriarch, who does not submit to her man’s authority the welfare 
dependent single mother is a ‘bad’ woman whose dominance wrecks the 
natural order of things within the family and is responsible for the lack of 
values within her dysfunctional community.  Like Jezebel who is overtly 
sexual and lascivious, the welfare dependent single mother’s hyper-sexuality 
is responsible for her anti-patriarchal child bearing.  Like the breeder, whose 
owner imposed on her a duty to procreate, the welfare dependent single 
mother’s extramarital childbearing is a learned response to the financial 
incentive provided by AFDC.  The welfare dependent single mother 
represents the point of which promiscuity and fecundity meet, and her 
childbearing is pathological compared to that of those ‘true’ women to whom 
proper motherhood within the traditional two-parent family is essential. 
Id. at 626. 
 237. See Charles Murray, Family Formation, in THE NEW WORLD OF WELFARE 159-
160 (Rebecca Blank & Ron Haskins eds, 2001) (arguing that for libertarians, the 
AFDC’s restructuring was little more than homage to the idea of ending welfare).  
Libertarians, like Murray, wanted the total elimination of AFDC and other welfare 
benefits.  Id. 
 238. See, e.g., Robert Rector, How Poor are America’s Poor? (Heritage 
Foundation, Backgrounder No. 791, 1990) (describing the ‘destruction of families’ as 
a major consequence of welfare spending), available at http://www.heritage.org/ 
Research/PoliticalPhilosophy/BG791.cfm (last visited July 20, 2005); see also Patrick 
F. Fagan et al., Marriage and Welfare Reform: The Overwhelming Evidence that 
Marriage Education Works ? (Heritage Foundation, Backgrounder No. 1606, 2002), 
available at http://www.heritage.org/Research/Welfare/bg1606.cfm (last visited July 
20, 2005). 
 239. According to PRWORA, the TANF program required Congressional 
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formation objectives of PRWORA had not been realized, and that it 
was time to put the promotion of marriage at the top of the 
reauthorization agenda.240  In February 2002, the Bush 
Administration put forward its vision of the reauthorization plan, and 
declared that promoting healthy marriages would be one of its top 
priorities, committing up to three-hundred million dollars to “strong 
marriages and stable families,” which “are incredibly good for 
children.”241  The Bush Administration proposal also sought to 
dramatically increase work requirements and limit state flexibility.242  
On May 16, 2002 the House of Representatives passed H.R. 4737, the 
Personal Responsibility, Work and Family Promotion Act, which 
closely followed the Bush administration vision, and included among 
others, substantial funds for the promotion of marriage.  The Bill 
included three substantive programs for the promotion of 
                                                          
reauthorization by September 2002.  Congress has approved several temporary 
extensions of TANF, while they debate the substance of the reauthorization.  On 
September 30, 2004, President Bush signed H.R. 5149 into law as Pub. L 108-308, 
which was another six-month TANF extension.  This most recent enactment was the 
eighth extension since the authorization for the TANF program was originally to 
expire.  Several TANF reauthorization bills have been drafted and debated in 
Congress, but Congress has not supported any bill yet.  See SHAWN FREMSTAD ET AL., 
CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES, SUMMARY COMPARISON OF TANF 
REAUTHORIZATION PROVISIONS: BILLS PASSED BY SENATE FINANCE COMMITTEE AND THE 
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES AND RELATED PROPOSALS (noting that several TANF 
reauthorization proposals have come before Congress, including the following: H.R. 
4737 that the House passed on May 16, 2002, a Democratic substitute for H.R. 4737 
that Rep. Cardin offered on the House floor, a list of provisions that a bipartisan 
group of Senate Finance committee members agreed to, a bill that Senator 
Rockefeller introduced [S. 2052], a bill that Senators Bahy and Carper introduced [S. 
2524] and H.R. 4, passed by the House in 2003), available at http://www.cbpp.org/7-
2-02tanf.pdf (last visited July 17, 2005); see also SHAWN FREMSTAD ET AL., CTR. ON 
BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES, REVISED SIDE-BY-SIDE COMPARISON OF FAMILY FORMATION 
PROVISIONS IN TANF REAUTHORIZATION LEGISLATION (comparing the current law to 
the various proposals Congress has considered), at http://clasp.org/publications/6-5-
02tanf3.pdf (last visited July 17, 2005). 
 240. See generally SHAWN FREMSTAD & WENDELL PRIMUS, CTR. ON BUDGET & POLICY 
PRIORITIES, STRENGTHENING FAMILIES: IDEAS FOR TANF REAUTHORIZATION (2002) 
(quoting Rep. Wally Herger, chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee’s 
Human Resources Subcommittee as stating, “During the first phase of welfare reform, 
we made sure we were putting people to work.  I believe that now is the time to stress 
the importance of marriage.”); Wade Horn, Wedding Bell Blues: Marriage and 
Welfare Reform, BROOKINGS REV., Summer 2001; Robert Rector, Using Welfare 
Reform to Strengthen Marriage, AM. EXPERIMENT QUARTERLY, Summer 2001. 
 241. See News Release, The White House, President Announces Welfare Reform 
Agenda (Feb. 26 2002) [hereinafter President Announces], available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/02/20020226-11.html (last visited 
July 31, 2005); see also Liz Schott, The Congressional Divide Over TANF 
Reauthorization, 1 SEATTLE J. SOC. JUST. 427, 428-29; Mark Greenberg, Bush’s 
Blunder, THE AM. PROSPECT, July 15, 2002. 
 242. See President Announces, supra note 241 (indicating that the proposal would 
increase the number of hours that TANF recipients must work, and further limit the 
range of activities that would count towards meeting the work requirements). 
61
Crossman: Contesting Conservatisms, Family Feuds and the Privatization of D
Published by Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law, 2005
476 JOURNAL OF GENDER, SOCIAL POLICY & THE LAW  [Vol. 13:3 
 
marriage.243 The Health Marriage Promotion Grants would have 
created a program of competitive grants in the amount of two-
hundred million dollars annually over five years to be used on a 
specified list of marriage related activities.244  The Marriage Research 
and Demonstration Funds would have allocated $100 million annually 
over five years for research demonstration and technical assistance 
grants to be used primarily for marriage related activities.245  Finally, 
the Promotion and Support of Responsible fatherhood and Healthy 
Marriage Grants program would have allocated $20 million annually 
over five years to fund marriage and fatherhood promotion 
activities.246  H.R. 4737 would also have amended the purpose 
                                                          
 243. See generally PARKE, supra note 220, at 2.  See generally JODIE EVEN-EPSTEIN 
ET. AL, CTR. FOR LAW & SOC. POLICY, SPENDING TOO MUCH, ACCOMPLISHING TOO LITTLE: 
AN ANALYSIS OF THE FAMILY FORMATION PROVISIONS OF H.R. 4737 AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CHANGE (2002), available at http://www.clasp.org/ 
publications/HR_4737_family_form 
_analysis_061102.pdf (last visited Aug. 5, 2005). 
 244. H.R. 4737, 107th Cong. § 103 (2002) (providing that that funds may be used 
to support specified activities).  The activities are: 
(1) Public advertising campaigns on the value of marriage and the skills 
needed to increase marital stability and health; (2) Education in high schools 
on the value of marriage, relationship skills, and budgeting; (3) Marriage 
education, marriage skills, and relationship skills programs, that may include 
parenting skills, financial management, conflict resolution, and job and 
career advancement, for non-married pregnant women and non-married 
expectant fathers; (4) Pre-marital education and marriage skills training for 
engaged couples and for couples interested in marriage; (5) Marriage 
enhancement and marriage skills training programs for married couples; (6) 
Divorce Reduction programs that teach relationship skills; (7) Marriage 
mentoring programs which use married couples as role models and mentors 
in at-risk communities; and (8) Programs to reduce the disincentives to 
marriage in means-tested aid programs, if offered in conjunction with any 
activity described in this subparagraph. 
Id. 
 245. Id. at § 115. 
 246. Id. at § 441 (indicating that grants under this program must be designed to 
accomplish four objectives).  The objectives are: 
(1) Promoting responsible, caring, and effective parenting through 
counseling, mentoring, and parenting education . . . information 
[dissemination] . . . positive involvement . . . and other methods; (2) 
Enhancing the abilities and commitment of unemployed or low-income 
fathers to provide material support for their families . . . by assisting them to 
take full advantage of education, job training, and job search programs; to 
improve work habits and work skills, to secure career advancement by 
activities such as outreach and information dissemination, coordination . . . 
with employment services and job training programs . . .  encouragement and 
support of child support payments, and other methods . . .; (3) Improving 
fathers’ ability to effectively manage family business affairs by means such as 
education, counseling, and mentoring on matters including household 
management, budgeting, banking, and handling of financial transactions, 
time management, and home maintenance; and (4) Encouraging and 
supporting healthy marriages and married fatherhood through such activities 
such as premarital education . . . inventories, marriage preparation programs 
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language of TANF.  It would have changed the focus of the purpose 
to “improve child wellbeing,” replaced a reference to “parents” with a 
reference to “families” in purpose (2), and added a focus on healthy 
married families and responsible fatherhood in purpose (4).247  H.R. 
4737 would also have required states to establish annual, specific 
numerical performance goals and improvement plans with respect to 
each of the four TANF purposes, including the promotion of healthy 
marriages.248 
The Senate Finance Committee Proposed legislation with similar 
marriage provisions to H.R. 4737, but with lower funding levels and a 
broader list of allowable activities.249  While the Senate Finance 
Committee passed the legislation, it never reached the Senate floor 
for a vote.  In 2003, the House of Representatives passed H.R. 4, the 
Personal Responsibility, Work and Family Promotion Act of 2003.250  
H.R. 4 is substantially the same as H.R. 4737.  It includes the same 
three programs for marriage promotion and responsible 
fatherhood.251  H.R. 4 was referred to the Senate Finance Committee, 
                                                          
. . . marital therapy, couples counseling . . . [and] skills enhancement 
programs, including . . . reduc[tion of] child abuse and domestic violence, 
and dissemination of information about the benefits of marriage. 
Id.  Authorized projects under this program would include: 
(1) Demonstration service projects that address all four objectives, and 
annual limited purpose grants under [twenty-five thousand dollars] that 
address at least one objective; and (2) Two multi-city demonstration projects, 
one of which must test services delivered by married couples; and (3) Other 
projects such as a national information clearinghouse, a national media 
campaign, technical assistance, and evaluation. 
MARY PARKE, CTR. FOR LAW & SOC. POLICY, MARRIAGE-RELATED PROVISIONS IN WELFARE 
REAUTHORIZATION PROPOSALS: A SUMMARY 8 (2004), available at http://www.clasp. 
org/publications/ marr_prov_upd.pdf (last visited July 17, 2005). 
 247. H.R. 4737, 107th Cong. (2002) (changing the fourth purpose to read 
“encourage the formation and maintenance of healthy two-parent married families, 
and encourage responsible fatherhood”). 
 248. Id. at § 113. 
 249. See PARKE, supra note 220, at 1; see also SHAWN FREMSTAD ET AL., CTR. ON 
BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES, ONE STEP FORWARD OR TWO STEPS BACK? 18-20 (2002) 
(noting that the Senate Finance Bill would also have prevented states from 
discriminating against two-parent families in their TANF programs), available at 
http://www.clasp.org/publications/doc_13reasons.pdf (last visited July 17, 2005).  In 
terms of the work requirements, the Senate Finance Bill would also have maintained 
the work requirement at thirty hours and had a broader list of activities that would 
count toward the primary twenty-four hour work requirement.  Id. at 5-6. 
 250. See H.R. 4, 108th Cong. (1st Sess. 2003). 
 251. The primary difference between H.R. 4 and H.R. 4737 is that most of the 
funding in H.R. 4 is for six years instead of five years.  It allocates two hundred million 
dollars annually for six years to the Healthy Marriage Promotion Grants, one 
hundred million dollars annually for six years to the Marriage Research and 
Demonstration Funds and twenty million dollars annually for five years to the 
Promotion and Support of Responsible Fatherhood and Healthy Marriage Grants.  
The list of allowable marriage activities is virtually the same as in H.R. 4737.  See 
63
Crossman: Contesting Conservatisms, Family Feuds and the Privatization of D
Published by Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law, 2005
478 JOURNAL OF GENDER, SOCIAL POLICY & THE LAW  [Vol. 13:3 
 
which held hearings in February and March 2003.  In its Report of 
October 3, 2003, the Finance Committee recommended that the bill 
(PRIDE) be passed, as amended.252  At the time of writing, the PRIDE 
version of H.R.4 is under consideration by the Senate. 
Thus, the current TANF reauthorization proposals place very 
considerable emphasis on family formation goals, with the 
Administration, House and Senate only disagreeing on questions of 
the appropriate amount of funding and the extent of state flexibility.  
Promoting marriage and, to a slightly lesser extent, responsible 
fatherhood, has become part of the mainstay of welfare reform.  This 
recent round of reform is witnessing a further welfarization of family 
law, insofar as many of the programs for marriage promotion and 
responsible fatherhood do not require that the funds be specifically 
directed towards TANF recipients or low-income populations 
generally.253  The reform proposals thus reflect the social conservative 
view that the family formation purposes of TANF are its most 
fundamental and must be central in its reauthorization.254 
While the social conservative critique of welfare reform appears to 
be emerging as dominant in current federal public policy debates 
around reauthorization, a libertarian critique of welfare reform 
remains visible. For example, Michael Tanner of the Cato Institute 
argues: 
The long term answer to poverty and dependency does not lie with 
any government program, no matter how well intentioned.  
Congress needs to go beyond proposals that simply tinker with 
welfare and begin to phase out government assistance in favor of 
                                                          
generally, PARKE, supra note 220, at 3-9. 
 252. S. REP. NO. 108-164 (2003). 
 253. See H.R. 4737, 107th Cong.  (2002) and H.R. 4 (mentioning low income 
populations in only two of the eight marriage-related activities).  Similarly, the 
fatherhood and marriage promotion grants focus primarily on promoting married 
fatherhood and are not specifically directed towards low-income fathers.  Id.; see also 
LEVIN-EPSTEIN & STARK, supra note 229, at 10-11.  See generally Brito, supra note 22 
(arguing that the wall separating the family law of welfare and general family law is 
crumbling and that welfare law is taking the dominant role). 
 254. See Murray, supra note 237 at 137-168 (arguing that emphasis on work 
requirements would be ineffective without first addressing the illegitimacy problem); 
Robert Rector, Comment, in THE NEW WORLD ORDER 264-69.  See generally JANICE 
PETERSON, INST. FOR WOMEN'S POLICY RESEARCH, FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES ON TANF 
REAUTHORIZATION: AN INTRODUCTION TO KEY ISSUES FOR THE FUTURE OF WELFARE 
REFORM (2002) (noting that at the same time, it is important to not overstate H.R. 4 as 
an exclusively social conservative welfare reform), available at http://www.iwpr. 
org/pdf/e511.html (last visited July 17, 2005).  The bill includes provisions to 
increase work participation rates and raise the hours for core activities, which will 
toughen the work requirements of TANF.  Id.  The bill also includes provisions for 
increased spending on child care and expanding state flexibility.  Id. 
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private charity.255 
According to Tanner, although welfare reform has had some 
success in reducing welfare dependency, it has been less successful in 
requiring welfare recipients to work, in reducing out of wedlock 
births, and in making individuals self-sufficient.256  The policy 
position, then, is virtually the same as Charles Murray’s prescription in 
the 1980s: “when it comes to welfare, we should end it, not mend 
it.”257 
We should . . . begin to remove the incentives that contribute to out 
of wedlock birth. That means phasing out the availability of welfare 
benefits to young women who make untenable life decisions.  No 
other reform will go as far in reducing welfare dependency or 
poverty.  That approach will almost certainly be more effective than 
current proposals that the federal government spend as much as 
[three hundred] million [dollars] on promoting marriage.258 
In Tanner’s analysis, the problem of moral hazard—understood in 
decidedly economic terms—can and must be reversed by eliminating 
the availability of welfare.  The solution lies not in more government 
regulation (promoting marriage), but in less (eliminating welfare).259  
                                                          
 255. See TANNER, supra note 87 (arguing that Congress should instead focus on 
job creation and economic growth), available at http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/ 
pa473.pdf (last visited July 20, 2005); see also LISA OLIPHANT, CATO INSTITUTE, FOUR 
YEARS OF WELFARE REFORM: A PROGRESS REPORT (Policy Analysis No. 378, 2000), 
available at http://www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa378.pdf (last visited Aug. 1, 2005).  See 
generally MICHAEL TANNER, THE END OF WELFARE: FIGHTING POVERTY IN THE CIVIL 
SOCIETY (1996). 
 256. See TANNER, supra note 87 (stating that the reduction of the number of 
individuals receiving welfare was as much due to the impact of economic growth and 
job creation as it was welfare reform).  Individuals who left welfare in the period after 
PRWORA were the individuals who were most likely to have left even if welfare had 
not been reformed.  Id. at 11. 
Studies of people leaving welfare since reform suggest that the majority are 
part of the easiest-to-place, least-dependent group of recipients.  While they 
may have left more rapidly under reform, they were not the people most at 
risk for long-term dependency.  As a group, the first wave of those leaving 
welfare has had better education, higher levels of basic skills, and more 
previous experience in the labor market than those remaining on the rolls . . 
. .  On the other hand, those remaining on the welfare rolls are most likely to 
be families headed by unmarried women under the age of [thirty] and 
increasingly concentrated in high poverty areas. 
Id. 
 257. See Murray, supra note 237, at 159 (reiterating his argument advocating the 
elimination of welfare benefits for young women who have children out of wedlock). 
 258. See TANNER, supra, note 87, at 30-31, 34-35; see also OLIPHANT, supra note 
255, at 30-35 (arguing similarly that PRWORA has failed to reduce out of wedlock 
births, and that the only solution lies in eliminating the availability of welfare for 
single mothers). 
 259. See, e.g., Michael Tanner, Wedded to Poverty, N.Y. TIMES, July 29, 2003, at 
A23 (criticizing the Congressional and White House marriage promotion initiatives, 
which is described as another example of conservatives deviating from their 
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While this critique remains visible in conservative public policy circles, 
it does not appear to have permeated the Congressional debates or 
hearings, and rather like Murray’s critique in the 1980s, it does not 
seem to be having a concrete effect on public policy formation.  
Federal public policy initiatives on welfare reauthorization continue 
to be heavily influenced by social conservative visions of promoting 
the traditional family, not libertarian visions of limited government 
and private choice. 
At the same time, it is important to recognize that the fiscal 
conservatism of earlier welfare reform has certainly not disappeared 
in this round of reform.  The basic structure of TANF is expected to 
remain intact, with its bloc grants, five-year entitlement limits, and 
work requirements.  The emphasis on transforming welfare 
dependents into self-employed market citizens remains a central 
objective of the legislation.  The new social conservative emphasis on 
family formation goals is a supplement, rather than replacement, for 
the fiscal conservative goals of individual self-sufficiency.  Once again, 
as in the area of child support, these objectives are being pursued in 
tandem.  In some respects, the initiatives are not entirely inconsistent.  
Fiscal conservatism is not so much opposed to shifting dependency 
from state to two-parent, opposite-sex family as it is agnostic.  Its 
primary goal is to reduce welfare dependency, and its primary strategy 
is to increase the self-sufficiency of welfare dependents primarily 
through an emphasis on market work.  Similarly, social conservatism 
is certainly not opposed to individual self-reliance and market work.  
Rather, it simply seeks to address what it views to be the cause of 
chronic welfare dependency, namely, illegitimacy and the decline of 
the traditional family. 
Yet, at a deeper level, there are some contradictions between the 
visions of fiscal and social conservatives.  The strategies of fiscal 
conservatives are both individualizing and degendering.  Single 
mothers are reconstituted as potentially employable market citizens.  
The strategies of social conservatives, by contrast, are familialing and 
gendering.  They seek to increase the role of the family in addressing 
                                                          
commitment to small government).  The program is unlikely to be of any assistance 
to poor single mothers on welfare, since there are few marriageable men, the 
beneficial effects of marriage on low-income women will be small—since many 
already live with the child’s father—and women may be in fact be encouraged to have 
a second child, furthering their inability to become self-sufficient.  Id.; see also KIMBLE 
FLETCHER AINSLIE, CATO INSTITUTE, IS THE PRESIDENT’S MARRIAGE PROPOSAL DOA? 
(Apr. 3, 2002) (describing President Bush's proposal as “a patchwork of poorly 
thought out and voluntary components begging the states to come on board” and as a 
“low impact fiscal effort” with little substance), available at: http://www.cato.org/ 
dailys/04-03-02.html (last visited July 17, 2005). 
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dependency, and to reconstitute single mothers as appropriately 
dependents, namely, married mothers dependent on wage earning 
husbands.  The fiscal conservative strategy is one that erodes the 
significance of gender and family, while the social conservative 
strategy is one that intensifies gender and family.  Once again, 
although these strategies are being pursued in tandem, their alliance 
is a precarious one. 
B.  Fiscal, Libertarian and Social Conservatives on Same-sex Couples 
and the Politics of Marriage 
While fiscal and social conservatives have been able to work towards 
compromise and coalition in child support and welfare reform, 
notwithstanding the underlying tensions and contradictions in their 
positions, their normative visions and privatizing projects could be 
expected to be more difficult to reconcile in the context of same-sex 
couples and the challenge to marriage.  Social conservatives are 
unequivocally opposed to same-sex marriage on moral grounds.  
Libertarians should support same-sex marriage on the basis of private 
choice. Fiscal conservatives would engage in a cost benefit analysis to 
determine whether same-sex marriage is fiscally responsible.  These 
differences might be expected to produce a serious schism on the 
issue of same-sex marriage, dividing libertarian, fiscal and social 
conservatives.  In fact, such a divide has occurred between 
conservatives in other jurisdictions, and both fiscal conservative and 
libertarian arguments about fiscal responsibility and private choice 
have contributed to the increasing recognition of same-sex 
relationships.260  However, in public policy debates regarding same-
sex marriage in the United States, these differences have largely 
disappeared.  The debate has, until very recently, been cast almost 
exclusively in terms of a classic liberal/conservative divide, with 
                                                          
 260. In Canada, fiscal conservative arguments about cost saving and fiscal 
responsibility have been part of the public policy discourse and have contributed to 
the recognition of same-sex relationships.  See M. v. H., [1999] S.C.R. 3 (striking 
down an opposite-sex definition of spouse in relation to spousal support as a violation 
of the equality rights of same-sex couples in Canada).  The Court explicitly referred 
to “alleviation of the burden on the public purse by shifting the obligation to provide 
support for needy persons to parents and spouses who have the capacity to provide 
support to them” as an objective of the legislation that would be furthered if same-sex 
couples were included with the definition.  Id.  For a fiscal conservative and 
libertarian argument in favor of same-sex marriage in Canada, see Andrew Coyne, 
How Far Do We Take Gay Rights, SATURDAY NIGHT, Dec. 1995 (debating neo-
conservative David Frum on same-sex relationship recognition), available at 
http://www.andrewcoyne.com/Essays/index.html (last visited July 17, 2005).  For a 
similar argument in England, see Opinion, Let Them Wed, THE ECONOMIST, Jan. 4, 
1996, at 13, available at http://www.economist.com/opinion/displaystory. 
cfm?story_id=2515389 (last visited July 17, 2005). 
67
Crossman: Contesting Conservatisms, Family Feuds and the Privatization of D
Published by Digital Commons @ American University Washington College of Law, 2005
482 JOURNAL OF GENDER, SOCIAL POLICY & THE LAW  [Vol. 13:3 
 
liberals arguing in favor of same-sex marriage and conservatives 
arguing against it.  Fiscal conservative arguments are largely absent 
from the debate, and when they do appear, they are often collapsed 
with social conservative positions, arguing that same-sex marriage 
would dramatically increase government expenditures.  Lone 
libertarian voices in favor of same-sex marriage in the academic and 
public policy literature have been largely drown out by the dominance 
of social conservatism, particularly in the legislative forum where the 
latter continues to reign. However, more recently, a private choice 
approach has begun to make some modest inroads, primarily in the 
judicial forum but also in broader public policy circles. 
1.  Dissipating Differences: the Discursive Power of the Social 
Conservative Vision 
Social conservatives oppose the recognition of gay and lesbian 
rights, in general, and same-sex spousal rights, in particular, at any 
cost.  The rearticulation of the traditional nuclear, and above all 
heterosexual, family goes to the very heart of the social conservative 
vision.  No group poses a greater threat to that traditional family for 
social conservatives than gays and lesbians.261  Social conservatives are 
unmoved by fiscal arguments about potential cost saving by 
expanding the definitions of spouse to include same-sex couples.  The 
issue is not economic, but moral, in which gay men and lesbians 
represent all that is wrong with the permissive culture of liberalism 
and the demise of the traditional moral order.262  In this vision, 
marriage is not a private contract between private individuals, but 
rather, a public institution that promotes a range of public goods, 
including reproduction and child rearing, the stability of the family as 
society’s most basic social unit, and democracy.263  In their view, not 
                                                          
 261. See generally  HERMAN, supra note 79. 
 262. See John M. Finnis, Law, Morality, and "Sexual Orientation”, 69 NOTRE DAME 
L. REV. 1049, 1070-73 (1994) (offering a natural law argument against homosexuality 
and same-sex marriage). 
 263. See, e.g., Lynn Wardle, Multiply and Replenish: Considering Same-Sex 
Marriage in Light of State Interests in Marital Procreation, 24 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 
771, 779-80 (2001) [hereinafter Wardle, Multiply] (noting that there are at least eight 
different societal interests for marriage). 
These include: (1) safe sexual relations; (2) responsible procreation; (3) 
optimal child rearing; (4) healthy human development; (5) protecting those 
who undertake the most vulnerable family roles for the benefit of society, 
especially wives and mothers; (6) securing the stability and integrity of the 
basic unit of society; (7) fostering civic virtue, democracy, and social order; 
and (8) facilitating interjurisdictional compatibility. 
Id.; see also George W. Dent, Jr., The Defense of Traditional Marriage, 15 J.L. & POL. 
581, 582 (1999) (identifying the public interest in marriage as child rearing, 
socializing adults, and promoting individual happiness); Maggie Gallagher, What is 
68
Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law, Vol. 13, Iss. 3 [2005], Art. 1
http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/jgspl/vol13/iss3/1
2005] CONTESTING CONSERVATISMS 483 
 
only does same-sex marriage not promote these public goods, but it 
threatens to undermine them.264 
By contrast, neither fiscal conservatism nor libertarianism is in 
principle opposed to gay and lesbian rights.  A general concern with 
promoting the liberty rights of individuals and a minimalist state 
would lead libertarians to oppose any rules and regulations that would 
impose special burdens on gay men and lesbians.265  Those who favor 
the shift towards private choice in family law would similarly support 
the state’s removal of status-based prohibitions on marriage.266  Fiscal 
conservatism could support a similar conclusion on the basis of a 
different set of concerns.  Given its general impulse towards 
privatizing costs of social reproduction, fiscal conservatism could be 
expected to support an expanded spousal definition that contributed 
to the privatization of these costs, while opposing any expanded 
definition that increased the public responsibility for these costs.  The 
question is largely answered by a cost-benefit analysis, in which fiscal 
conservatives weigh the relative costs and benefits of expanding 
                                                          
Marriage For? The Public Purposes of Marriage Law, 62 LA. L. REV. 773 (2002) 
(arguing against a private choice vision of marriage and in favor of marriage as a 
public institution about reproduction and child rearing). 
 264. See Robert P. George & Gerard V. Bradley, Marriage and the Liberal 
Imagination, 84 GEO. L.J. 301, 314-18 (1995) (arguing that the sexual acts of same-sex 
partners can only provide mere individualized sexual gratification and, thus, are 
harmful to integrity).  Therefore, the authors argue, the government should not 
institutionalize same-sex relationships.  Id. at 320; see also Wardle, Multiply, supra 
note 263, at 797 (arguing that “[l]egalizing [s]ame-[s]ex [m]arriage [w]ould 
[u]ndermine the [s]ocial [i]interests in [r]esponsible [p]rocreation and the 
[i]nstitution [t]hat [h]as [b]est [p]rotected [t]hose [i]nterests[.]”); Dent, supra note 
263, at 628-38 (arguing that recognizing gay marriage would damage traditional 
marriage and would lead to other changes in the law such as the legalization of 
polygamy, endogamy, artificial reproduction and baby selling, child marriage, 
“[b]estiality, etc.”).  The “etc.” apparently includes “necrophilia, nudity and 
performance of sex acts in public.”  Id.at 237. 
 265. See, e.g., Richard A. Epstein, Caste and the Civil Rights Laws: From Jim Crow 
to Same-Sex Marriages, 92 MICH. L. REV. 2456 (1994) [hereinafter Epstein, Caste]; 
Richard A. Epstein, Liberty, Equality, and Privacy: Choosing a Legal Foundation for 
Gay Rights, 2002 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 73 (2002) [hereinafter Epstein, Liberty]. 
 266. See Ehrenreich, supra note 11, at 1242-43 (arguing that the extent to which 
the increasing emphasis on private choice through the privatization of marriage 
would support same-sex marriage); Ertman, supra note 16, at 1167-68 (asserting that 
progressives favor private law because it provides an avenue to legalize same-sex 
marriage); see also David Boaz, Privatize Marriage: A Simple Solution to the Gay 
Marriage Debate, SLATE (Apr. 25, 1997), at http://slate.msn.com/id/2440 (last 
visited June 14, 2005). 
‘Privatizing’ marriage can mean two slightly different things.  One is to take 
the state completely out of it.  If couples want to cement their relationships 
with a ceremony or ritual, they are free to do so.  Religious institutions are 
free to sanction such relationships under any rules they choose.  A second 
meaning of ‘privatizing’ marriage is to treat it like any other contract: The 
state may be called upon to enforce it, but the parties define the terms. 
Id. 
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spousal definitions given the overall project of privatizing social costs. 
While a private choice position has been articulated in the 
academic debates, even here sometimes otherwise fiscal conservative 
and libertarian voices have at times seemed to succumb to the 
contrary influence of social conservatism.  For example, law and 
economics guru Richard Posner does not argue in favor of same-sex 
marriage.267  He concludes that even if “[t]he benefits of [same-sex] 
marriage may outweigh the costs[,]  [n]onetheless . . . the public 
hostility to homosexuals in this country is too widespread to make 
homosexual marriage a feasible proposal even if it is on balance cost-
justified . . . .”268  As some commentators have suggested, Posner 
effectively allows social conservative disapproval of homosexuality to 
infuse his analysis, and fails to consistently apply law and economics 
principles, with its emphasis on individual preference, private 
contract, rational choices, and market efficiencies.269  Darren Bush 
has argued that a law and economics analysis of same-sex marriage 
should exclude such moral disapprobation and, in contrast to Posner, 
that such a cost-benefit analysis would support same-sex marriage.270 
Richard Epstein has made a stronger argument in favor of same-sex 
marriage from a libertarian perspective.271  In his view, the fact that 
                                                          
 267. See RICHARD A. POSNER, SEX AND REASON 311-13 (1992) (arguing that 
permitting same-sex couples to marry would impose a “stamp of approval on 
homosexuality” by sanctioning same-sex marriage as a desirable, even noble 
condition).  In his view, same-sex marriage will confuse the meaning of marriage and 
the information it conveys, may be abused by homosexuals as a way of obtaining the 
benefits of marriage, and might have a detrimental effect on children.  Id. 
 268. Id. at 313. 
 269. See Darren Bush, Moving to the Left by Moving to the Right: A Law & 
Economics Defense of Same-Sex Marriage, 22 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 115, 125-34 
(2001) (highlighting the inconsistencies in Posner's analysis of same-sex marriage 
under the law and economics theory); see also Ryan Nishimoto, Book Note, Marriage 
Makes Cents: How Law & Economics Justifies Same-Sex Marriage, 23 B.C. THIRD 
WORLD L.J. 379, 384 (2003) (reviewing ANDREW KOPPELMAN, THE GAY RIGHTS 
QUESTION IN CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN LAW (2002), and noting that law and 
economics theorists have been “unjustifiably reluctant” to view same-sex marriage 
through an economic lens); Jordon Herman, The Fusion of Gay Rights and 
Feminism: Gender Identity and Marriage After Baehr v. Lewin, 56 OHIO ST. L.J. 985 
(1995) (observing that “Posner’s pragmatism stops short, reincorporating moral 
values and sacrificing libertarian principles when they lead to unpopular results”). 
 270. See Bush, supra note 269, at 116 (describing Bush’s argument that “favoring 
non-intervention in marriage generally while accepting (or approving of) 
prohibitions on same-sex marriage is a fundamentally inconsistent position when 
viewed from an economic perspective”).  In his view, a law and economics cost benefit 
analysis would reveal that same-sex marriage actually reduces externalities, and the 
recognition of same-sex marriage is consistent with a more general position in favor 
of a more contractual, non-interventionist approach to marriage.  Id. at 137. 
 271. See generally Epstein, Caste, supra note 265, at 2460 (advocating a rejection 
of prohibitions against same-sex marriage because they contradict the basic principles 
of freedom of association and a liberal society); Epstein, Liberty, supra note 265 
(concluding that although same-sex marriage can fit into the context of either privacy 
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many people find same sex-marriage offensive cannot be used to 
prevent same sex couples from “normalizing their relationships by 
contract” nor to allow the state to deny them the opportunity “to 
introduce into their relationships the same level of permanence and 
stability that state sanctions give to marriages between couples of 
different sexes.”272  Yet, he too is prepared to stop short of using the 
word “marriage,” preferring, like Posner, to use the term “domestic 
partnership.”273  Posner’s and, to a lesser extent, Epstein’s slippage is 
illustrative of the influence of the social conservative vision of family.  
While they both seek to broaden relationship recognition in a way 
that respects private choice,  which  not incidentally would have the 
effect of privatizing the costs of supporting families, both do so in 
ways that stop short of recognizing same-sex marriage.  Moral 
opposition to same-sex marriage operates to limit their economic and 
libertarian analysis. 
Stronger conservative arguments have been made in favor of same-
sex marriage.  Andrew Sullivan, a leading “gay-con,” has argued in 
favor of same-sex marriage, deploying fiscal conservative, libertarian, 
and occasionally even more traditional social conservative 
arguments.274  Similarly, the Log Cabin Republicans, an organization 
of Republicans committed to the promotion of gay and lesbian rights, 
has made libertarian and fiscal conservative arguments in favor of 
same-sex marriage.  Its principles are consistent with a more 
libertarian and fiscal conservatism, describing itself as committed to 
“limited government, individual liberty, individual responsibility, free 
                                                          
rights or equal protection, the important point is that it is constitutional). 
 272. Epstein, Caste, supra note 265, at 2473-74 (asserting that same-sex couples 
receive the same rights and benefits as heterosexual couples, from immigration to 
inheritance rights). 
 273. See Epstein, Liberty, supra note 265, at 101. 
Here the issue is one of ‘confusion’ . . . .  Many people may be rightly upset 
that the similarity in names will lead to an erosion of support for the 
traditional institution.  So at this point, the use of the term ‘domestic 
partnership’ helps eliminate the confusion while allowing gay individuals to 
enjoy certain status benefits . . . that they could not acquire simply by a 
contract arrangement between themselves. 
Id. 
 274. See JONATHAN RAUCH, GAY MARRIAGE: WHY IT IS GOOD FOR GAYS, GOOD FOR 
STRAIGHTS, AND GOOD FOR AMERICA 55-103 (2004) (describing how gays, straights, and 
the concept of marriage will benefit by legalizing same-sex marriage); see also Andrew 
Sullivan, American Conservatism: The State of Our Unions, WALL ST. J., Oct. 8, 2003, 
at A24 (using the fiscal argument that allowing same-sex couples to marry would 
relieve the state’s burden of providing welfare for single people without family 
support).  See generally ANDREW SULLIVAN, VIRTUALLY NORMAL: AN ARGUMENT ABOUT 
HOMOSEXUALITY  (1996) (arguing, amongst other things, that same-sex marriage 
would help curb promiscuity among gay men). 
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markets, and a strong national defense . . . .”275  It argues that these 
principles “are consistent with the equal protection of laws for gay and 
lesbian Americans.”  The Log Cabin Republicans support the legal 
recognition of same-sex relationships and oppose legislative initiatives 
intended to block same-sex marriage.276  Log Cabin Republicans tend 
to emphasize the principles of both libertarianism (individual choice, 
privacy, and protection from government intervention277) and fiscal 
conservatism (the assumption of individual responsibility and gays 
and lesbians as responsible tax payers seeking tax fairness) in their 
support of the legal recognition of same-sex relationships.278 
                                                          
 275. Brief of Amici Curiae Log Cabin Republicans and Liberty Education Forum at 
*2, Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (No. 02-102 ) (stating that the moral 
values that underlie their principles are consistent with equal protection for gays and 
lesbians); see also Liberty Education Forum (describing its mandate as working 
“toward achieving freedom and fairness for all Americans,  regardless of sexual 
orientation”), at http://www.libertyeducationforum.org/lefcontents/aboutus/  (last 
visited July 9, 2005). 
 276. See Sean Bugg, Right Here, Right Now: Interview with Log Cabin Republican 
Executive Director Patrick Guerriero, METROWEEKLY, July 10, 2003 (quoting Patrick 
Guerriero, the Executive Director of the Log Cabin Republicans), available at 
http://www.metroweekly.com/feature/?ak=543 (last visited July 31, 2005).  He speaks 
of the need to: 
[C]hange the language around the so-called marriage issue.  We should be 
talking about fairness via a civil contract, which is what marriage really is.  
When people use the word marriage it brings up connotations of intervening 
in religious ceremonies and institutions.  That is not at all what gays and 
lesbians are asking for.  We’re asking for the right to have a piece of paper 
that recognizes our tax-paying, loving relationships, that offers us tax fairness 
in America. 
Id.; see also LOG CABIN REPUBLICANS, A MESSAGE FROM LOG CABIN REPUBLICANS, Aug. 6, 
2003 [hereinafter Message from LCR] (declaring that Log Cabin Republicans’ efforts 
for civil recognition aim to obtain legal and financial responsibilities that come with 
establishing a life-long relationship) (on file with the Journal of Gender, Social Policy 
& the Law); Press Release, Log Cabin Republicans, Log Cabin Republicans of New 
York Joins National Campaign Against Constitutional Amendment Targeting Gay 
Families (Sept. 5, 2003) [hereinafter LCR Press Release] (attacking the proposed 
constitutional amendment to ban same-sex marriage as a distortion of the 
Constitution and the Bill of Rights) (on file with the Journal of Gender, Social Policy 
& the Law). 
 277. See, e.g., LCR Press Release, supra note 276 (sending a message against the 
Constitutional Amendment banning same-sex marriage, by stating, “[t]he Founders 
drafted the Constitution and the Bill of Rights to protect the rights of individuals 
from the intrusive forces of government . . . .  The federal marriage amendment 
attacks the very premise of our founding document”).  Further, the Press Release 
argued that the constitutional amendment “seeks to take the rights of self-
government away from these families and place the power to define the institution of 
marriage, which the Founders prudently entrusted to the states, with a distant federal 
government.”  Id. 
 278. See id. (supporting its opposition against the proposed constitutional 
amendment with the statistic that over 594,000 gay and lesbian couples live in each 
county in the U.S.); see also Message from LCR, supra note 276 (stressing that gays 
and lesbians want the same rights as other Americans, such as tax fairness and the 
legal structure to make their families stable and secure); News Update, Log Cabin 
Republicans, Log Cabin Challenges Frist (R-TN) on Anti-Gay Constitutional 
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Yet, as the next section illustrates, these theoretical differences 
have, until very recently, largely disappeared in the public policy 
debates surrounding same-sex marriage.  In the legislative forum 
these libertarian and fiscal conservative voices have been 
overshadowed by social conservatism, which has been the dominant 
conservative voice in federal public policy debates about same-sex 
marriage.  However, a more libertarian discourse has begun to 
emerge as a challenge to the dominance of social conservatism. 
2.  Federal Initiatives: From the Defense of Marriage Act to the 
Federal Marriage Amendment 
Over the past decade, gay and lesbian rights activists have begun to 
challenge the exclusion of same-sex couples from the definition of 
marriage with some success.279  In May 1991, three same-sex couples 
filed a lawsuit against the state of Hawaii challenging the 
constitutionality of the opposite-sex requirement of marriage.280  
While the trial court rejected the challenge, the Hawaii Supreme 
Court remanded the case to the trial court to determine whether the 
state had a compelling state interest that could justify discrimination 
against same-sex couples.281  In 1996, the trial court found that the 
state had not met its burden of justifying the marriage law 
discrimination.282  Shortly thereafter, the Hawaii legislature 
responded by placing a constitutional amendment on the 1998 ballot 
that would give the legislature the power to restrict marriage to 
opposite-sex couples only.283  They also passed the Reciprocal 
                                                          
Amendment, June 30, 2003 [hereinafter LCR Challenges Frist] (contending that the 
“real threat to traditional marriage” is not homosexuals but the fifty percent divorce 
rate in the United States) (on file with the Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the 
Law), available at http://www.lcrga.com/archive/200306301204.shtml (last visited 
July 31, 2005). 
 279. But see Singer v. Hara, 522 P.2d 1187 (Wash. App. 1974) (holding that the 
state's denial of a marriage license to a gay couple was required by state statutes and 
was permitted by both the state and federal constitutions); Baker v. Nelson, 191 
N.W.2d 185, 186-87 (Minn. 1971) (holding that a Minnesota statute governing 
marriage did not authorize marriage between persons of the same sex and was not 
unconstitutional). 
 280. See Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 48-49 (Haw. 1993) (challenging the 
constitutionality of § 572-1 of the Hawaii Revised Statutes, which restricted marriage 
to a male and a female). 
 281. See id. at 63 (presuming unconstitutional laws based on suspect classes unless 
the government can show a compelling interest). 
 282. See Baehr v. Miike, 1996 WL 694235, *21 (Haw. Cir. Ct. Dec. 3, 1996) 
(requiring the government to show prejudice to the public in order for the public to 
claim a compelling interest in withholding the marriage right from same-sex 
couples). 
 283. See HAW. CONST., art. I, § 23 (1998) (granting the legislature the power to 
restrict marriage to opposite-sex couples); see also 1997 Haw. Sess. Laws 2883 
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Beneficiaries Act, which allowed same-sex couples and others 
excluded from marriage to register as reciprocal beneficiaries, and 
thereby be subject to a limited range of the rights and responsibilities 
enjoyed by married couples. 
But, in the aftermath of the Hawaii Supreme Court decision and 
the subsequent trial court ruling, many believed that Hawaii was on 
the cusp of recognizing same-sex marriage.  Opponents feared that if 
Hawaii did so, other states would be forced to recognize the validity of 
Hawaii marriages.284  Beginning with Utah, states began to pass laws 
defining marriage as a union between opposite sexes and limiting the 
recognition of same-sex marriage.285  Over the next six years, thirty-
four states followed Utah’s example, legislating against the 
recognition of same-sex marriages.286 
Congress also responded to the Hawaii challenge to traditional 
marriage.  In May 1996, the Defense of Marriage Act (DOMA) was 
                                                          
(ratifying an amendment that permits the state to withhold marriage rights from 
same-sex couples in November 1998); Baehr v. Miike, 1999 Haw. LEXIS 391, *8 
(1999) (holding that the marriage amendment placed Hawaii Revised Statutes § 572-
1 beyond the scope of the state’s equal protection clause and thereby rendered the 
challenge to the statute prohibiting same-sex marriage moot). 
 284. See ROBERT LEFLAR ET AL., AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAW § 221 (4th ed. 1986) 
(stating that the marriage’s place of celebration ordinarily determines the validity of 
marriage); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 283(2) (2004) (presuming 
that marriages valid where they were celebrated will be recognized elsewhere, unless 
the marriage violates public policy); Andrew Koppelman, Dumb and DOMA: Why the 
Defense of Marriage Act is Unconstitutional, 83 IOWA L. REV. 1 (1997). 
In the United States, public policy has often been invoked to deny 
recognition to incestuous, underage, or interracial marriages.  Unless a 
restriction violated some substantive constitutional prohibition [as, it was 
eventually held, the prohibition of interracial marriage did], states have never 
been constitutionally prevented from withholding recognition from foreign 
marriages where those marriages violated their own strong public policies.  
Whether any particular marriage need be recognized is, then, primarily a 
question of state rather than federal law. 
Id.; see also Barbara J. Cox, Same-Sex Marriage and Choice of Law: If We Marry in 
Hawaii, Are We Still Married When We Return Home?, 1994 WIS. L. REV. 1033, 1101 
(1994) (contending that states should recognize same-sex marriage because it 
eliminates both discrimination based on prejudice and state interference with 
personal relationships); Andrew Koppelman, Same-Sex Marriage, Choice of Law, and 
Public Policy, 76 TEX. L. REV. 921 (1998). But see Linda J. Silberman, Can the Island 
of Hawaii Bind the World? A Comment on Same-Sex Marriage and Federalism 
Values, 16 QUINNIPAC L. REV. 191, 200 (1996) (analogizing same-sex marriage to 
incest or polygamy to conclude that states can prohibit types of marriage based on 
strong public policy). 
 285. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., EQUALITY PRACTICE: CIVIL UNIONS AND THE 
FUTURE OF GAY RIGHTS 27 (2002) (recounting that Utah initially amended its marriage 
law to declare same-sex marriages invalid and later amended it so that state courts 
would not recognize out-of-state same-sex marriages). 
 286. See id. at 27-28 (comparing Utah to other states’ responses, which passed a 
variety of laws, from redefining marriage to refusing to recognize any contractual 
rights created by same-sex marriages). 
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introduced in the Senate.  A parallel bill was introduced in the House 
by Representative Robert Barr and others.  The bill passed in the 
House by a vote of 342-67 on July 12, 1996, and in the Senate by a 
vote of 85-14 on September 10, 1996.287  President Clinton signed 
DOMA just after midnight on September 21, 1996.288  DOMA defines 
marriage as “only a legal union between one man and one woman as 
husband and wife,” and “spouse” as “only . . . a person of the opposite 
sex who is a husband or a wife.”289  The law permits states to ignore 
the Full Faith and Credit Clause of the Constitution in relation to 
same-sex marriages by authorizing the states to refuse to recognize 
“any public act, record, or judicial proceeding of any other State . . . 
respecting a relationship between persons of the same sex that is 
treated as a marriage under the laws of such other State . . . .”290 
Congressional debates on DOMA overwhelmingly reflected a social 
conservative vision of family, in which same-sex marriage is seen to 
threaten the very fabric of American society.291  As the following 
excerpts from Congressional debates illustrate, the political discourse 
was one that emphasized the hallmarks of social conservatism.  Many 
defended the opposite-sex definition of marriage on the basis of 
tradition.  Senator Don Nickles stated, “[t]he definitions of [DOMA] 
are based on common understanding rooted in our Nation’s history, 
our statutes, and our case law.  They merely reaffirm what Americans 
have meant for 200 years when using the words marriage and 
                                                          
 287. 142 CONG. REC. 17094 (1996) (listing the names of Representatives against 
the bill, for the bill, and not voting); 142 CONG. REC. S10129 (1996) (discussing 
whether the states should retain the exclusive right to legislate on whether to 
recognize same-sex marriages valid in other states). 
 288. See, e.g., Clinton Campaign Pulls Ad After Outcry, S.F. CHRONICLE, Sept. 23, 
1996, at A10 (stating that the gay and lesbian community were angered when 
President Clinton signed DOMA and referred to him as a “fair-weather friend”). 
 289. Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996) (codified 
at 28 U.S.C. § 1738C) (restricting the federal definition of marriage to one between a 
man and a woman while permitting states to develop their own definition). 
 290. Id. (adding a section to ensure that states preserved their right to legislate 
independently on family law and marriage). 
 291. See, e.g., Charles J. Butler, The Defense of Marriage Act: Congress’s Use of 
Narrative in the Debate Over Same-Sex Marriage, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 841 (1998) 
(claiming that during Congress’ debates on DOMA, it used anecdotes to reinforce 
the apprehensions of permitting same-sex marriages and to justify the statute); James 
M. Donovan, DOMA: An Unconstitutional Establishment of Fundamentalist 
Christianity, 4 MICH, J. GENDER & L. 335, 338 (1997) (criticizing the intent of the 
Defense of Marriage Act for lacking secular goals and thus violating the Establishment 
clause of the Constitution); Alec Walen, The “Defense of Marriage Act” and 
Authoritarian Morality, 5 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J.  619, 619 (1997) (categorizing 
Congressional arguments against same-sex marriages into six parts: “:(1) politics and 
economics; (2) history and tradition; (3) religion; (4) the essential nature of marriage 
and the family; (5) social decay; and (6) morality”). 
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spouse.”292 
Many also focused on the procreative nature of marriage.  The 
House Report noted, “[s]imply defined, marriage is a relationship 
within which the community socially approves and encourages sexual 
intercourse and the birth of children.  It is society’s way of signaling to 
would-be parents that their long-term relationship is socially 
important—a public concern, not simply a private affair.”293  Senator 
Robert Byrd stated, 
The purpose of this kind of union between human beings of 
opposite gender is primarily for the establishment of a home 
atmosphere in which a man and a woman . . . bring into being 
children for the fulfillment of their love for one another and for 
the greater good of the human community at large.294 
Some commented on the threat of social chaos that the destruction 
of the traditional family would produce.  Representative Asa 
Hutchinson stated, “[O]ur country can survive many things, but one 
thing it cannot survive is the destruction of the family unit which 
forms the foundation of our society.  Those among us who truly desire 
a strong and thriving America for our children and grandchildren will 
defend traditional heterosexual marriage . . . .”295 
Senator Byrd argued, “Much of America has lost its moorings.  
Norms no longer exist.  We have lost our way with a speed that is 
awesome.”296  Some also emphasized the religious basis of marriage.  
Representative Hutchinson stated, “[M]arriage is a covenant 
established by God wherein one man and one woman are united for 
the purpose of founding and maintaining a family.”297  
Representative Charles Canady declared, “[T]he traditional family 
structure—centered on the lawful union between one man and one 
woman—comports with nature and with our Judeo-Christian moral 
tradition.”298 
                                                          
 292. 142 CONG. REC. S10103 (1996) (statement of Sen. Nickles) (arguing that 
DOMA does not interfere with the States’ ability to define marriage how it chooses). 
 293. H.R. REP. 104-664, at 15 (1996) (justifying society’s interest in safeguarding 
traditional marriage on the connection between marriage and children). 
 294. 142 CONG. REC. S10109 (1996) (statement of Sen. Byrd) (basing his view that 
only the relationship between a man and a woman is worthy of legal recognition and 
protection on history and culture). 
 295. 142 CONG. REC. 16970 (1996) (statement of Rep. Hutchinson) (stating that 
the majority of people would reserve marriage for a man and a woman). 
 296. 142 CONG. REC. S10111 (1996) (statement of Sen. Byrd) (defending the 
traditional definition of marriage based on the institution laid out in the Bible). 
 297. 142 CONG. REC. 16970 (1996) (statement of Rep. Hutchinson) (contending 
that the bill “simply restat[es]” the traditional view of marriage as set out both by the 
United States and State Supreme Courts). 
 298. 142 CONG. REC. H7441 (1996) (statement of Rep. Canady) (restricting 
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Many focused on questions of morality.  Representative Bob Barr 
noted, “The flames of hedonism, the flames of narcissism, the flames 
of self-centered morality are licking at the very foundations of our 
society: the family unit.”299  The House Report further stated, “Civil 
laws that permit only heterosexual marriage reflect and honor a 
collective moral judgment about human sexuality.  This judgment 
entails both moral disapproval of homosexuality and a moral 
conviction that heterosexuality better comports with traditional 
(especially Judeo-Christian) morality.”300  Relatedly, a strong current 
of disapproval of homosexuality also ran through the debates, 
sometimes erupting in explicit condemnation.  Representative Tom 
Coburn explained, “I come from a district . . . who has very profound 
beliefs that homosexuality is wrong.”301 
While this social conservative discourse of tradition, morality and 
religion dominated the Congressional debates, fiscal conservative 
arguments also appeared intermittently in the debate.  Interestingly, 
however, these arguments were deployed not to expand the definition 
of marriage and spouse to include a broader range of individuals and 
thereby broaden the scope of private responsibility.  Rather, the fiscal 
arguments were deployed by the proponents of DOMA, asserting that 
the expansion of marriage and spouse would increase public costs.  
Senator Phil Gramm, for example, argued: 
A failure to pass this bill, if the Hawaii court rules in favor of same-
sex marriage, will create . . . a whole group of new beneficiaries—no 
one knows what the number would be—tens of thousands, 
hundreds of thousands, potentially more—who will be beneficiaries 
of newly created survivor benefits under Social Security, Federal 
retirement plans, and military retirement plans.  It will trigger a 
whole group of new benefits under Federal health plans.  And not 
only will it trigger these benefits for the Federal Government, but 
under the full faith and credit provision of the Constitution, it will 
impose—through teacher retirement plans, State retirement plans, 
State medical plans, and even railroad retirement plans—a whole 
                                                          
marriage to a relationship between a man and a woman); see also 142 CONG. REC. 
H7486 (1996) (statement of Rep. Buyer) (“We as legislators and leaders for the 
country are in the midst of a chaos, an attack upon God’s principles.  God laid down 
that one man and one woman is a legal union.  That is marriage, known for 
thousands of years.  That God-given principle is under attack.”). 
 299. 142 CONG. REC. H7480-05 (1996) (statement of Rep. Barr) (criticizing 
“extremists” for forcing a “tortured view of morality” on the United States people). 
 300. H.R. REP. 104-664, at 15-16 (defending the traditional view of marriage by 
asserting that approving same-sex marriage would not only be illegitimate, but also 
trivialize the legitimacy of traditional marriage).  
 301. 142 CONG. REC. H7444 (1996) (statement of Sen. Coburn) (describing his 
District’s view that homosexuality is based on perversion and lust). 
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new set of benefits and expenses which have not been planned or 
budgeted for under current law.302 
Similarly, Representative Barr stated, “[I]f you do not believe it is 
fiscally responsible to throw open the doors of the U.S. Treasury to be 
raided by the homosexual movement, then the choice is very 
clear.”303  Other representatives in the House agreed with Senator 
Gramm.  Representative Dave Weldon stated, “I think it would be 
wrong to take money out of the pockets of working families across 
America and use those tax dollars to give Federal acceptance and 
financial support to same-sex marriages.”304 
These fiscal conservative arguments were made notwithstanding the 
fact that no study was conducted regarding the impact of the 
recognition of gay marriage on state and federal benefits programs.305  
The House of Representatives turned back an amendment to DOMA 
that would have “commissioned a General Accounting Office study of 
these and related questions.”306  Thus, Congress failed to consider the 
relative costs of benefits of expanding the marriage; in fact, the idea 
of saving money through potential privatization of public costs did 
not enter the political discussion.  Rather, the political discourse—
overwhelmingly influenced by a social conservative vision of the family 
that is anything but agnostic on same-sex marriage—simply deployed 
the rhetoric of fiscal costs in support of its traditional family agenda. 
DOMA did not put an end to the constitutional challenges to 
marriage by same-sex couples.  The battle over same-sex marriage 
subsequently moved to Vermont, where the state Supreme Court of 
Vermont held that the opposite sex definition of marriage violated 
the common benefits provision of the state constitution.307  But, 
rather than redefine marriage to include same sex couples, the Court 
handed the issue back to the Vermont legislature to craft an 
                                                          
 302. 142 CONG. REC. 142 Cong. Rec. S10100-02 (1996) (statement of Sen. 
Gramm). 
 303. 142 CONG. REC. H7488 (1996) (statement of Rep. Barr) (suggesting that only 
those who believe that the beliefs of the American public are meaningless would 
oppose DOMA). 
 304. 142 CONG. REC.  H7493 (1996) (statement of Rep. Weldon) (expressing 
concern that a State’s recognition of same-sex marriages would affect federal policies 
such as Social Security benefits). 
 305. See Donovan, supra note 291, at 356-57 (describing and refuting the Senate’s 
concern that same-sex marriages would overtax the current programs allowing for 
spousal benefits). 
 306. See id. at 358 (concluding that the failure to conduct a study while debating 
the bill was intentional) (citing 142 CONG. REC. H7503-05 (daily ed. July 12, 1996)). 
 307. See Baker v. Vermont, 744 A.2d 864, 886 (Vt. 1999) (rejecting the State's 
arguments that the State's interest in furthering procreation and traditional child-
rearing warrants a ban on same-sex marriages). 
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appropriate remedy.308  After considerable and heated debate, the 
Vermont legislature enacted the Civil Unions Act, which established a 
parallel regime whereby same sex couples could register their civil 
unions, and thereby be subject to the same rights and responsibilities 
as married couples.309 
Same sex marriage challenges have continued apace.  In November 
2003, the Massachusetts Supreme Court found the opposite sex 
definition of marriage to be in violation of the state Constitution and, 
in a subsequent reference, held that a civil unions law would also be 
in violation of the equality rights in the state Constitution.310  A 
similar same-sex marriage challenge is still pending in New Jersey.311  
And same sex marriage challenges have proliferated beginning with 
the actions of Mayor Newsom of San Francisco who began issuing 
marriage licenses to same sex couples in February, 2004.312 
With these same-sex marriage challenges pending and the Supreme 
Court striking down Texas’ sodomy laws in Lawrence v. Texas, social 
conservatives have once again placed their opposition to same-sex 
marriage squarely on the federal public agenda.313  In May 2003, 
Representative Marilyn Musgrave proposed an amendment to the 
                                                          
 308. See id. at 886-87 (imagining that the legislature could devise a system to 
define marriage as heterosexual marriage while still protecting the common benefits 
rights of same-sex couples). 
 309. See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15 §§ 1201-1207 (2004) (extending the benefits of 
marriage to same-sex couples). 
 310. See Goodridge v. Dept. of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 968 (Mass. 2003) 
(finding that the State’s interest in creating an environment to further procreation 
did not constitute a rational basis for banning same-sex marriage); see also Cheryl 
Wetzstein, States Lining Up to Outlaw Same-Sex 'Marriage', WASH. TIMES, Nov. 9, 
2004, at A03 (noting that Massachusetts state legislature subsequently agreed to 
amend the state constitution to allow civil unions and ban same sex marriage). 
 311. See Lewis v. Harris, 2003 WL 23191114, at *7-8 (N.J. 2003) (rejecting same-
sex marriage benefits as a fundamental right embedded in the Federal or State 
constitution). 
 312. See Dean E. Murphy, California Attorney General is Pressed on Gay Marriage, 
N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 25, 2004, at A19 (discussing judicial and political challenges to San 
Francisco Mayor Gavin Newsom's directive to allow same-sex couples to legally 
marry). 
 313. See 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) (striking down a Texas sodomy law that 
prohibited gay sex because it violated the right to privacy protected by the Due 
Process Clause).  In his classically social conservative dissenting opinion, Justice 
Antonin Scalia warned of the dire consequences of the majority: 
The Court today pretends that it possesses a . . . freedom of action, so that we 
need not fear judicial imposition of homosexual marriage, as has recently 
occurred in Canada.  Do not believe it . . . .  Today’s opinion dismantles the 
structure of constitutional law that has permitted a distinction to be made 
between heterosexual and homosexual unions, insofar as formal recognition 
in marriage is concerned. 
Id. at 604 (Scalia, J. dissenting) (citations omitted). 
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Constitution to prohibit same-sex marriage in the United States.314  
As initially drafted, the Federal Marriage Amendment (“FMA”) read: 
Marriage in the United States shall consist only of the union of a 
man and a woman.  Neither this Constitution nor the constitution 
of any state under state or federal law shall be construed to require 
that marital status or the legal incidents thereof be conferred upon 
                                                          
 314. See Federal Marriage Amendment, H.R.J. RES. 56, 108th Cong. (2003) 
(proposing a constitutional amendment that would define and limit marriage to one 
between a man and a woman).  The Federal Marriage Amendment is a bipartisan 
proposal, whose sponsors include Collin Peterson (D-MN), Mike McIntyre (D-NC), 
Ralph Hall (D-TX), Marilyn Musgrave (R-CO), Jo Ann Davis (R-VA) and David Vitter 
(R-LA).  Id.; see also Press Release, Alliance for Marriage, Introduction of the Federal 
Marriage Amendment in Congress (May 15, 2002) (noting that the Alliance for 
Marriage, a racially diverse organization “dedicated to promoting marriage and 
addressing the epidemic of fatherless families in the United States,” has spearheaded 
the campaign for the constitutional amendment for several years), available at 
http://www.allianceformarriage.org/site/PageServer?pagename=mac_coalition_state
ment (last visited July 24, 2005).  The Alliance for Marriage is committed to a range 
of neo-conservative public policy reforms to promote the traditional family.  Id.  On 
the proposed constitutional amendment, the organization states, in classically social 
conservative terms: 
For several decades, America has been wandering in a wilderness of social 
problems caused by family disintegration.  And an overwhelming body of 
social science data has established that America's greatest social problems -- 
violent crime, welfare dependency, and child poverty -- track more closely 
with family disintegration than they do with any other social variable, 
including race and income level.  Tragically, as bad as our current situation 
may be, it could soon become dramatically worse.  This is because the courts 
in America are poised to erase the legal road map to marriage and the family 
from American law.  In fact, the weakening of the legal status of marriage in 
America at the hands of the courts has already begun. . . .  The institution of 
marriage is so central to the well being of both children and our society that 
it was, until recently, difficult to imagine that marriage itself would need 
explicit constitutional protection.  However, our country's time-honored 
understanding that the very essence of marriage is the union of male and 
female has come under fire in the courts. 
Id.  The Alliance for Marriage concludes that the only way to protect the institution of 
marriage from its disintegration at the hands of the courts is through a constitutional 
amendment.  Id.; Necessary Amendment: On Gay Marriage, NAT’L REV., Aug. 11, 
2003, at 15 (objecting to judges and states deciding whether or not to legalize same-
sex marriage), available at http://www.nationalreview.com/11aug03/editors 
081103a.asp (last visited July 31, 2005); Robert P. George, The 28th Amendment, 
NAT’L REV., July 23, 2001, at 3234 (concluding that because the judiciary is eroding 
the concept of marriage, a national campaign to preserve the institution must be 
mounted quickly); Robert H. Bork, Stop Courts From Imposing Gay Marriage: Why 
We Need a Constitutional Amendment, WALL ST. J., Aug. 7, 2001, at A14 (blaming the 
courts for leading the “radical redefinition of marriage” while the majority of 
Americans do not want to special rights for homosexuals); Maggie Gallagher, Do We 
Need a Federal Marriage Amendment?, TOWNHALL.COM, July 18, 2001 (arguing that 
the Federal Marriage Amendment would not prohibit legislatures and private 
corporations from extending benefits to unmarried couples), at 
http://www.townhall.com/columnists/maggiegallagher/mg20010718.shtml (last 
visited July 25, 2005).  But see Todd Hertz, Christian Conservatives Split on Federal 
Marriage Amendment, CHRISTIANITY TODAY, June 17, 2002 (criticizing the Alliance for 
Marriage for not going far enough to prevent states from recognizing same-sex 
marriage), available at http://www.christianitytoday.com/ct/2002/123/43.0.html 
(last visited June 16, 2005). 
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unmarried couples or groups.315 
The proposal was referred to the House Judiciary Subcommittee on 
the Constitution the day before the Supreme Court ruling in 
Lawrence.  The Senate debated the need for a constitutional 
amendment such as the FMA in subcommittee hearings in September 
2003.316  Senator Allard subsequently introduced a Senate version of 
the FMA and referred it to the Senate Committee on the Judiciary.  A 
Senate version of the FMA was subsequently introduced by Senator 
Allard, and referred to the Senate Committee on the Judiciary.317  On 
March 23, 2004—the day before the Senate Subcommittee hearings 
on the FMA—Senator Allard and Representative Musgrove 
introduced an amended text: 
Marriage in the United States shall consist only of the union of a 
man and a woman.  Neither this Constitution, nor the constitution 
of any State, marriage shall be construed to require that marriage 
or the legal incidents thereof be conferred upon any union other 
than the union of a man and a woman.318 
The amendment was largely in response to the criticism that the 
FMA, as originally drafted was so broad that it would prohibit 
individual states from introducing civil union or other partnership 
recognition legislation.  The revised text is intended to narrow the 
FMA to prevent a conflict with any such state legislation. 
In the intervening period, same sex marriage challenges continued 
apace, adding further momentum to the social conservative resolve to 
move forward with their anti-same sex marriage agenda.  In 
November 2003, the Massachusetts Supreme Court struck down the 
opposite sex definition of marriage as violating the state constitution, 
and held that same sex marriages would begin to be recognized in six 
months.  On a reference from the Massachusetts legislature, the 
Supreme Court subsequently stated that a civil union regime would 
not be consistent with the state constitution.  Then, in a somewhat 
unexpected development, in February 2004, the Mayor of San 
Francisco told city officials to begin issuing marriage licenses to same 
                                                          
 315. H.R.J. Res. 56, 108th Cong. (2003) (proposing a constitutional amendment to 
be ratified by the States). 
 316. See generally What is Needed to Defend the Bipartisan Defense of Marriage 
Act of 1996: Hearing Before the S. Subcomm. of the Constitution, Civil Rights and 
Property Rights, 108th Cong. (2003) [hereinafter Bipartisan Defense Hearing] 
(debating  whether there was a need for a constitutional amendment banning same-
sex marriage). 
 317. See Federal Marriage Amendment, S.J. Res. 26, 108th Cong. (2003) 
(proposing a constitutional amendment to ban same-sex marriage throughout the 
United States). 
 318. S.J. Res. 30, 108th Cong. (2004).  
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sex couples.  Indeed, it has been these developments that have 
brought the issue squarely within the federal limelight.  While 
President Bush initially hinted at his support for the constitutional 
amendment,319 in both the State of the Union 2004, and even more 
explicitly in a press conference on February 24, 2004, he specifically 
stated his support for a constitutional amendment banning same sex 
marriage.320 
The Senate Subcommittee on the Constitution, the Senate 
Committee on the Judiciary, and the House Subcommittee on the 
Constitution each held hearings in March 2004.  Those who have 
testified at the hearings in favor of the FMA have cast their arguments 
in social conservative terms.  However, as an analysis of the hearings 
reveals there are also some marked departures from the political 
debate surrounding DOMA a decade earlier.  Four discrete and 
recurrent themes are evident in the FMA hearings to date: the decline 
of the family,321 the need to protect children within traditional 
                                                          
 319. See Neil A. Lewis, From the Rose Garden: Same-Sex Marriage; Bush Backs Bid 
to Block Gays from Marrying, N.Y. TIMES, July 31, 2003, at A1 (quoting President 
Bush’s appeal to social conservatives and religion in his 2004 State of the Union 
Address). 
[W]e’re all sinners. . . .  On the other hand, that does not mean that 
somebody like me needs to compromise on issues such as marriage.  And 
that's really where the issue is headed here in Washington, and that is the 
definition of marriage.  I believe marriage is between a man and a woman, 
and I believe we ought to codify that one way or the other and we have 
lawyers looking at the best way to do that. 
Id.; see also Robert Pear & David D. Kirkpatrick, Bush Plans $1.5 Billion Drive for 
Promotion of Marriage, N.Y. TIMES , Jan. 14, 2004, at A1 (quoting President Bush’s 
response to whether he would support a constitutional amendment against gay 
marriage and gay civil unions). 
If necessary . . . I will support a constitutional amendment which would 
honor marriage between a man and a woman, codify that, and will—the 
position of this administration is that whatever legal arrangements people 
want to make, they're allowed to make, so long as it's embraced by the state, 
or does start at the state level. 
Id. 
 320. President George W. Bush,  State of the Union Address (Jan. 20, 2004) 
[hereinafter State of the Union Address] (reprimanding “activist judges” for creating 
law allowing same-sex marriages while declaring support for DOMA), available at 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/01/20040120-7.html (last visited 
June 17, 2005); President George W. Bush, Presidential Press Conference, President 
Calls for Constitutional Amendment Protecting Marriage, Feb. 24, 2004 
(recommending a constitutional amendment because “activist” courts could strike 
down an ordinary law), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/ 
2004/02/20040224-2.html (last visited June 17, 2005). 
 321. See 150 Cong. Rec. H7895-02 (statement of Rev. Richard Richardson, 
Assistant Pastor) (“The dilution of the ideal—of procreation and child-rearing within 
the marriage of one man and one woman—has already had a devastating effect on 
our community.  We need to be strengthening the institution of marriage, not 
diluting it.”); see also 150 Cong. Rec. S7876-01 (2004) (statement of Hon. Orrin 
Hatch, Chairman). 
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marriage,322 and the need to protect democracy from activist 
judges.323  A fourth theme evident throughout the hearings has been 
in response to the critics of the FMA, and argues that the FMA is not 
discriminatory.324 
Of the six themes identified in the DOMA debates—tradition, 
procreative nature of marriage, destruction of the traditional family, 
religion, morality and condemnation of homosexuality—only the first 
three remain evident throughout the FMA debates.  Religion is rather 
less in evidence in the hearing.  Some of the supporters of the FMA 
articulated their position in more explicit religious discourse.  For 
example, the American Center for Law and Justice submissions to the 
House Subcommittee on the Constitution began their discussion of 
marriage with a quote from Genesis.325  President Bush has at times 
deployed religion in his support for FMA, although most of his 
support is articulated in terms of tradition and the sanctity of 
                                                          
The bedrock of American success is the family, and it is traditional marriage 
that undergirds the American family.  The disintegration of the family in this 
country correlates to the many serious social problems, including crime and 
poverty.  We are seeing soaring divorce rates.  We are seeing soaring out-of-
wedlock birth rates that have resulted in far too many fatherless families.  
Weakening the legal status of marriage at this point will only exacerbate these 
problems, and we simply must act to strengthen the family. 
Id.; Bipartisan Defense Hearing, supra note 316 (statement of Rev. Dr. Ray 
Hammond II, Pastor) (claiming that an acceptance of same-sex marriages will further 
exacerbate the difficulties already faced by American families); id. (statement of 
Maggie Gallagher) (contending that legalization of same-sex marriage asserts the 
government’s belief that children no longer need mothers and fathers); id. 
(statement of Michael Farris, President, Patrick Henry College) (indicating that the 
potential for judge-made law to undermine the traditional definition of marriage is 
too great to be tolerated). 
 322. See 150 Cong. Rec. H7897 (2004) (statement of Rev. Richard Richardson, 
Assistant Pastor) (“We firmly believe that children do best when raised by a mother 
and a father. . . .  It is not just society—it is biology, it is basic human instinct.  We 
alter those expectations and basic human instincts at our peril, and at the peril of our 
communities.”); see also Oversight Hearing on the Defense of Marriage Act: Hearing 
Before the Subcomm. on the Const. of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th 
Cong. (2004) [hereinafter Oversight Hearing] (statement of Vincent McCarthy, Am. 
Ctr. for Law and Justice) (arguing that “claims that raising children within a 
homosexual union [are] not damaging to the children are entirely impeached by 
flawed constructions and conclusions”). 
 323. See A Proposed Constitutional Amendment to Preserve Traditional Marriage: 
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 108th Cong. (2004) [hereinafter 
Proposed Constitutional Amendment] (statement of Prof. Katherine Spaht) 
(supporting the Federal Marriage Amendment to prevent the issue from being 
decided by the courts). 
 324. See 150 Cong. Rec. H7895-02 (statement of Rev. Richard Richardson) (“The 
traditional institution of marriage is not discrimination.  And I find it offensive to call 
it that.  Marriage was not created to oppress people.  It was created for children.”). 
 325. See Oversight Hearing, supra note 322 (statement of Vincent McCarthy, Am. 
Ctr. for Law and Justice) (quoting Genesis 1:26-27 about the creation of man, and 
more specifically, the creation of male and female in support of the constitutional 
amendment). 
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marriage.326  However, both the American Center for Law and Justice 
and President Bush have overwhelming cast their support in terms of 
the traditional family.  The themes of immorality and the 
condemnation of homosexuality are, however, conspicuously absent 
in the political discourse of the hearings.  Arguably, the discursive 
terrain has shifted sufficiently in the intervening period that the social 
conservatives are now forced to confront the argument that the FMA 
is discriminatory.  The idea that discrimination against gay men and 
lesbians is wrong was simply not part of the social conservative 
conversation in the DOMA debates.  Social conservative discourse 
simply presumed that gay men and lesbians, and same sex 
relationships were morally inferior—indeed defective—and deserving 
of condemnation, not equality.  It would appear that this kind of 
explicit condemnation of gay men and lesbians has lost some of its 
political legitimacy.327  Social conservatives must instead refute the 
allegation of discrimination. 
Yet, much of the social conservative discourse is enduring.  The 
decline of the traditional and the resulting harm to children remains 
foundational to their claims, and consistent with their political 
discourse in other dimensions of the legal regulation of the family.  
Strong government intervention is required to reverse this decline.  
Indeed, it is a claim to the kind of government intervention that many 
conservatives typically oppose—federal and constitutional 
intervention in an issue that falls squarely within state jurisdiction.  
The FMA then not only runs counter to libertarian conservative 
claims for minimalist government, but also for local and state 
governance over federal.  To the extent that it is even addressed, 
social conservative supporters of the FMA attempt to justify this 
intervention in terms of the importance of the interest at stake. 
                                                          
 326. See Lewis, supra note 319 (indicating that Bush’s statement that “we’re all 
sinners” in his 2004 State of the Union address was mix of tolerance with his 
conservative policy); see also, State of the Union Address, supra note 320 (“The same 
moral tradition that defines marriage also teaches that each individual has dignity and 
value in God's sight.”). 
 327. See Alan Cooperman, Santorum Angers Gay Rights Groups, WASH. POST, Apr. 
22, 2003, at A04 (quoting Senator Rick Santorum’s disparagement of homosexual 
acts, “If the Supreme Court says that you have the right to consensual (gay) sex within 
your home, then you have the right to polygamy, you have the right to incest, you 
have the right to adultery”).  The political furor that erupted around these 
comments, comments which were utterly commonplace during the DOMA debates, 
suggests that the terrain of legitimate debate and comment around gay and lesbian 
issues is shifting.  But see Press Release, Concerned Women for America, CWA 
Condemns “Gay Thought Police” Attacks on Sen. Santorum (Apr. 22, 2003) 
(implying that the shift must not be overstated because many individuals and 
organizations continue to oppose homosexual acts), available at 
http://www.cultureandfamily.org/articledisplay.asp?id=3817&department=CFI&categ
oryid =cfreport (last visited June 17, 2005). 
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While libertarian arguments have been largely ignored, some 
witnesses have attempted to address and reject these concerns.  For 
example, Katherine Shaw Spaht, a witness before the Senate Judiciary 
Committee hearings, attempted to justify the intrusion into states’ 
rights on the basis of the importance of the interests at stake.328  
Spaht also argued that the courts have reinterpreted (and in her view, 
misinterpreted) liberty rights as a “radical right of individual 
autonomy without the tempering language of ‘the common 
good.’”329  It is an argument of liberty going too far; of liberty coming 
unhinged from its foundations in the “country’s history and 
tradition.”330  It is an argument that appeals to the social conservative 
emphasis on authority over freedom, social order over individual 
liberty.  In a similar rejection of more libertarian ideas, Maggie 
Gallagher, a witness before the Senate Subcommittee on the 
Constitution Hearings in September 2004, specifically considered and 
rejected the private choice arguments in favor of same-sex 
marriage.331  In her view, the interest of children in opposite-sex 
parents far outweighs any right of individuals to make intimate 
choices. 
While this social conservative rhetoric remains the dominant 
conservative voice around same sex marriage, a more libertarian 
discourse has begun to emerge in federal political debates beyond the 
few lone voices of the Log Cabin Republicans.  A private choice 
approach to the question of gay and lesbian rights has begun to 
                                                          
 328. See Proposed Constitutional Amendment, supra note 323 (statement of Prof. 
Katherine Splaht). 
State experimentation as fifty individual laboratories has not been permitted 
when the question is as fundamental as what is marriage . . . .  We don’t 
permit a state to experiment with socialism or printing its own currency.  
Denying such experimentation is especially prevalent if there is concern for 
the welfare of children . . . .  Children’s welfare is central and at stake in a 
common understanding of marriage. 
Id. 
 329. Id. (expressing concern that the courts’ interpretation of liberty has rendered 
the definition of marriage unpredictable in the future). 
 330. Id. 
 331. See Bipartisan Defense Hearing, supra note 316 (statement of Maggie 
Gallagher). 
Two ideas are in conflict here: one is that children deserve mothers and 
father (sic), and that adults have an obligation to at least try to conduct their 
sexual lives to give children this important protection.  That is the marriage 
idea.  The other is that adult interests in sexual liberty are more important 
than “imposing” or preferring any one family form: all family forms must be 
treated identically by law if adults are to be free to make intimate choices.  
This is the core idea behind the drive for same-sex marriage.  And it is the 
core idea that must be rejected if the marriage idea is to be sustained. 
Id. 
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emerge from within the judicial forum with the United States 
Supreme Court decision in Lawrence, and a similar libertarian 
sensibility is beginning to make its way into the political realm as 
conservative opposition to the FMA.  In Lawrence, the United States 
Supreme Court in striking down the Texas sodomy law, articulated a 
strong right to liberty that encompassed the right of gays and lesbians 
to enter into consensual, sexual relationships in the privacy of their 
homes free from government intervention.  It described the sodomy 
laws as “touching upon the most private human conduct, sexual 
behavior, and in the most private of places, the home.”332  According 
to the majority opinion, the State should not attempt 
[T]o define the meaning of the relationship or to set its boundaries 
absent injury to a person or abuse of an institution the law protects.  
It suffices for us to acknowledge that adults may choose to enter 
upon this relationship in the confines of their homes and their own 
private lives and still retain their dignity as free persons.  When 
sexuality finds overt expression in intimate conduct with another 
person, the conduct can be but one element in a personal bond 
that is more enduring.  The liberty protected by the Constitution 
allows homosexual persons the right to make this choice.333 
While the significance of this passage and the decision for same-sex 
marriage will be debated for years to come,334 it does represent a 
strong statement of a right to be free from government intervention 
in the personal sphere of privacy.  In contrast to the legislative forum, 
where social conservative arguments remain dominant, Lawrence 
represents a significant incursion of a private choice approach in 
which a libertarian sensibility trumped the social conservative 
argument in favor of the legal prohibition of same-sex conduct.335  
While it is too early to tell, it is possible to speculate that the discursive 
                                                          
 332. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 567 (concluding that the Court failed to appreciate the 
liberty rights at issue in Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), before overruling 
the previous decision). 
 333. Id. (counseling against the government’s attempts to limit the types of 
relationships a person may legally enter into). 
 334. Compare id. at 578 (“The present case . . . does not involve whether the 
government must give formal recognition to any relationship that homosexual 
persons seek to enter.”), with id. at 604 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Today’s opinion 
dismantles the structure of constitutional law that has permitted a distinction to be 
made between heterosexual and homosexual unions, insofar as formal recognition in 
marriage is concerned.”).  According to Scalia, once “moral disapprobation of 
homosexual conduct” is removed as a justification for limiting marriage to opposite 
sexes, little other justification remains.  Id. at 604-05. 
 335. See generally Randy Barnett, Justice Kennedy’s libertarian Revolution: 
Lawrence v. Texas, CATO SUPREME CT. REV. 21, 36 (2002-03) (arguing that Kennedy 
has endorsed a “presumption of liberty” that places the burden on the government to 
justify a restriction on freedom rather than a burden on the citizen to establish the 
liberty is fundamental). 
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power of liberty in the judicial forum may be beginning to displace, or 
at least challenge, the hold of social conservatism on issues of gay and 
lesbian rights.  While the private choice arguments in relation to 
same-sex couples still finds little support in the legislative forum, the 
Supreme Court ruling in Lawrence is illustrative of the ways in which 
the law operates to mediate and select amongst competing 
discourses.336  In affirming this private choice approach, the Supreme 
Court discourse is forced onto the legislative stage of governments 
otherwise committed to a more social conservative vision.  While there 
may be significant limitations on the ability of the judiciary to do so in 
the future, given its precarious ideological balance and the politically 
contested nature of judicial appointments, it is worth observing that 
the discursive power of liberty is powerful in law.  When a social 
conservative vision collided with a private choice one, moderate 
conservatives, like Justices Kennedy and Souter, sided with the 
discourses of liberal legalism, allowing private choice to trump moral 
regulation.  Lawrence may represent the beginning of a cleavage 
between libertarian and social conservative voices in judicial 
discussions of same-sex issues. 
Quite arguably, the criminalization of gay sex represents a more 
egregious violation of private choice than the prohibition on same-sex 
marriage.  While libertarians would unanimously condemn the 
former, they might take a different position of the latter.  For 
example, some might be wary of the judiciary finding a constitutional 
right to same-sex marriage and imposing that right on a recalcitrant 
state.  Others might be more inclined to see the state get out of 
marriage entirely.337  It is thus not a foregone conclusion that the 
private choice approach endorsed in Lawrence would be extended to 
same-sex marriage. 
However, some conservative voices have increasingly articulated 
their discomfort with the social conservative position on same-sex 
marriage.  Several prominent Republicans appeared before the 
Senate and House committee hearings to speak against the FMA.  
They have not cast arguments to support the concept of same-sex 
marriage, but because they see the marriage amendment as an undue 
intervention in state and individual rights.338  Former Republican 
                                                          
 336. See HERMAN, supra note 79, at 137-69. 
 337. See David Boaz, Privatizing Marriage, SLATE (Apr. 25, 1997) (arguing that the 
legal regulation of intimate relationships should be left to the parties to structure 
according to their own private choices), available at http://www.slate.com/ 
toolbar.aspx?action=print&id=2440 (last visited June 17, 2005). 
 338. See Bipartisan Defense Hearing, supra note 316 (statement of Prof. Dale 
Carpernter) (arguing that since the Constitution, states have retained the authority to 
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Congressman Bob Barr, an author of the Defense of Marriage Act, has 
opposed the constitutional amendment stating that, “A constitutional 
amendment is both unnecessary and needlessly intrusive and 
punitive.”339  In Barr’s view, “marriage is a quintessential state 
issue.”340  It is, in his view, a conservative vision: 
As conservatives, we should be committed to the idea that people 
should . . . be free to govern themselves as they see fit.  State and 
local governments provide the easiest and most representative 
avenue to this ideal . . . .  In the best conservative tradition, each 
state should make its own decision without interference from 
Washington.341 
Barr acknowledges social conservative fears about the demise of the 
family, and endorses the need to return stability to the American 
family.342  But, in his view, “homosexual couples seeking to marry did 
not cause this problem, and the Federal Marriage Amendment cannot 
be the solution.”343  He thus distinguishes his position on same-sex 
marriage from other social conservatives. 
Former Republican Senator Alan Simpson has similarly stated his 
opposition to the FMA in the language of state rights and individual 
                                                          
legislate on all matters not reserved to the federal government and have traditionally 
controlled the area of family law). 
 339. See Bob Barr, Leave Marriage to the States, WASH. POST, Aug. 21, 2003, at A23 
(asserting that DOMA goes as far as the federal government needs to go in defining 
the legal parameters of marriage). 
 340. See Preserving Traditional Marriage: A View From the States: Hearing Before 
the S. Comm. on the Judiciary (2004) (statement of Hon. Bob Barr, Chairman) 
(stating that he spend efforts to ensure the traditional institution of marriage in his 
home state of Georgia but would not advise Alaska or California how to define 
marriage). 
 341. Id.  (noting, cautiously, but explicitly, his opposition to same-sex marriage: 
“To be clear, I oppose any marriage save that between one man and one woman.  
And, I would do all in my power to ensure that such a formulation is the only one 
operative in my home state of Georgia.”).  However, in his view, individual states are 
entitled to make their own decisions.  Id.  Barr also opposes the FMA on the grounds 
that the Constitution should not be easily amended.  Id.  He fears that amending the 
Constitution for this purpose would be a dangerous precedent which could lead to 
liberal activists modifying the Second Amendment, or banning tax cuts.  Id.  In his 
view, the Constitution should not be used to promote particular political ideologies 
and a constitutional amendment is unnecessary in light of DOMA and the legislation 
in thirty-eight states prohibiting same sex marriage.  Id. 
 342. See id. 
I worry, as do many Americans, about the erosion of the nuclear family, the 
loosening influence of basic morality, and the ever-growing pervasiveness of 
overtly sexual and violent imagery in popular entertainment.  Divorce is at an 
astronomical rate—children born out of wedlock are approaching the 
number born to matrimony.  The family is under threat, no question. 
Id. 
 343. Id. (emphasizing the need for solutions to restoring family values and stability, 
but refusing to endorse the constitutional amendment as an effective answer). 
88
Journal of Gender, Social Policy & the Law, Vol. 13, Iss. 3 [2005], Art. 1
http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/jgspl/vol13/iss3/1
2005] CONTESTING CONSERVATISMS 503 
 
liberty.344  In his view, the FMA would undermine the basic principles 
of federalism.345  “[I]t is surely not the tradition in this country to try 
to amend the Constitution in ways that constrict liberty.”346  He 
further argues that the FMA would not be consistent with Republican 
values of “respecting the rights and dignity of the individual.”347 
Many of the witnesses quoted with approval the words of Vice 
President Cheney, although the Vice President has subsequently 
distanced himself from this position: 
The fact of the matter is we live in a free society, and freedom 
means freedom for everybody.  That means people should be free 
to enter into any kind of relationship they want to enter into . . . .  I 
think we ought to do everything we can to tolerate and 
accommodate whatever kind of relationships people want to enter 
into.348 
This statement goes farther than a mere assertion of state rights; it 
comes closer to a libertarian assertion of the rights of individuals, and 
the rights of gay men and lesbians in particular to make their own 
private choices about how to structure their private lives. 
The conservative opposition to the FMA, while falling short of 
supporting same-sex marriage, reflects a libertarian sentiment about 
private choice and limited government.  These republican voices join 
Log Cabin Republicans who have similarly voiced their opposition to 
                                                          
 344. See Alan Simpson, Missing the Point on Gays, WASH. POST, Sept. 5, 2003, at 
A21 (explaining that “Republicans have always believed that government actions that 
affect someone’s personal life, property and liberty—including, if not especially 
marriage—should be made at the level of government closest to the people.”); Press 
Release, Republican Unity Coalition, Why RUC? (opposing the Federal Marriage 
Amendment based on federalism and the Republican belief in limited government), 
available at http://www.republicanunity.com/background.html (last visited June 17, 
2005); see also Deb Price, Gerald Ford: Treat Gay Couples Equally, DETROIT NEWS, 
Oct. 29, 2001, at 11A (contending that former president Gerald Ford, another 
prominent member of the RUC, has publicly stated he is in favor of treating gay 
couples the same as married couples). 
 345. See Simpson, supra note 344 (suggesting that the proposed constitutional 
amendment would undermine federalism and achieve nothing to strengthen 
American families). 
 346. Id. (contrasting the proposed amendment to past constitutional amendments, 
which the legislature has consistently designed to expand freedom and liberty). 
 347. See id. (stressing that the real threats to American family values are “divorce, 
out-of-wedlock births and infidelity,” not homosexuality). 
 348. Vice President Dick Cheney, The Lieberman-Cheney Vice Presidential Debate 
(Oct. 5, 2000) (responding to the moderator’s question concerning whether 
homosexuals in America deserve equal rights), available at http://www.debates.org/ 
pages/trans2000d.html (last visited June 17, 2005).  Vice President Cheney has 
subsequently stated that he will support whatever decision President Bush makes on 
the issue.  See Alan Cooperman, Mary Cheney Urged to Fight a Ban on Same-Sex 
Marriage, WASH. POST, Feb. 24, 2004, at A03.  However, Cheney’s original statement 
has been cited with approval by many of the conservative opponents to the FMA. 
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the FMA,349 articulating their position in the language of individual 
autonomy, freedom from government intervention and tax fairness.  
These statements are indicative of the beginnings of a more 
libertarian inspired private choice discourse entering into public 
policy debates on same-sex marriage.  While the social conservative 
position remains dominant (and the fiscal conservative lays dormant), 
this libertarian approach represents the emergence of a fissure within 
conservative politics on the question of same sex marriage, a fissure 
that could produce very different positions not only on the FMA, but 
on same sex marriage itself.  While the libertarian position, as 
articulated within federal public policy debates, has stopped well short 
of supporting same-sex marriage, a position that advocates private 
choice and limited government could be expected to eventually 
endorse the Log Cabin Republican position in favor of same sex 
marriage. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article began with a question about the partial privatization of 
dependency in American law and policy.  The analysis has sought to 
reveal the extent to which the conflicts and contradictions within 
conservative political discourse has been partially responsible for this 
partial privatization.  While a fiscal conservatism would endorse a 
more robust privatization of dependency, broadening the scope and 
content of family support obligations with broader definitions of 
family, both libertarian and social conservatism place constraints on 
this privatization.  Libertarian conservatives are concerned about the 
imposition of obligations in the absence of choice, and seek to 
maximize private choice within the legal regulation of the family.  
Social conservatives, by contrast, are concerned about promoting the 
traditional family and are opposed to broader definitions of family 
that would undermine this ideal. Both of these conservatisms oppose, 
for entirely different reasons, an expansion of support obligations and 
the privatization of dependency beyond the marital unit.  For 
libertarians, support obligations outside of marriage would be to 
impose obligations in the absence of choice.  For social conservatives, 
support obligations outside of marriage would be to encourage the 
demise of the traditional family. 
Federal public policy in the legal regulation of marriage has been 
                                                          
 349. See LCR Challenges Frist, supra note 278 (advocating for a type of “civil 
contract providing tax fairness and family stability” for same-sex couples, without 
infringing on religious values); LCR Press Release, supra note 276 (seeking rights for 
same-sex couples, such as the right to visit a partner in the hospital and the right to 
control the partner’s remains). 
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characterized by an ebb and flow in the relative power of fiscal and 
social conservatism, with libertarian conservatism making but a rare 
appearance in public policy debates.  In the reform of child support 
and social welfare in the 1970s and 1980s, fiscal conservatism 
informed the restructuring of welfare encouraging single mothers to 
work and the broadening of child support obligations to include 
unmarried parents.  As the discursive power of social conservatism 
grew in the 1990s, public policy initiatives promoting responsible 
fatherhood and marriage have increasingly sought to reverse the ways 
in which these earlier developments may have weakened the 
traditional family.  While child support laws continue to impose broad 
support obligations on married and unmarried parents, the new 
initiatives seek to promote the married over the unmarried variety, 
and the two parent over the one parent variety. 
Libertarian emphasis on private choice has had little resonance in 
the area which has been the most intense privatization of 
dependency, namely, child support.  Individuals are not given a 
choice about whether or not to assume responsibility for their 
children.  Similarly, in the restructuring of welfare, choice simply does 
not resonate.  Individuals are not to be given the choice to go on 
public assistance.  According to the critique of moral hazard, it was 
the existence of this choice that has resulted in women making bad 
choices and not assuming the costs of single motherhood.  Choice is 
simply not extended to deadbeat dads and welfare mothers. 
But the idea of private choice has begun to have some, albeit still 
limited, resonance in the area of same-sex marriage.  While social 
conservatism remains the dominant conservative voice in 
contemporary debates about same-sex marriage, a libertarian 
conservatism that emphasizes the importance of the choice to marry 
has become audible in public policy debates.  In striking contrast, 
fiscal conservatives are virtually absent in this arena.  Unlike in other 
jurisdictions where fiscal conservatives have supported the expansion 
of definitions of family to include same-sex couples explicitly on the 
basis that it will help privatize dependency and relieve the burden on 
the public purse, federal debates about the legal regulation of same-
sex couples has not included a significant fiscal conservative voice.  To 
the extent that fiscal conservatism has even been audible in earlier 
debates about DOMA, these arguments were used against the 
recognition of same-sex marriage, rather than in support. 
The continuing, indeed escalating power of social conservatism has 
operated to limit the privatization of dependency beyond more 
traditional family forms.  According to social conservatives, 
dependency can and should be privatized, but only within the 
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traditional family.  Social conservatism has similarly operated to 
preclude a more libertarian privatization of the family, in terms of the 
expansion of private choice.  According to social conservatives, 
individuals are free to make choices within the family – provided they 
are the right individuals and they make the right choices.  The 
continuing discursive power of the social conservative vision of the 
family has to a large extent precluded the emergence of a broader 
definition of family, and a more spirited privatization of support 
obligations capable of promoting the goals of either fiscal 
conservatives or libertarians. 
At the same time, it is important to recognize that both fiscal 
conservatism and libertarian conservatism place constraints on social 
conservatism.  The continuing influence of fiscal conservatism is 
evident in the on-going enforcement of child support obligations and 
workfare requirements of welfare.  The promotion of responsible 
fatherhood and marriage by social conservatives is intended to 
operate to supplement the existing child support and welfare laws, 
not to override them.  Similarly, in the area of same-sex marriage, 
libertarian conservatism is placing limitations on the kinds of 
arguments that social conservatives can make, or at a minimum, on 
the kinds of arguments to which they are forced to respond.  Social 
conservatives are being forced to answer the allegation of the 
restriction of state rights, and to a lesser extent, the violation of 
individual privacy rights.  The constraining influence of the clash 
between these contesting conservatisms thus cut in multiple 
directions.  It is not simply a matter of the dominance of social 
conservatism.  Rather, it is the clashes and contradictions between and 
amongst these divergent visions of family and privatization have been 
an animating force in public policy debates, initiatives, and legislation, 
all constraining and enabling different regulatory possibilities at 
different moments. 
Moreover, the continuing discursive power of social conservatism 
has placed limitations on the frames within which the question of the 
privatization of dependency is debated and discussed.  The focus on 
defending the traditional family—responsible fatherhood, marriage 
promotion, defending opposite-sex marriage—puts some questions 
on the table, while bracketing other ones.  The debate is framed as 
one of choice versus tradition, equality versus morality, economic 
obligation versus gendered parental roles.  While these are important 
issues to be resolved and the resolution will affect the future of the 
legal regulation of the family, the framework is one that precludes 
attention to a range of other potentially more far reaching issues.  For 
example, how should we best regulate intimate relationships?  Who 
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should be responsible for supporting persons without market income?  
Is marriage the most appropriate regulatory regime for the legal 
regulation of intimacy?  If we extend the legal regulation to marriage-
like relationships, namely, unmarried cohabiting relationships on the 
basis of their functional equivalency to marriage, why not extend legal 
regulation beyond conjugality?  Why should we privilege conjugal 
over non-conjugal relationships? 
One of the reasons that public policy has recognized and regulated 
marital relationships has to do with the unique nature of the 
economic and emotional dependency that characterizes these 
relationships.  Society imposes rights and responsibilities on 
individuals within these relationships of economic and emotional 
dependency because of the unique vulnerabilities and 
interdependencies.350  Other jurisdictions have extended recognition 
significantly beyond marriage.  Canada and Australia, for example, 
extensively regulate non-marital cohabitation on the basis of the 
functional equivalency of these relationships to marriage.  What about 
other non-conjugal relationships that are characterized by similar 
economic and emotional dependency?  What about the two adult 
sisters who have lived together for forty years, in lives that are 
economically and emotionally intertwined?  If their relationship 
breaks down, should one be able to look to the other for support?  
Should the sister without market income be able to seek support if 
she performed the role of homemaker?  Or if she contributed to her 
sister’s business without compensation?  Or if she maintained the 
home but never received legal title? These individuals were not 
married, nor could they ever marry.  But, nor were these individuals 
living in a conjugal relationship.  Therefore, even in jurisdictions that 
recognize non-marital cohabitation, there would be little to no legal 
interest in the dependency that might arise on the breakdown of such 
a relationship.351 
The example of the two sisters raises the question of whether 
                                                          
 350. See Brenda Cossman & Bruce Ryder, What is Marriage-Like Like? The 
Irregularity of Conjugality, 18 CAN. J. FAM. L. 269, 281-82 (2001) (characterizing a 
conjugal relationship, the basis for a marriage-like relationship, as one founded on 
interdependency and equality, rather than on traditional gender roles).  See 
generally BRENDA COSSMAN & BRUCE RYDER, THE LEGAL REGULATION OF ADULT 
PERSONAL RELATIONSHIPS: EVALUATING POLICY OBJECTIVES AND LEGAL OPTIONS IN 
FEDERAL LEGISLATION (2000) (criticizing the law for identifying relationships based on 
blood and marriage rather than in terms of contemporary norms such as qualitative 
attributes), available at http://www.lcc.gc.ca/research_project/00_regulations_1-
en.asp (last visited June 17, 2005). 
 351. See LAW COMMISSION OF CANADA, BEYOND CONJUGALITY 30 (2002) 
(recommending a fundamental rethinking of the legal regulation of adult personal 
relationships). 
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marriage and conjugality ought to be end the story for consideration 
of the kinds of obligations individuals owe one another.  It is not an 
argument in favour of this recognition.  Rather, it is simply an 
argument about the kind of questions remain submerged within 
contemporary public policy debates about the family.  The continuing 
influence of social conservatism focuses attention on a much narrower 
set of concerns, namely, marriage.  The broader questions are simply 
not visible.  Yet, libertarian and fiscal conservatives would have very 
different perspectives on these broader questions of the appropriate 
regulation of intimacy.  Libertarians would, of course, be concerned 
with private choice.  They might support a legal regime whereby the 
two sisters could structure their intimate relationships by contract and 
have that contract enforced.  They might support a legal regime 
whereby the two sisters could opt into a legal regime, such as a 
domestic partnership regime, that imposes rights and responsibilities.  
But, they would oppose a regime that imposes rights and 
responsibilities on the sisters without their consent.  Fiscal 
conservatives, by contrast, might support such an imposition of rights 
and responsibilities, simply on the basis of the economic 
interdependency of the individuals.  Fiscal conservatives, concerned 
first and foremost with privatizing dependency and thereby reducing 
the burden on the state, would be prepared to override private 
choice, and impose support obligations. 
The conflicts, contradictions and relative discursive power of the 
three conservative visions thus not only impact the legal regulation of 
the family, but also the very terms of the public policy debate whereby 
some issues are kept in sharp relief, and others remain not only off 
the agenda, but beyond the imagination.  Again, it is the continuing 
influence of social conservatism, and the mitigating influence of 
libertarian conservatism that limits a re-imagining of the legal 
regulation of intimacy, and not incidentally, a more extensive 
privatization of dependency.  Once again, it is the conflict between 
and among conservative visions that makes some things possible, and 
others not. 
The relationship between these three conservatisms, and their 
effect on the development of public policy needs further attention 
and analysis.  Many questions remain unanswered – indeed, many 
remain entirely unasked.  For example, is there a particular logic to 
the development of federal public policy on the family? Was it 
necessary for the fiscal conservative developments in child support 
and welfare to precede the social conservative developments?  
According to path dependency analysts of public policy, once a 
particular policy direction has been chosen, the costs of reversal are 
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high.352 In the context of the legal regulation and privatization of 
dependency through child support and welfare, the shift from fiscal 
to social conservatism has not required a reversal of public policy 
initiatives.  The institutional arrangements for the enforcement of 
child support, and for limiting welfare assistance remain in place.  
The social conservative initiatives currently under debate are intended 
as supplements, not reversals of these earlier policies.  Thus, it may be 
important to further analyze not simply the shifts between the relative 
power of these contesting conservatisms, but also to pay greater 
attention to the underlying institutional structures that may enable 
them.  Beyond the specific issue of the partial privatization of 
dependency within federal public policy, it would also be important to 
consider how these contesting conservatisms influenced the 
development of public policy as it affects the family in a range of 
other areas, from taxation to social security.  To what extent are 
similar contestations being played out in different arenas of legal 
regulation?  While the extraordinary influence of conservative 
political discourse in the last several decades has become a common 
place observation, its nuances, conflicts and cleavages are a rich and 
unexcavated resource for those interested in the development of law 
and public policy, of the family and beyond. 
 
                                                          
 352. See, e.g., Paul Pierson, Increasing Returns, Path Dependence and the Study 
of Politics, 94 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 251, 252 (2000) (defining path dependency as “once 
a country or region has started down a track, the costs of reversal are very high.  
There will be other choice points, but the entrenchment of certain institutional 
arrangements obstruct an easy reversal of initial choice.”) (citing Margaret Levi, A 
Model, a Method and a Map: Rationale Choice in Comparative and Historical 
Analysis, in COMPARATIVE POLITICS: RATIONALITY, CULTURE AND STRUCTURE 28 (Mark 
Lichbach & Alan Zuckerman eds. 1997)). 
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